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ABSTRACT 
Rural development has become a v i t a l issue to most less developed 
countries and internat ional organisations during the recent past. The 
United Nations has declared the 1970's and 1980's to be "development" 
decades. Agr icu l tu ra l development constitutes the main backbone f o r 
rura l development and together wi th other supportive social po l i c i e s , 
rural development can pave the way to national development. 
In t h i s thes is , the rura l development problem i s stated and i t s 
objectives are analysed, p a r t i c u l a r l y with respect to a centrally-planned 
economyin the. in t roduc t ion . The Study examines c r i t i c a l l y PDRY's 
experience i n i t s ag r i cu l t u r a l and rura l development, based on a 'balanced 
growth' s trategy, during the past decade. I t looks into the pros and cons 
o f various ag r i cu l t u r a l po l ic ies on agr i cu l tu ra l production and rural 
development. The Study examines a l l ag r icu l tu ra l i n s t i t u t i ons in the 
country and envisages the role played by the planning machinery and 
i t s consistency wi th p o l i t i c a l and administration structures in the 
country. I t also makes an assessment of the horizontal investment on the 
ag r i cu l tu r a l sector and assesses i t s impact on the agr icu l tura l production. 
In a separate section the Study evaluates a l l agr icu l tura l pol ic ies 
and t h e i r repercussion on ag r i cu l tu ra l and rura l development. I t examines 
a l l changes i n current pol ic ies and the i r relevance to both the producer 
and the consumer. 
Rural integrated programmes are also considered by the Study to 
show a new consolidated approach to rural development. Three major 
projects are examined i n th i s section to evaluate th i s approach and 
assess i t s relevance to the issue. 
In the conclusion the whole experience of PDRY's agr icul ture and 
rura l development is evaluated i n terms of successes and f a i l u r e s and a prop-
osed s t rategy, v e r t i c a l l y in tegrated, i s set f o r fu tu re agr icu l tu ra l and rura l 
developffient wi th spec i f i c Ideas on each aspect. 
i i 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
At independence i n 1967, the rural population of the Peoples 
Democratic Republic o f Yemen (PDRY) consti tuted 80% of the to t a l popul-
at ion of the country. The then per capita income was only US$ 110 with 
a very low produc t iv i ty i n the t r a d i t i o n a l agr icu l tura l sector. Thus, 
PDRY was c l a s s i f i e d - by a l l internat ional organisations - as one o f the 
(1) 
least developed of developing countries, one having to adopt rural 
development pol ic ies wi th meagre resources. A t y p i c a l less developed 
country (LDC) can generally be characterised by ma lnu t r i t i on , i l l i t e r a c y 
and poverty owing to overwhelming rural problems such as under-unemployment, 
low p r o d u c t i v i t y , lack o f social services, poor t ransportat ion, lack o f 
capi ta l and machinery and, above a l l , social oppression and exp lo i t a t ion . 
In terms o f in ternal incomes, highly skewed patterns o f income d i s t r i b u t i o n 
are o f ten found with the top 20% of the population of ten receiving; f i v e 
to ten times as much Income as the bottom 40%. In terms of product ivi ty 
more than 7 o f the world 's population in LCDs is producing only 15% of 
world output . Pa r t i cu la r ly important on the income side, the t h i r d world, 
with almost 70% of the world's population, subsists on less than 20% of 
the world 's income.^^^ 
Economic and social forces , both internal and external , are respons-
i b l e f o r the poverty, inequal i ty and low product iv i ty that characterise 
most LDCs. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's almost a l l national and 
in ternat ional e f f o r t s tended to solve "development" problems by indust-
r i a l i s a t i o n . Some countries achieved desirable growth rates because of 
t h e i r r i c h resource endowment but had aggravated rural problems. The 
growth rates achieved were accompanied by many economic and social ev i l s 
such as greater income inequa l i t y , high i l l i t e r a c y and death rates, and 
poor p roduc t iv i ty . 
The rural development issue, therefore , has become the focus of 
in teres t o f a l l LDCs and internat ional organisations. The 1970's and 
1980's have been declared the development decades whereby a l l e f f o r t s 
were to be focussed on rura l development o f the t h i r d world. 
Various rural development strategies and policies have been adopted 
by many LDCs but very few o f them have been thought to be successful. 
In c e n t r a l l y planned economies, the rural development Issues have been -
r e l a t i v e l y speaking - taken most seriously and even so some success 
achieved In the Issue at the expense of other factors in the economy. 
I t is the preference of national p r i o r i t i e s that determine ul t imately 
the success o f rural development objectives and programmes. 
The objectives of rura l development have been best i l l u s t r a t e d by 
Sur ta j Aziz as fol lows 
"To organise, develop and u t i l i s e the available resources of land, 
water and manpower i n such a manner that the entire rural 
population dependent on these resources has an equal (or at least 
an equitable) opportunity to meet, as a minimum the i r basic 
needs o f food, c lo th ing and shelter with reasonable f a c i l i t i e s f o r 
education and health and can l i v e together in a posi t ive and healthy 
social environment".(^) 
With respect to these objectives in rural development and to PDRY's centra l -
planned economy, th i s thesis w i l l u t i l i s e i n ,pa r t i cu l a r , t he Chinese model 
on rura l development which w i l l be analysed i n b r i e f below. 
According to Aziz 's analysis , the most Important element o f the 
Chinese model is an equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of land and other rural resources 
I f these resources are unevenly d i s t r i b u t e d , very few objectives can be 
achieved. Unemployment and the underut i l ised labour which are po ten t ia l ly 
avai lable i n rural areas must be f u l l y u t i l i s e d to get more benefits from 
i r r i g a t i o n schemes. Drastic land reforms in favour of the poorest segment 
o f the rura l population are thus the f i r s t essential prerequisite of 
a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d rural development. 
The second important element is the organisation of the rural popul-
ation f o r co l l ec t i ve or cooperative a c t i v i t i e s appropriate to the stage of 
development and to the level o f technology that has been reached. This 
would include a b i l i t y to mobilise unemployed and under-employed labour in 
various rura l a c t i v i t i e s : improving land, water-control p ro jec t , bui lding 
roads and even other c r a f t a c t i v i t i e s . I t would require gradual evolution 
of an i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework with respect to the gradual improvements in 
ag r i cu l tu ra l technology and practices. Land reform may reduce inequal i ty 
but by themselves can seldom lead to a sustained increase in agr icu l tura l 
production without some degree of c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n . A small farmer with 
a small p lot cannot own a tube-well or machinery, and without c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n , 
he is handicapped with production and technological l i m i t a t i o n s . Co l lec t iv -
i s a t i o n , therefore , has the advantages of labour mobi l i sa t ion , pooling of 
savings, and investable resources, uniform sharing of knowledge and tech-
nology, great specia l isa t ion and above-all a d i s t i n c t improvement in social 
re la t ionships . Out of a l l c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n forms, the most productive 
one i s the one which i t s units are communally owned by a l l t he i r members 
who develop t h e i r own arrangements fo r decision-making on such matters 
as cropping patterns, organisation of work and d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits 
w i t h i n the broad pol icy guidelines coming from above. What counts in 
c o l l e c t i v i s a t i o n i s , in f a c t , e f f i c i e n c y of labour and optimum scale 
to the par t i cu la r a c t i v i t y , and t h i s w i l l not come about without f u l l 
pa r t i c ipa t ion of each rura l member in the rural economy. 
The t h i r d element, stated by Aziz, is the d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of the 
rura l economy into a l l rura l a c t i v i t i e s : f i s h e r i e s , animal husbandry, 
i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s and other rura l c r a f t s . In a country with an 
abundant labour and land scarci ty these are bound to be unut i l i sed 
resources i f the whole population is t i e d to c u l t i v a t i o n . I t i s , therefore . 
very necessary to d iver t surplus labour to more f r u i t f u l a c t i v i t i e s . 
The d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n process, however, must be gradual but well-maintained 
to increase real rura l income. 
The four th important element in the model is the gradual, but active 
promotion o f a pol icy of social development. The expansion of social 
services such as education and health f a c i l i t i e s is c r i t i c a l l y important 
in human resources development and so is the nature o f social re la t ionship . 
Oppression and exp lo i ta t ion by the land-owner, the local o f f i c i a l or the 
middle-man are essential Ingredients o f poverty In many countries and these 
must be eliminated through land reforms, administrative reforms or other 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l , devices which not only Impose cei l ings on larger holdings, 
but also change the social and p o l i t i c a l relationships in the rural areas. 
A pos i t ive social s tructure Is needed to give d i g n i t y , self-respect and a 
sense o f pa r t i c ipa t ion in a healthy and dynamic social environment. 
F i n a l l y , the rural development framework must be linked to the rest 
o f the economy in I t s p o l i t i c a l and administrative structure i n order to 
resolve any c o n f l i c t s or differences inevi tab ly a r i s ing from d i f f e r e n t 
in te res t groups wi th in the community. The ult imate success of such 
strategy w i l l depend on the degree o f in tegrat ion of the p o l i t i c a l and 
administrat ive system o f a rural area wi th in the central p o l i t i c a l and 
administrat ive s tructure o f the society. 
Undoubtedly, t h i s model w i l l be successful only in an LDC which has 
a sound material base i n i t s rura l areas such as China or Ind ia , or even 
some Afr ican countries which have material and manpower in t h e i r rural 
areas. But in small countries such as PDRY which has a labour shortage 
as well as a poor material base at present, the model w i l l have some 
d i f f i c u l t i e s but in time w i l l d e f i n i t e l y achieve some success leading to 
bet ter social re la t ionship and rural Integrat ion wi th in the central 
sys te l f i^ f the socie ty; but I t s meagre resourees has created some gaps 
in I t s e f f o r t to achieve i t s material goals. ; 
The thesis is based on the author's experience i n the agr icu l tura l 
sector in PDRY f o r the past ten years (1973-1982) where she worked as a 
Planning d i rec tor f o r the agr icu l tu ra l sector in both the "Ministry of 
Planning' and the "Minis t ry o f Agricul ture and Agrarian Reform" fo r 
four years in each Minis t ry respect ively. She was also a head of the 
ag r i cu l tu ra l projects evaluation un i t in the Minis t ry of Agr icul ture . 
Regular f i e l d work has been accomplished by the author throughout the 
country and to aV!_ ag r i cu l tu ra l areas (at least 3 v i s i t s to each main wadi 
a year) . The author part ic ipated in the a c t i v i t i e s leading to most of 
the references quoted l o c a l l y or in t e rna t iona l ly and used in th i s thesis . 
F i n a l l y , two academic v i s i t s were made purely fo r th is thesis during the 
summer o f 1981 and in Apr i l 1982 in order to obtain more recent and 
up-to-date data. 
Within th i s context PDRY's agr icu l tu ra l and rural development during 
the past decade w i l l be examined c r i t i c a l l y and new proposals put forward 
f o r the author i t ies concerned to consider them fo r fu ture development. 
The theme of the thesis w i l l discuss the relevant issues in the 








w i l l include h i s to r i ca l background, the climate and the 
physical s tructure o f the country Cin Part One). 
w i l l discuss the t r a d i t i o n a l agr icul ture in South Yemen 
(Part Two), 
w i l l discuss the e f f o r t f o r and machinery of agr icul tura l 
transformation and rural integrat ion in seven sections : 
a preliminary section on the administration of agricul ture 
and rura l s t ruc ture , and six sections on the agr icul tura l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , 1,e. 
The administration of agr icu l tu ra l and rural s t ructure . 
I r r i g a t i o n 
Cooperatives 
State Farms 
2.5 : Research & extension 
2.6 : Agr icu l tu ra l Corporations 
2.7 : Agr icu l tu ra l Educational In s t i t u t i ons 
Chapter 3 : w i l l discuss investment pol ic ies and the i r e f f e c t on 
the performance of agr icu l tu ra l and rura l projects . 
Chapter 4 : w i l l discuss a l l agr icu l tu ra l pol ic ies : p r i c i n g , subsidies 
and taxa t ion , and w i l l analyse the i r influence on the 
ag r i cu l tu ra l production and labour. 
Chapter 5 : w i l l look in to the rural development aspects through 
three selected major projects f o r r u r a l integrat ion 
Chapter 6 : I : The Conclusion and ( I I ) The Recommendations 
1.1 Hi s to r i ca l background 
The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) Is one of the 
newly established states i n t h i s world. I t was established at the end 
of 1967 from the B r i t i s h Colony (Aden) and sixteen other dispersed 
Sultanates and Sheikhdoms which used to be cal led the B r i t i s h Protectorates 
i n South Arabia. The National Liberat ion Front got independence f o r the 
country a f t e r a four-year struggle (1963-1967). The Front was composed 
of d i f f e r e n t freedom f igh t e r s which could be c l a s s i f i ed in to a r i g h t and 
l e f t wing party. In 1967 leadership was mainly constituted of the r i g h t 
wing group which was overthrown by the l e f t wing of the Front on 22nd 
June, 1969. This has become to be known as the "Corrective Move" f o r the 
P o l i t i c a l Organisation of the National Liberat ion Front. The country 
witnessed stable p o l i t i c a l conditions f o r nine years u n t i l June, 1978 when 
the President was overthrown because of his over-powered handling of . the economy 
In October of the same year the Yemeni Soc ia l i s t Party was established 
to replace the Unif ied P o l i t i c a l Organisation o f the National Liberat ion 
Front. This Party,had the same Marxist-Leninis t ideology basis. A l l 
other s o c i a l i s t groups and part ies have been amalgamated wi th in i t . 
-7-
The economy of the country before independence was a colonial one 
wi th a d u a l i s t i c nature. The modern sector, based almost e n t i r e l y on 
servicing B r i t i s h ru le wi th i t s substantial m i l i t a r y base and Government 
in Aden f o r 129 years. The service sector was very active because of 
Aden Port , Aden Refinery and the f ree zone enjoyed by Aden. The remaining 
parts of the country were la rge ly rural areas where the population 
were engaged in t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s such as agr icu l tu re , f i s h i n g 
^ 4. . (5) 
and pasturing. 
The s ignif icance of the correct ive move in 1969 was brought about 
by the leaders' a t t i tudes and objectives towards developing rura l areas 
where economic p o t e n t i a l i t i e s were feas ib le . The Government introduced 
some dras t ic reforms in order to change the country's former colonial -
t r a d i t i o n a l economic and social s tructures. This included nat ional isat ion 
of fo re ign and major economic and f inanc ia l en t i t i e s and foreign trade 
and agrarian reform, which turned a substantial part of the cul t ivable 
land in to state and cooperative farms. 
Since then. Government pol ic ies have been geared to res t ra ining 
pr ivate consumption and to accelerate the rate o f capital formation 
which reached a high level of 31% of GNP in 1977 compared with less than 
two per cent i n 1970, Consequently, between 1973 and 1977, the country 
witnessed a substantial economic and social development with a GNP growth 
averaging 9.9% per year. However, despite t h i s progress in PDRY's economic 
and social f i e l d s , wi th such a low resources base, very low level of 
consumption, low produc t iv i ty and growing imbalance in commodity trade, the 
Government is fac ing an enormous and challenging task which is v i r t u a l l y 
impossible to accomplish without a substantial amount of assistance from 
the in ternat ional community, commensurate wi th th i s formidable task.(^^ 
PDRY population i s estimated at 1.9 m i l l i o n in 1980 and growing at 
about 2!6% annually i fhei country5 With a 1979 ^er eapit-a ihgome eStlfnated 
at SYD 120 or US$ 320 i s considered one of the poorer countries i n the 
world. The problems facing the country are enormous, but the most 
formidable one is i t s very low base of natural resources 
Although density of population i n PDRY is low compared to popul-
ations i n least developed countries i t i s d i f f i c u l t to provide basic 
social services because of scattered and widely dispersed habitats and 
ca l l s f o r highly expensive investment in physical and social infras t ructures . 
See F ig . 1 showing densely populated areas i n each Governorate in 1978. 
1.2 (a) Physical Structure 
PDRY is located i n the South Western par t of the Arabian Peninsula 
in Western Asia, extending over a t e r r i t o r y about 337,000 sq.kms., 
including i t s is lands. The country i s mountainous and generally poor i n . 
natural resources. Oil was discovered i n March 1982 but needs f i v e 
years at least f o r f u l l explorat ion. The country lacks permanent water 
streams and i s bas ica l ly dry . Agr icu l tu ra l production, consequently, is 
l i m i t e d to scattered areas "wadis" of 700,000 acres i r r iga ted by short-, 
seasons spate and the l imi t ed ground water resources. Presently, PDRY 
major resources are i t s considerable f i shery resources, i t s excellent 
habour of Aden and r e f i ne ry and a talented labour force of whom a 
s i g n i f i c a n t number are working abroad and t ransfer r ing back some remit-
tances to t h e i r f ami l i e s residing i n the country.(^^he country i s divided 
in to s ix Governorates; each governorate i s divided in to 4 muderiates 
(Hadhramaut has s ix ) and each muderiate, i n t u r n , i s divided in to three 
to four centres (F ig . 2 ) . 
(b ) Climate 
PDRY has three c l ima t ica l regions : 
( i ) The coastal region, 
( i i ) The mid-a l t i tude region, and 






The c l i m a t e i s t r o p i c a l w i t h mean annual temperature ranging 
between 30°C - 40°C, 20°C - 30°C and zero - 20°C i n each reg ion 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . The coas ta l p l a i n s are hot and humid i n the summer 
(80-85 ) , bu t i n the w i n t e r they are cool and much less humid ( l ess 
than 50 ) . 
( c ) A g r i c u l t u r e 
The d r y , a r i d c l i m a t e o f PDRY does not encourage a g r i c u l t u r a l 
a c t i v i t y . The c u l t i v a b l e area i s est imated a t about 700,000 acres 
c o n s t i t u t i n g on l y ]% o f the t o t a l area o f the coun t r y . Out o f t h i s 
c u l t i v a b l e area on l y between 200-250 thousand acres are c u l t i v a t e d 
annua l l y ma in ly by the spates o f the e x i s t i n g 4 main wadis and 14 subs id -
i a r y wadis i n the c o u n t r y . Today 72% of c u l t i v a t e d areas depend on spate 
i r r i g a t i o n and 28% on w e l l - i r r i g a t i o n . 
Before independence, most a rab le land was under feudal con t ro l and 
the peasant earned very l i t t l e o f the r e t u r n , e i t h e r i n cash or i n k i n d . 
A g r i c u l t u r a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s were few and na tu ra l a g r i c u l t u r a l problems 
represented by l i m i t e d water resources and the s a l i n i t y o f both s o i l and 
water made a g r i c u l t u r a l prospects very l i m i t e d . The wors t na tu ra l 
problem i n a g r i c u l t u r e was the i r r e g u l a r i t y and u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f 
f l o o d s o r droughts o f the spa tes . The f o u r major wadis : Abyan, Tub an , 
Hadhramaut and Beihan are main ly cha rac te r i sed by s w i f t and short -season 
f l o o d s which sometimes des t roy eve ry th ing i n t h e i r way - v i l l a g e s , 
l i v e s t o c k , farms and even br idges and roads as happened r e c e n t l y i n the 
Spr ing o f 1981 and 1982. These f l oods come tw i ce a y e a r , A p r i l and August, 
and owing t o i n e f f e c t i v e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s such as dams, we i rs or canals 
most o f the spate goes t o the sea. 
Major crops are c o t t o n and bananas i n coasta l areas (Tuban and 
Abyan) p lus o the r ce rea l s such as sorghum, maize, m i l l e t and sesame 
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and f r u i t s and vege tab les . In the h i n t e r l a n d wheat and o t h e r cerea ls 
are a lso grown, p lus vegetables and f r u i t . Most o f the vegetables and 
f r u i t are new crops in t roduced a f t e r independence. Tobacco i s a lso grown 
i n coas ta l areas where the c l ima te i s m i l d e r . 
The mode o f p roduc t ion was very t r a d i t i o n a l before independence; no 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ex i s t ed and the re was no machinery. Rural l i f e was l ack ing 
a l l s o c i a l f a c i l i t i e s and r u r a l markets were h i g h l y f ragmented. Together 
w i t h na tu ra l problems the Yemeni peasant was insecure and i n constant 
f e a r o f h i s l i v e l i h o o d being ma in ta ined . Faced w i t h these problems, the 
Government i n i t s plans ( the T r i e n n i a l Plan 1970/71-1972/3; the F i r s t 
F ive Year Plan (FFYP) 1974-1978 and the c u r r e n t amended Second Five 
Year Plan (SFYP) 1981-85) has been g i v i n g top p r i o r i t y to i r r i g a t i o n 
schemes as a bas is f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s . The Government has 
a lso r e a l i s e d t h a t these l i m i t a t i o n s are too severe t p b r i ng about 
any p r o f i t a b l e aspects i n a g r i c u l t u r e and t h e r e f o r e a l l costs o f these 
expensive i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s are t o be t r e a t e d as sunk-cos ts . 
The a g r i c u l t u r a l sec to r i s a l so r e s t r a i n e d by man-made l i m i t a t i o n s 
such as i n e f f i c i e n t management, l ack o f techno log ica l know-how, m is -
a l l o c a t i o n o f i n p u t resources , misusage o f mechanisat ion and inadequacy 
o f c ropp ing p a t t e r n s . The new r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o l i c i e s have on one hand 
eased c e r t a i n aspects i n l a n d - t e n u r e , c ropp ing p a t t e r n s , d r i l l i n g boreho les , 
l a n d - l e v e l l i n g , machinery i n t r o d u c t i o n , ex tens ion serv ices and t r a i n i n g 
o f management, but on the o the r hand added, o r r a the r c rea ted , o ther 
problems which w i l l have t o be discussed i n t h i s t h e s i s i n the appropr ia te 
s e c t i o n s . F i g s . 3 & 4 d i s p l a y c u l t i v a t e d and p o t e n t i a l - c u l t i v a t e d areas. 
The Government's investments i n the T r i e n n i a l Plan amounted t o 
32 m i l l i o n d ina rs f o r which 39% o f i t s a l l o c a t i o n was f o r road cons t r uc t i on 
t o connect a l l r u r a l areas w i t h the Cap i ta l (Aden). The r e s t o f the 
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f a c i l i t i e s m a i n l y ) . Only about 86,000 d inars was a l l o ca ted f o r a g r i c u l -
t u r a l suppor t as w i l l be discussed i n Chapter 3. A l l investments i n t h i s 
p l a n , t h e r e f o r e , were i n r u r a l a reas. S i m i l a r l y , i n the FFYP, a high 
p r o p o r t i o n o f investment was i n t r a n s p o r t and communication sectors and 
soc ia l se rv i ces f a c i l i t i e s to support the r u r a l development and a 
l i m i t e d amount f o r a g r i c u l t u r e . 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f PDRY today cons is t s o f s i x teen 
m i n i s t r i e s and two Sta te Committees, a l l o f which come under the Premier 
S u p e r v i s i o n . The M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e and Agrar ian Reform (MAAR) i s 
the major m i n i s t r y i n terms o f resources and manpower. Each m i n i s t e r 
and head o f a State Committee i s respons ib le f o r the func t i ons o f h i s 
m in i s t r y / commi t t ee t o the Pr ime-Min is te r and the Cabinet . The Cabinet 
i s the u l t i m a t e execu t i ve body f o r a l l Governmental a c t i v i t i e s . The 
h igher Pub l i c Counci l headed by the Pres ident i s a l e g i s l a t i v e body f o r 
the Government's a c t i v i t i e s . 
The P o l i t i c a l S t r u c t u r e had the rea l power t o lay-down and moni tor 
Government p o l i c i e s by i t s c e n t r a l Committee. The P o l i t i c a l S t ruc tu re 
i s a py ramid ica l s t r u c t u r e headed by the 7-9 Pol i t -Bureau members who 
are respons ib le f o r a l l p o l i c y issues discussed by the cen t ra l committee. 
The s e c r e t a r i a t o f the c e n t r a l committee has several departments, each 
being headed by a s e c r e t a r y . The S e c r e t a r i a t , a t the reg ion i s represented 
by a Par ty s e c r e t a r y who moni tors and f o l l o w s - u p pa r t y a c t i v i t i e s i n the 
r e g i o n . S i m i l a r l y , the S t a t e ^ i s represen ted , a t reg iona l l e v e l , by a 
Governor who i s appointed by Premier S t a t u t e . I t i s the coherence between 
the f u n c t i o n s o f both the Par ty Secretary and the Governor t h a t mainta ins 
r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y i n r u r a l a reas . 
The m i n i s t r i e s , i n t h e i r t u r n are a lso represented by t h e i r u n i t s 
i n the reg ion and a l l o f f i c i a l s i n the reg ion are i n t e g r a t e d under the 
Governor 's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
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The p lann ing machinery i s o f c e n t r a l nature and i s , p r i m a r i l y , 
respons ib le f o r a l l developmental programmes throughout the coun t r y . 
S i m i l a r t o any m i n i s t r y , i t has i t s pyramidic s t r u c t u r e i n a l l r eg ions . 
I t coord ina tes i t s a c t i v i t i e s w i t h a l l m i n i s t r i e s and corranittees through 
p lann ing u n i t s i n the m i n i s t r i e s and i t s p lann ing u n i t s i n the reg ions . 
Strong l i n k s are mainta ined among a l l s t r u c t u r e s : p o l i t i c a l , p lanning 
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CHAPTER 2 
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF MAAR 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f the MAAR i s headed by the M i n i s t e r 
who has the u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the sector to the Premier. He has 
two deput ies both respons ib le f o r the nine departments i n the M i n i s t r y . 
The f i r s t deputy " f o r I r r i g a t i o n and Corpora t ions" has the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r the main f ou r depar tments , namely : the DIME, the Corporat ions 
department wh i ch , i n t u r n , superv ises the f i v e A g r i c u l t u r e Corporat ions 
(Abyan Board, Tuban Board, PCMVF, P o u l t r y & A F ) , the Man-power Department, 
and the Finance & A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Department. The second deputy " f o r 
Planning and Produc t i on " i s respons ib le f o r the o ther f i v e departments, 
namely : the Planning & S t a t i s t i c s Department, the Cooperatives 
Department, the S ta te Farms Department, the Research & Extension 
Department and the Animal Product ion D e p a r t m e n t . ^ 
At reg iona l l e v e l the M i n i s t r y i s represented by an A g r i c u l t u r a l 
Department which has a pyramidic s t r u c t u r e o f the cen t ra l m i n i s t r y 
i . e . a l l departments ' r ep resen ta t i ves are encompassed a t the reg iona l 
l e v e l . The d i r e c t o r o f the A g r i c u l t u r a l Department comes under the 
M i n i s t e r ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y d i r e c t l y but coord inates the department 's 
f u n c t i o n w i t h the Governor on the one hand and w i t h cen t ra l department 
i n MAAR on the o t h e r . 
A g r i c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s a r e , p r i m a r i l y , coord inated v ia the p lanning 
department i n MAAR and u l t i m a t e l y by the "Consu l t ing body" which gathers 
monthly a l l general d i r e c t o r s o f a l l depar tments, regions and corpora t ions 
under the Chairmanship o f the M i n i s t r y to d iscuss h igh l y r e l evan t issues 
such as investment and p roduc t ion p l a n s , p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s , p r o j e c t s ' 
problems, t r a i n i n g and any immediate issues to be reso lved . 
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2 .2 IRRIGATION 
The most impor tan t f u n c t i o n a l department i n the M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c -
u l t u r e and Agra r ian Reform (MAAR) i s the Department o f I r r i g a t i o n and 
Mechanical Engineer ing (DIME) which i s regarded as the main agent o f the 
MAAR i n i t s a g r i c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . I t i s a massive department o f 
about 7,500 employees and t echn i ca l s t a f f . 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f the DIME i s governed by the MAAR 
Law issued r e c e n t l y i n 1980. (Decree No . l2 ) This l e g a l i s e s the p re -
e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e . The DIME i s headed by a t echn i ca l D i r e c t o r General 
who comes under the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the Deputy M i n i s t e r f o r I r r i g a t i o n 
a c t i v i t i e s . U n t i l 1980 the department was d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e main 
sec t ions namely : sur face w a t e r , underground wa te r , secondary i r r i g a t i o n 
p r o j e c t s , meteoro log ica l and mechanical eng ineer ing s e c t i o n s ; and th ree 
o the r sec t i ons f o r accoun ts , maintenance and personne l . An i r r i g a t i o n cent re 
i s annexed to the Department. The cent re runs a two-year course t o t r a i n 
i r r i g a t i o n techn ic ians t o a s s i s t i n i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s throughout the 
c o u n t r y . Th is absorbs about 40 Secondary schoo l - leavers annual ly and 
i s run by a w e l l - q u a l i f i e d team o f l e c t u r e r s r e c r u i t e d both l o c a l l y and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . 
The sur face water sec t i on i s again subdiv ided i n t o sub-sect ions 
which deal w i t h r e c l a m a t i o n , canal work , maintenance, s o i l conse rva t i on , 
spate i r r i g a t i o n and s i m i l a r a c t i v i t i e s . 
The underground water sec t i on i s p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h d r i l l i n g 
o f w e l l s , c a s i n g , c l e a r i n g and deepening and r i g maintenance. 
The secondary i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s sec t i on i s respons ib le f o r 
maintenance o f e x i s t i n g i r r i g a t i o n s t r u c t u r e s l i a b l e to f l o o d / s p a t e 
damage. I t holds gab ions , cement and machinery t o be a v a i l a b l e a t any t ime . 
The me teo ro log i ca l s e c t i o n runs a l l the meteoro log ica l s t a t i o n s 
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i n the wadis and r e l e v a n t a g r i c u l t u r a l a reas . (There are about 17 s t a t i o n s 
a l t o g e t h e r ) . Gauging s t a t i o n s f o r r a i n f a l l and spates are meant t o g ive 
warning to i r r i g a t o r s t h a t a heavy spate or r a i n i s on i t s way to s p e c i f i c 
areas which r e q u i r e p r i o r p r o t e c t i o n . 
The mechanical eng ineer ing sec t i on was es tab l i shed r e c e n t l y (1979) 
i n the department. This sec t i on i s i n techn ica l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e charge 
o f a l l machinery r e n t i n g s t a t i o n s (MRS) and M i n i s t r y workshops i n the 
coun t r y . 
P o l i c i e s and S t ra teg ies 
P o l i c i e s i n respec t o f i r r i g a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s are the cornerstone o f 
p o l i c y towards the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . They s t ress the u t i l i s a t i o n o f 
a l l a v a i l a b l e a rab le land i n the coun t r y . Both MAAR and the p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t y have emphasised the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an adequate i r r i g a t i o n i n f r a -
s t r u c t u r e which w i l l improve the cond i t i ons o f a g r i c u l t u r a l and u l t i m a t e l y 
w i l l improve r u r a l a reas . 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f i r r i g a t i o n i n a g r i c u l t u r e i s due to the f a c t 
t h a t water resources are very l i m i t e d and represent the main c o n s t r a i n t 
on a g r i c u l t u r a l development. Furthermore about 72% o f the a g r i c u l t u r e 
depends on spate i r r i g a t i o n , but spates are o f t e n so i r r e g u l a r i n t im ing 
and d i r e c t i o n t h a t t h e i r usefu lness i s unpredictableC^^When the spate i s 
s t rong and s w i f t i t damages every th ing i n i t s course : v i l l a g e s , 
l i v e s t o c k and farms. When i t i s meagre, there i s l i t t l e e f f e c t and 
drought c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l . These i nc i den t s are q u i t e f requen t i n South 
Yemen a g r i c u l t u r e and the main p o l i c y , t h e r e f o r e , i s t o s t rengthen the 
i r r i g a t i o n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e by b u i l d i n g dams and wei rs i n the main v a l l e y s 
and e s t a b l i s h i n g i r r i g a t i o n networks and gauging s t a t i o n s to ensure 
the minimum necessary i r r i g a t i o n i n r e l e v a n t a reas . I r r i g a t i o n i n recent 
years has been r e i n f o r c e d by a new p o l i c y , namely the making o f hydro-
l o g i c a l and topograph ica l s tud ies p r i o r t o any engineer ing c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
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Th is p o l i c y has been adopted f i r s t l y because many ad hoc i r r i g a t i o n p ro jec t s 
f a i l e d and, second ly , because prev ious s tud ies had not recognised the need 
f o r l ong - te rm i n f o rma t i on on spate courses and t h e i r d i v e r s i o n s . 
In respect o f we l l / g round water i r r i g a t i o n , t he p o l i c y up to 1978 
was t o d r i l l as many w e l l s as poss ib le f o r S ta te farms,cooperat ives and 
the Nat iona l Water Co rpo ra t i on . For State farms the number of deep we l l s 
d r i l l e d up t o 1980 was 353 and f o r cooperat ives 207 deep we l l s and over 
500 open sha l low w e l l s . This i s shown i n t a b l e 2.1 and 2.2 and d i sp lays 
the number o f deep w e l l s d r i l l e d i n each Governorate by the DIME up to 
1977. Since 1978, the p o l i c y has changed somewhat whereby d r i l l i n g i s 
on l y t o be mainta ined i n a g r i c u l t u r a l areas where there i s no danger o f 
reduc ing resources f o r d r i n k i n g water . There has been a concent ra t ion 
o f d r i l l i n g i n L a h e j , Abyan and Hadhramaut a reas , the most a g r i c u l t u r a l 
areas i n the c o u n t r y , but because Aden C i t y draws i t s d r i n k i n g water 
from Lahej a rea , t h i s reg ion i n p a r t i c u l a r has been g r e a t l y a f f e c t e d by 
over -exhaus t ion o f d r i l l i n g water f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes. As a r e s u l t , 
the a q u i f e r i s now a f f e c t e d by s a l i n i t y due t o sea i n t r u s i o n and t h i s 
endangers d r i n k i n g wa te r . Consequent ly, the Government p r o h i b i t e d 
any f u r t h e r d r i l l i n g i n the area f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l purposes. 
Other p o l i c i e s f o r groundwater i r r i g a t i o n were ; encouragement 
o f s p r i n k l i n g i r r i g a t i o n , replacement o f a group o f shal low we l l s by a 
deep w e l l and r e g u l a r maintenance f o r o l d deep w e l l s . 
I r r i g a t i o n s t r a t e g i e s , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , have not been very successful 
because, so f a r , they have had a h o r i z o n t a l p a t t e r n . With a count ry l i k e 
South Yemen - l a rge i n area and i r r e g u l a r i n r e l i e f - a huge sum o f 
m a t e r i a l resources w i l l be needed to i nves t i n a l l o f i t s 18 wadis f o r an 
adequate i r r i g a t i o n system. Owing t o the l i m i t e d resources Invested 
i n them most o f the i r r i g a t i o n schemes so f a r es tab l i shed are not adequate 
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Table 2.1 No. o f Wells (Deep & Shal low) and t h e i r Condi t ions 







Working Out-of Tota l 
order 
ADEN 16 8 24 •3 - 3 
S.F. 16 8 24 3 - 3 
Coops - ~ — 
LAHEJ 68 6 74 306 8 
314 
S.F. 59 6 65 10 1 n 
Coops 9 9 296 7 303 
ABYAN 161 30 191 1157 852 2009 
S.F. 99 26 125 7 2 
9 
Coops 62 4 66 1150 850 2000 
SHABWA 53 ]1 68 439 476 
S.F. 37 9 46 3 . - 3 
Coops 16 6 22 436 37 
473 
HADRAMOUT 180 23 203 2021 42 
2063 
S.F. 77 16 93 - • 
Coops 103 7 110 2021 42 
2063 
AL-MAHARA - - - 200 200 























Source : Product ion Plan 1980/81 - MAAR 
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Table 2.2 Number o f Wells D r i l l e d by Governorate 
(1971/72 - 1976/77) 
Governorate 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 '1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 Tota l 
1s t - - -
i 
18 7 25 
2nd . 38 22 20 21 14 n 
126 
3rd 27 37 28 19 16 34 161 1 i 
1 
4 th 8 3 22 19 24 15 
91 
5th 19 28 33 13 16 • 
35 144 
6 th - - - 5 . 5 
! 
— — — 




Source : Department o f I r r i g a t i o n , M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e and 
Agrar ian Reform. 
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t o w i ths tand the heavy and s w i f t spate t h a t may be expected to occur a t 
any t ime and very o f t e n i r r i g a t i o n schemes are l o s t i n t h i s way. Last 
summer (1981) an unexpected spate swept over Del ta Abyan des t roy ing a 
cons iderab le amount o f an i r r i g a t i o n network which had been made dur ing 
the l a s t 5 y e a r s . I t destroyed the whole dam which had served the area 
(3) 
f o r the l a s t 28 yea rs . Between A p r i l 1981 and A p r i l 1982 a new design 
was made to w i ths tand a huge spate o f about 4,000 cubic metres per second, 
but i n A p r i l 1982 a spate came to the area est imated a t about 5,000 cubic 
metres per second des t roy ing p r a c t i c a l l y every th ing i n the wad i , roads, 
b r i d g e s , l i v e s t o c k and v i l l a g e s . I t was the m o s t t e r r i b l e d i s a s t e r 
(4) 
ever seen i n the area. 
Though the h o r i z o n t a l s t r a t egy adopted by the Government i n order 
t o reach a l l areas e q u a l l y has not proved to be very success fu l , i t was 
unavoidable g iven the concern w i t h broader issues such as equ i tab le 
reg iona l development, m i g r a t i o n c o n t r o l and r u r a l development. 
Methods o f I r r i g a t i o n - su r face-water 
I t has a l ready been i nd i ca ted t h a t 72% of c u l t i v a b l e land i s 
i r r i g a t e d by spate i r r i g a t i o n . This i s mainly channel led to th'e coop-
e r a t i v e s l a n d . The sur face water i s est imated to be 1,400 m i l l i o n cubic 
metres per annum and i s cha rac te r i sed by i r r e g u l a r i t i e s and 
(5) 
u n c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y . The main sur face water areas w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d . 
The Tuban and Abyan wadis are i r r i g a t e d tw ice a year - i n A p r i l and 
a t the end o f August . The sources o f Wadi Tuban are i n North Yemen 
namely f rom Wadi Agan and Wadi Warayan as we l l as o the r secondary 
wad is . The source o f Wadi Abyan comes main ly f rom the highlands o f 
Lahej Governorate. Both Wadi Hassan and Wadi Bana sweep over 
Abyan D e l t a . The phys ica l s t r u c t u r e o f Wadi Tuban f a l l i n t o a g rea t 
r i f t th roughout the Governorate from nor th to south where the wadi 
gets d i v i d e d i n t o two d i s t r i b u t a r i e s : Al-Wadi A l -Kab i r ( the b ig 
v a l l e y ) and Al-Wadi A l -Sagh i r ( the small v a l l e y ) ; In the Tuban area^ 
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one dam and seven d i v e r t i n g we i rs have been es tab l i shed to spate f o r a 
few days on even hours , but most o f the spate s t i l l goes to the sea. 
O v e r a l l , ba re l y 1% o f the water can be e f f e c t i v e l y exp l o i t ed f o r c u l t i v a b l e 
l a n d . 
Abyan Wadi has a s i m i l a r - i f not worse - cha rac te r . There has 
on ly been one dam b u i l t and maintained f o r the past 28 years from the 
B r i t i s h occupat ion u n t i l l a s t y e a r , 1981, when i t was destroyed by an 
unexpectedly heavy spa te . 
Both wad is , p r i m a r i l y , regu la te the co t ton crop product ion but 
w i t h some subs id i a r y ce rea ls and o ther crops such as sorghum, m i l l e t , 
vegetables and f r u i t s i n most o f the coopera t i ves . 
Wadi Hadhramout i s the t h i r d l a r g e s t wadi i n the country and 
i r r i g a t i o n observa t ion show t h a t once every f o u r years the spate comes 
h e a v i l y and s w i f t l y , des t roy ing eve ry th ing i n i t s way. In 1976 i t 
washed away a whole Sta te farm and some surrounding v i l l a g e s i n Qam 
area . I t s i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n i t s course are apparent . I t f lows f o r 
about 250 km. from the mountains o f the h i n t e r l a n d o f Hadhramout 
Governorate t o A l - S h i h e i r - passing through var ious d i s t r i b u t a r i e s i n the 
a rea . Wadi I d i m , Du 'an , A l - A i n and Amd are among the most s i g n i f i c a n t 
wadis feed ing the g rea t Wadi Hadhramout which consists , of 120,000 
ac res o f i r r i g a b l e l a n d . Cereal crops such as wheat, sorghum and 
m i l l e t are grown i n the wadi but dates are the dominant and the h i s t o r i c a l 
crop o f the wad i . Fodder and a l f a l f a i n p a r t i c u l a r has become i nc reas i ng l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n recen t y e a r s . Since 1976 i n t r o d u c t i o n o f vegetables and 
f r u i t have become more -important f o r the farmers i n the wadi owing to 
t h e i r h igher p r i c e s , r e l a t i v e l y speak ing, than some cereal c rops . Tomatoes 
and potatoes i n p a r t i c u l a r have been newly in t roduced and are r ece i v i ng 
more a t t e n t i o n than o the r c rops . Three main d i v e r t i n g weirs ha rd ly con t ro l 
the i r r i g a t i o n system i n the wad i . 
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M a ' i f a - Hagr area i s a coasta l area charac te r i sed by a perennia l 
spate i r r i g a t i o n which comes from spr ings i n Wadi-Hagr. From an 
i r r i g a t i o n po in t o f view the area i s idea l f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l expansion, 
but the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f the wadi requ i res heavy investment which could 
not y i e l d any r e t u r n f o r 20 years a t l e a s t , 
Wadi Beinan i s a major one i n the Shabwa Governorate ( f o u r t h 
Governorate) but i t has almost no e x i s t i n g i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a t a l l a t 
p resen t . A study o f the wadi i s being done now, f inanced by IDA o f the 
World Bank and executed by FAO. Crops such as wheat, sorghum and fodder 
are ma in ly grown on those patcnes o f land i n the wadi where water i s 
concent ra ted through i t s i r r e g u l a r course. 
Wadi H a i f a ' a i s another main wadi i n the coasta l pa r t o f Shabwa 
Governorate and i s more regu la r than the Beihan wad i . I n f r a s t r u c t u r e i s 
almost non -ex i s t en t but a b ig p r o j e c t v/as launched i n 1973 by the 
Government and ass i s ted by Hungary. Co t t on , vegetables and f r u i t 
are the p o t e n t i a l crops i n the wad i , i n a d d i t i o n . t o the cereal crops 
grown a t p resen t . 
There are a lso about ten o ther medium and small wadis such as 
Wadi Ahwar, Wadi A l - A z a r i q , Wadi Masi la and Wadi Nisab i n var ious par ts 
o f the c o u n t r y . 
The main method adopted i n spate i r r i g a t i o n i s to d i v i de the land 
i n t o small r ec tangu la r p l o t s o f less than an acre ( the m a j o r i t y o f 
p l o t s i n Tuban and Abyan areas are between 1/3 and 2/3 o f an acre) 
and a l l o w water to en te r v i a d i s t r i b u t a r y cana ls . In con t ras t the new 
areas a f f e c t e d by c e r t a i n b ig p r o j e c t s or progratflnieS, such as the Yemeni-
Russian programme,are p rope r l y l e v e l l e d and sub -d i v i ded ; each p l o t i s about 
3 acres c o n t r o l l e d manual ly when the spate i s passing through the 
main c o n t r o l l e d cana l s . 
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The t r a d i t i o n a l i r r i g a t i o n methods p rac t i ced by Yemeni farmers 
are not adequate f o r a modern, t ransformed a g r i c u l t u r a l system. Such 
small i r r e g u l a r p l o t s make mechanisat ion d i f f i c u l t . 
Ground water 
The ground water i r r i g a t i o n system i s p re fe rab le to the spate system 
f o r two reasons : f i r s t , i t i s c o n t r o l l a b l e by e i t h e r the fa rmer , the 
State farm or the coopera t i ve and secondly , i t i s , to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , 
guaranteed a t l e a s t f o r the medium and s h o r t - t e r m . A l l Sta te farms depend, 
p r i m a r i l y , on ground water i r r i g a t i o n wh i le cooperat ives use t h e i r ground 
water t o i r r i g a t e c u l t i v a b l e land f o r vegetables and f r u i t . As t a b l e 2.1 
shows i n 1980, the number o f deep w e l l s i n a l l Governorates was about 560 wh i le 
the re were 5055 shal low w e l l s . I t a lso d i sp lays the importance o f the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l areas namely Hadhramout, Abyan and Tuban r e s p e c t i v e l y . While 
S ta te farm land c o n s t i t u t e s on ly about 15% o f t o t a l c u l t i v a b l e l a n d , the 
t a b l e i n d i c a t e s the g rea te r s i g n i f i c a n c e of groundwater to State farms 
than t o coope ra t i ves . The average deep we l l i s about 60 metres i n depth 
and on l y i r r i g a t e s 50 ac res . This imp l ies t h a t on ly 28,000 acres are 
i r r i g a t e d by the deep w e l l s and not more than 50,000 acres by the shal low 
w e l l s , w h i l e the annual average area under c u l t i v a t i o n i s about 260,000 
acres and the t o t a l c u l t i v a b l e area i s about 750,000 acres . 
The main problem w i t h t h i s form o f i r r i g a t i o n i s i t s compet i t ion 
w i t h po tab le water i n c e r t a i n areas. Tuban area has the most impor tant 
a q u i f e r f o r both d r i n k i n g and a g r i c u l t u r a l water . D r i l l i n g f o r potable 
water f o r Aden C i t y s t a r t e d i n the ea r l y 1940 's . In 1981 the area had 
45 w e l l s f o r d r i n k i n g as we l l as 74 deep we l l s and 314 shal low w e l l s f o r 
a g r i c u l t u r e . Since 1977, s a l i n i t y ( f rom the i n t r u s i o n o f sea water to the 
a q u i f e r ) reached the potab le water r e s e r v o i r t h rea ten ing Aden C i t y and 
i t s suburbs. As a r e s u l t , as noted p r e v i o u s l y , the Government banned 
any f u r t h e r d r i l l i n g f o r MAAR i n t h a t a rea . Howey^rj the cooperat ives 
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and Sta te farms which needed more I r r i g a t i o n evaded the problem by 
r e p l a c i n g the small d i ese l engines o f deep we l l s by l a rge r ones. 
Despi te t h i s , we l l i r r i g a t i o n i s usefu l f o r vegetab les , f r u i t and 
o the r permanent crops such as f odde r , sorghum and other ce rea l s . I t 
rece ives h igh p r i o r i t y i n the investment p lan i n order to f u l f i l 
Government p o l i c y f o r r egu la r food supply i n the market. 
Machinery Renting S ta t i ons 
The MRS es tab l ishment was seen by the ' C o r r e c t i v e move' as 
a necessary step to sus ta i n the o b j e c t i v e s o f cooperat ives and State 
farms i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l sec to r . The work s t a r t e d when USSR provided 
the f i r s t 3 mechanical workshops i n the count ry (1970) ; t h i s was 
fo l l owed by the GDR w i t h 5 MRS,each es tab l i shed i n a la rge a g r i c u l t u r a l 
a rea , namely Lahej (Saber ) , Abyan ( G i a r ) , Modia, Ma i fa 'a and Seyoun; 
and the es tab l ishment o f e i g h t mechanical and maintenance workshops 
accomplished w i t h the ass is tance o f B u l g a r i a . Furthermore the MAAR 
has a l a rge workshop i n Aden (Dar-Sa'ad) f o r ma in ta in ing c a r s , mobi le 
v e h i c l e s , r i g s and o ther a g r i c u l t u r a l equipment. There are,1n t o t a l , 
17 MRS and workshops f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery and maintenance 
th roughout a g r i c u l t u r a l a reas. Table 2. 3 shows places of the MRS 
i n a l l Governorates and the manpower w i t h respect to t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n 
each one. The l a s t f ou r s t a t i o n s were under cons t r uc t i on dur ing the data 
c o l l e c t i o n f o r the s t a ted r e p o r t . Only the l a s t one (Scotrah) i s s t i l l 
under c o n s t r u c t i o n owing t o t r a n s p o r t a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
The MRS had become l e g a l l y recognised as commercial en te rp r i ses 
by law No. 14 of 1972. U n t i l 1980, a l l MRS had been se l f - adm in i s t e red 
and run by a very weak a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n c u r r i n g heavy losses and 
equipment d e s t r u c t i o n i n t h e i r e n t e r p r i s e s . Lack o f both experience and 
the t e c h n i c a l know-how i n the o v e r a l l management was respons ib le f o r the 
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Table 2.5 Manpower i n Machinery Renting S ta t ions 





Technicians Dr ivers Total 
No. % No. • % No. /J 
Saber Lahej 21 10 78 38 108 52 207 
A l - H a b i l a i n II 6 27 5 23 11 50 22 
Dala ir 11 31 16 46 8 23 35 
Giar Abyan 37 12 122 39 154 49 313 
Lodar II 38 21 73 40 71 39 182 
Ahwar II 13 16 23 28 47 56 83 
Modia II 18 31 19 32 22 37 59 
Laboos - - - - - - -
Maifah Shabwa 10 11 38 44 39 45 87 • 
Beihan II 17 19 22 25 50 56 89 
Nissab II 15 13 30 26 72 61 117 
Seyoun Hadhramout • 52 16 105 32 169 52 326 
A l -Qtn II - - - - - - -
Mai fa 'a -Hagr - - - - - - -




TOTAL 238 16 531 35 751 49 1500 
Source : Committee Report i n MAAR 
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(8) 
heavy losses o f ma te r ia l equipment. Table 2.4 . ind icates the q u a n t i t y 
o f machinery a v a i l a b l e i n the w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d MRS and workshops. With 
respect to the a v a i l a b l e machinery and equipment o f these MRS, the ideal 
s i t u a t i o n f o r the MRS manpower i s the f o l l o w i n g : 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e manpower 10% 
Technic ians on f i x e d equipment 30% 
" f o r mobi le equipment ( d r i v e r s ) 60% 
The a fore-ment ioned manpower t ab le o f the MRS shows t h a t the dev i a t i on 
from the idea l s i t u a t i o n i s not g r e a t ; but there are considerable va r -
i a t i o n s among MRS and workshops from one to the o t h e r , w i t h some o f the 
smal le r MRS having a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . There are 
s i m i l a r v a r i a t i o n s i n the maintenance o f f i e l d machinery. In genera l , not 
less than 40% o f var ious machinery i s out of o rder , though the c o n d i t i o n 
o f the machinery i s d e t e r i o r a t i n g owing to shortage o f techn ica l s t a f f 
and t o u n s k i l l e d use. Genera l ly speaking, however, one can measure the 
e f f i c i e n c y o f e x i s t i n g machinery and f i x e d equipment i n MRS and workshops 
from the f o l l o w i n g data : 
% o f each type i n working order 
D4 & bu l ldozers 62 
T rac to rs 63 
Cars and mobi le e q u i p e n t 58 
Fixed equipment 68 
Combines 50 
Var ious s tud ies and c r i t i q u e s o f MRS cond i t i ons have been made 
and forwarded t o the a u t h o r i t i e s concerned to take appropr ia te measures. 
A l l these c r i t i q u e s were c r y s t a l l i s e d i n the Nat ional Seminars f o r MRS 
which took p lace i n MAAR i n February 1980 and where f u l l d e t a i l s o f MRS 
c o n d i t i o n s were d iscussed. As a r e s u l t many steps have a l ready been taken 
t o improve MRS c o n d i t i o n s . The most c r i t i c a l one was annexing MRS to 
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the i r r i g a t i o n Department as one impor tant sec t i on o f the Department. 
P rev ious ly the MRS were s e l f - a d m i n i s t e r e d , but the most w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d 
ones such as MRS in Saber, Giar and Seyoun were admin is tered by Lahej 
Recons t ruc t ion Board, Abyan Development Board and Governorate admin-
i s t r a t i o n i n Seyoun d i s t r i c t r e s p e c t i v e l y . Today the MRS are under the 
f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the i r r i g a t i o n Department i n a l l aspects . In con t ras t 
to the prev ious lax and weak techn ica l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the MRS now have 
equal and cen t ra l a t t e n t i o n from a techn ica l team o f both loca l and f o r e i g n 
exper ts who respond immediately to the MRS requ i rements . 
(8) 
The f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n o f a l l MRS i s gene ra l l y very poor.^ 'Despi te the 
ass is tance the MRS rece ive from the Government , most o f them cont inue to 
be i n annual d e f i c i t . The main f a c t o r here i s the discrepancy between 
the r e n t i n g p r i c e and c o s t s . The MRS charge the State farms and the 
coopera t i ves a p r i ce f o r r e n t i n g machinery on an hour ly basis which f a l l s 
f a r below the cost o f f ue l a lone ( l e t a lone d e p r e c i a t i o n ) . This p r i ce 
was se t by the MAAR i n 1972 and desp i te f ue l p r i c e changes,MRS could not 
convince the a u t h o r i t i e s o f the need f o r h igher p r i c e s . As long as the 
Government kept on p rov id ing the MRS w i t h a stock o f new machinery and 
r e p l a c i n g the o l d s tock , there was l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e f o r the MRS to put 
t h e i r case e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y . I t was on l y r e c e n t l y (1980) t h a t new pr ices 
have been se t f o r a l l the var ious types o f machinery but they s t i l l a l l ow 
a n e g l i g i b l e p r o f i t to the MRS. So f a r a l l the debts of the MRS have been 
borne by the Government. A f r e s h s t a r t f o r the MRS was made i n 1981 
and changes are under way to l i f t t h e i r s tandard . A major t r a i n i n g 
programme has been launched f o r MRS s t a f f and techn ic ians a t var ious l e v e l s 
and a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the o l d account ing system i s being in t roduced i n 
MRS and workshops. But again so much i s needed since some problems remain 
untouched. 
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I r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s 
I r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s c o n s t i t u t e almost 75% o f the p ro jec t s in the 
(9) 
annual and f i v e - y e a r p lans . As f a r as investments are concerned, i r r i g a t i o n 
p r o j e c t s absorb between 60%-80% o f the a g r i c u l t u r a l t o t a l . In the e a r l y 
stage o f p l a n n i n g , not less than 80% used to be a l l o ca ted f o r i r r i g a t i o n , 
wh i l e a t present not l ess than 60% i s a l l o c a t e d f o r i r r i g a t i o n - apar t 
from the i r r i g a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s invo lved i n o ther p lan t or l i v e s t o c k p r o j e c t s . 
The i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s i n the f i r s t f i v e - y e a r plan (1974-78) cost 
SYD 32,493,800 out o f a t o t a l investment o f SYD 52,556,400 f o r the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l sec to r . The ac tua l spending on i r r i g a t i o n schemes was 
SYD 26,776,900 (62% ou t o f the t o t a l ac tua l spending o f SYD 43,382,000 i n 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l sec to r . A cons iderab le p o r t i o n o f these investments has 
been f inanced by b i l a t e r a l agreements and f o r e i g n a i d . 
Table 2 . 5 and 2 . 6 show the re levance o f i r r i g a t i o n p ro jec t s i n 
the investment p lans . The l a r g e s t i r r i g a t i o n scheme i s the excavat ion o f 
main and d i s t r i b u t a r y canals i n spate i r r i g a t e d areas i n Lahej and Ahwar and 
d r i l l i n g o f w e l l s w i t h land rec lamat ion i n Hadhramout and other areas as 
inco rpora ted i n the Yemeni-Russian programme. B a s i c a l l y the work invo lves 
excavat ion o f a main canal and d i s t r i b u t a r y canals on each o f Lahej and 
Ahwar areas to con t ro l the spate , es tab l ishment o f a dam w i t h a capac i t y 
to c o n t r o l water up to 2500 c. metres per second on e i t h e r s ide and 
d i v e r t i n g w e i r s , l e v e l l i n g and rec la im ing an area of about 22,000 acres 
and d r i l l i n g 55 we l l s i n Hadhramout. The programme has another 4-5 
s u b s i d i a r y i n t e g r a t e d p r o j e c t s namely : es tab l ishment o f a c e n t r a l work-
shop to ma in ta in Russian equipment; investment p r o j e c t s f o r completed 
l e v e l l e d areas and d r i l l i n g o f more w e l l s i n Hadhramout. 
The est imated cos t o f t h i s programme i n the second f i v e - y e a r plan 
(SFYP) i s not less than US$ 100 m i l l i o n (SYD 35 m i l l i o n ) . Other major 
p r o j e c t s are : Del ta Abyan p r o j e c t cover ing about 45,000 acres i n the 
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Table 2.5 I r ^ ru |a t ion Pro jec ts in the Second 
Five-Year Plan 1 979-83 
The P ro jec t 
Al l oca t i ons 
SYD 
Remarks 
1 . Del ta Abyan devp t . 4,000,000 To improve 5000 acres 
2 . Establ ishment o f main 
& d i s t r i b u t o r y canal 
16,500,000 To improve 26,500 acres 
3. Development o f Wadi Maifah 3,000,000 To improve 4,750 acres 
4 . We l l s ' d r i l l i n g & Land 
Reclamation in Wadi 
Hadhramount 
4,200,000 For 75 Wells & 4600 acres o f 
land l e v e l l i n g . 
5. Well d r i l l i n g ( i n o ther 
par ts o f PDRY) 
4,100,000 350 we l l s 
6. Fodder Farm i n Abyan 2,400,000 To cover 2900 acres 
7. Cotton Farm in Loder 2,000,000 To cover 2500 acres 
8. P i l o t Farms i n Abyan 1 ,000,000 To cover 1000 acres 
9. 
10. 
Centra l mainta inance 
workshop 
Devpt o f MRS 
1,600,000 
2,000,000 No o f MRS .& Workshops 16 
1 1 . Maintainance o f i r r i g a t i o n 
a l ready i n s t a l l e d 
1 ,800,000 
12. I r r i g a t i o n Centre Devpt. 150,000 
13. Secondary I r r i g n . Schemes 1,500,000 
14. S p r i n k l i n g I r r i g n . 280,000 P i l o t work 
15. Water Resources Study 2,000,000 
16. Other Studies 1,970,000 I r r i g a t i o n Studies f o r Hadramount 
(149,000 a c r e s ) , Nissals (16,610 
a c r e s ) , & Wadu Hagr (16,000 acres) 
17. P r o j e c t designs o f Wadis 
Beihan & Ma'adin 
250,000 
Source: 2nd F ive-Year .P i an (1 979-83) Document 
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Abyan a rea . This has cos t about US$ 25 m i l l i o n s ince 1971 and has been 
i n va in s ince the summer and sp r i ng spate o f 1981 and 1982 r e s p e c t i v e l y 
dest royed the whole work of the p r o j e c t . D r i l l i n g p ro j ec t s have been 
inco rpo ra ted i n plans throughout the sevent ies and w i l l cont inue i n the 
1980 's . Table 2,5 shows the concen t ra t i on o f d r i l l i n g a c t i v i t i e s i n the 
e a r l y 1970's i n the most r e l e v a n t a g r i c u l t u r a l areas namely Hadhramout, 
Abyan and Lahej Governorates r e s p e c t i v e l y . There are 12 other p ro j ec t s 
sca t t e red throughout a g r i c u l t u r a l areas conso l ida ted by l oca l and f o r e i g n 
e x p e r t i s e from var ious c o u n t r i e s . 
Eva lua t i on o f Performance 
From the above, DIME i s c l e a r l y one o f the main p i l l a r s o f MAAR. 
I t s t o t a l labour f o r c e i s est imated as 7,500 o f which there are not more 
than 30 t e c h n i c a l people and 50 a s s i s t a n t techn ic ians i n a l l the i r r i g a t i o n 
schemes a t the department. The o v e r a l l performance o f the i r r i g a t i o n 
schemes i s not very s a t i s f a c t o r y and not as much as was hoped f o r . The 
reasons f o r t h i s are a t t r i b u t e d to many complex f a c t o r s r e l a t e d to low 
e f f i c i e n c y o f manpower and m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s o f va r ious parameters a t 
p l a n n i n g , execut ion and superv i s ion l e v e l s . 
A t p lann ing l e v e l , most o f i r r i g a t i o n p ro jec t s f inanced b i l a t e r a l l y 
or by the Government had not been evaluated p r i o r to the implementat ion 
phase and had no f e a s i b i l i t y s t u d i e s . Investments were made a v a i l a b l e 
f o r any p r o j e c t prepared by the i r r i g a t i o n department. However, poor ly 
i n t e g r a t e d p r o j e c t s i n the i r r i g a t i o n f i e l d were not cons idered, but 
g e n e r a l l y , a t the e a r l y s t age , i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s were not r e l a t e d to each 
o t h e r . Th is r e s u l t e d i n much waste i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e manpower. Secondly, 
m i s c a l c u l a t i o n i n investments o f t e n took place r e s u l t i n g i n repeat ing the 
p r o j e c t i n every p lan i n form o f f i n i s h i n g - u p or expanding the p r o j e c t . T h i r d l y , 
programming o f the p ro jec t -phases had always been a problem f o r p lanning 
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owing to u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n f o r e i g n f i n a n c e . More impor tan t i s the problem 
o f de lay o f some f o r e i g n coun t r i es and agencies i n f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r 
pledges to c e r t a i n p r o j e c t s . There was a s i x month delay i n Delta Abyan 
p r o j e c t be fore s ign ing the agreement w i t h f o r e i g n f und ing . Wadi-Tuban 
p r o j e c t i s another example which su f f e red 18 months delay i n i t s 
s t a r t i n g d a t e . 
At implementation l e v e l , problems are numerous but the major ones are 
as f o l l o w s : 
(a) The lack or shortage o f t echn ica l manpower i n p ro jec t s creates 
severa l d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r f o r e i g n expe r t i se and consu l tan ts who main ly 
implement the p r o j e c t on s i t e s . 
(b ) P r o j e c t schedules are o f t e n i n t e r r u p t e d by the involvement o f 
several a u t h o r i t i e s , or by delay i n equipment a t the appropr ia te t ime . 
( c ) T rans fer o f e i t h e r manpower on the job or o f equipment to o ther 
s i t e s o f t e n i n t e r r u p t s the work p a t t e r n o f the team. 
(d) Other r e l a t e d agencies do not always f u l f i l t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s 
towards i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s . 
(e ) Spare par ts o f equipment have been a problem i n a l l k inds o f p ro jec t s 
and can ha rd l y be solved under a c e n t r a l i s e d market system. 
( f ) Shortage o f labour f o r c e i n such a c t i v i t i e s i s qu i te common. High 
i n c e n t i v e s , t h e r e f o r e , has been the on ly outcome f o r t h i s problem but 
a t the expense o f o the r a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o j e c t s i n l i v e s t o c k or i n State farms 
(g) P ro j ec t management s t i l l s u f f e r s ser ious d e f i c i e n c i e s and u n f o r t -
una te l y the Department has to g i ve up i t s key techn ica l s t a f f f o r p r o j e c t 
management owing to the cons iderab le amount o f investment being put i n a 
s p e c i f i c p r o j e c t . Thus the Department s u f f e r s two crosses : i n s u f f i c i e n t 
management ( f rom a ' p r o p e r ' management p o i n t o f v iew) and a loss o f an 
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i r r i g a t i o n man from the s i t e . 
(h) High dep rec i a t i on o f machinery and equipment such as r i g s and 
combines before making optimum use dur ing t h e i r l i f e - s p a n . 
There a r e , however, o ther minor but impor tan t problems i n the 
i r r i g a t i o n f i e l d such as s to rage , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f machinery to promote 
areas and equipment c lea rance . A l l these r e s t r i c t the department 's 
a c t i v i t i e s t o a c e r t a i n ex ten t but the scale of the problem has been 
reduced as t ime has gone by. 
At supe rv i s i on l e v e l , the above problems are r e f l e c t e d i n the 
c e n t r a l department a c t i v i t i e s and consequent ly i n f l uence supe rv i s i on . 
Del ta Abyan Development p r o j e c t i s superv ised e n t i r e l y by the D i r e c t o r 
General o f the DIME who has a great bu lk o f d a i l y work i n mon i to r ing and 
runn ing the department a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y and f i n a n c i a l l y . Very few lucky 
p r o j e c t s are monitored and superv ised by sound techn ica l personnel , but 
even these personnel are i nvo lved i n v o l u n t a r i l y w i t h other committees' 
works. Th is imp l i es t h a t the marginal e f f i c i e n c y o f superv is ion i s pu l l ed 
down by the d i v e r s i o n o f t h e i r e f f o r t s e lsewhere. 
In c o n c l u s i o n , i r r i g a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s are very impor tant f o r 
a g r i c u l t u r a l development i n the PDRY and t r u l y represents the backbone 
o f a sound a g r i c u l t u r a l s t r a t e g y . They do, however, requ i re heavy and 
susta ined ma te r i a l resources f o r they are i n such d i f f i c u l t phys ica l 
c o n d i t i o n s . A f r u i t f u l and meaningful p o l i c y would have been to ensure 
t h a t i r r i g a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s were more h i g h l y concentrated on c e r t a i n 
s p e c i f i c areas r a t h e r than have been sca t te red a l l over a g r i c u l t u r a l 
a reas . However, a concent ra ted p o l i c y imp l i es a v e r t i c a l s t r a tegy i n 
correspondence w i t h o the r socio-economic p o l i c i e s . 
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2.3 COOPERATIVES 
The coopera t ive movement i n PDRY e f f e c t i v e l y s t a r t e d a t the beginning 
o f the independence era i n 1968 when the f i r s t Agra r ian Reform Law was 
i ssued . The movement was cons idered , t hen , as an i n t e g r a l par t o f the 
soc ia l ph i losophy adopted by the newly -es tab l i shed S ta te . In 1970, the 
Agra r ian Reform Law was amended so t h a t coopera t ives became regarded as 
the p r i n c i p a l agency f o r r u r a l development i n the count ry and in 1972 
the coope ra t i ves ' law was i ssued . This governs cooperat ives estab l ishment 
and o r g a n i s a t i o n and provides the lega l basis f o r a l l types of a g r i c u l t u r a l 
and n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l cooperat ives.^^^^ 
Land Reform 
The Agra r ian Reform Law o f 1970 abo l ished the t r a d i t i o n a l share-
cropping systems and se t c e i l i n g s on p r i v a t e - h e l d land o f 20 acres of 
i r r i g a t e d land and 40 acres of n o n - i r r i g a t e d l a n d . Land i n excess o f 
these c e i l i n g s was t o be e x p r o p r i a t e d . A l l con f i sca ted and expropr ia ted 
lands were vested i n the State f o r redevelopment as product ion cooperat ives 
or Sta te fa rms. The coopera t ive farms were to be a l l o c a t e d to land less 
a g r i c u l t u r a l workers , poor fa rmers , and c i t i z e n s who had migrated i n t o the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l area e i t h e r from the c i t i e s or the dese r t . 
S t ruc tu re 
Since t hen , about 44 a g r i c u l t u r a l cooperat ives have been es tab l i shed 
compared w i t h some 85 n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l coopera t ives ( f i s h e r i e s , i n d u s t r i a l 
and consumer c o o p e r a t i v e s ) . The s ize o f a coopera t ive va r ies between about 
5,000-15,000 acres depending on i t s l o c a t i o n and i t s f e r t i l i t y . The 
t o t a l number o f coopera t ives members i s about 39,000 w i t h an average 
o f 800 members per cooperat ive.^^^ ^ 
Most coopera t ives are i n f o u r main v a l l e y s : Abyan, Tuban, 
Hadhramout and Beihan and depend main ly on spate i r r i g a t i o n . Only 28% 
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of the c u l t i v a t e d land i s i r r i g a t e d by ground-water and t h i s supply i s 
l i m i t e d as coopera t ives have very few a r t e s i a n w e l l s and many shal low 
we l l s w i t h no more than 30 f e e t i n depth as i nd i ca ted in t ab le 2.1 
(3 maps are at tached on cooperat ives on the three major wadis o f Abyan, 
Tu^Jan and Hadhramout). 
There are two types o f cooperat ives : 
( i ) Serv ice Cooperat ives 
In t h i s category the members farm t h e i r own p l o t s i n d i v i d u a l l y , 
wh i l e the coopera t ive organises supp l ies and serv ices on t h e i r beha l f . 
The m a j o r i t y o f coopera t ives i s o f t h i s t ype . 
( i i j P roduc t i on -be rv i ce Cooperat ives 
In t h i s category some or a l l members are grouped i n t o small "p roduc t ion 
u n i t s " (between 5-20 members). The members o f p roduc t ion u n i t s pool t h e i r 
land and l a b o u r , and share the costs and the income of the u n i t . The 
coopera t i ves are i n o the r respects l i k e those i n category ( i ) , p rov id ing a 
se rv i ce t o a l l members whether farming i n d i v i d u a l l y or i n product ion u n i t s . 
In the n a t i o n a l Law on c o o p e r a t i o n , t h i s type o f cooperat ives are seen as 
" t r a n s i t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s " i n which cooperat ive product ion can be encouraged 
and developed. This t y p e , however, e x i s t s main ly in.Wadi-Hadhramout.^^^ 
The coopera t i ve f u n c t i o n s to t h e i r members are summarised as fo l l ows :^^^^ 
procurement and d i s t r i b u t i o n o f seeds, f e r t i l i s e r s and i n s e c t i c i d e s , 
p r o v i d i n g seasonal c r e d i t , i n cash or k i n d , f o r inputs and labour , 
p r o v i d i n g pumps and o c c a s i o n a l l y , o ther equipment on l ong - te rm, 
supp ly ing machinery serv ices e i t h e r us ing the coopera t i ves ' own 
equipment o r h i r i n g from machinery r e n t a l s t a t i o n s and 
t r a n s p o r t , s torage and market ing o f fa rmers ' p roduct . 
Cooperat ives a lso c o l l e c t t h e i r fees and State taxes from members. 
A coopera t i ve i s managed by a managing board c o n s t i t u t e d of a manager, 
an accountant and between seven and f i f t e e n e lec ted members, depending on 
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the size of the cooperative. The Manager and the accountant are the only 
two members appointed and paid by the Government. Other members of the 
managing board are paid by the cooperative. 
Cooperative Policies 
The policies for cooperatives are laid down by the Party authorities 
and adopted by the Government represented by MAAR. The general policy has 
been the promotion of a l l cooperatives so that they play a positive role 
in national development by enlarging the public awareness of the benefits 
of cooperation, by u t i l i s ing a l l resources effectively to increase production 
and by creating a se l f - re l iant sp i r i t in rural areas. Two more specific 
objectives have been laid down for cooperatives, namely : 
( i ) To achieve a sustained development in production of food and agro-
industrial crops to meet the requirements of both a growing population and 
growing local industries. 
( i i ) To raise the standard of l iv ing of the peasant in social and economic 
terms via the cooperatives and other progress insti tut ions so that advantages 
of these new inst i tut ions for social transformation can be shown. 
To achieve and sustain these general aims, the Government adopted other 
macro and micro-policies for the cooperatives. The major policies are as 
fol1ows:-
(a) In formulating projects for the Plans, pr ior i ty is given to those 
agricultural and economic projects which wi l l serve the cooperatives directly 
or indirect ly (e.g. i r r igat ion schemes and rural highways). 
(b) All agricultural requirements ( fe r t i l i se rs , seeds and chemicals) are 
to be provided at 50% of their cost, (this policy was effective unt i l 1979 at 
which time a high portion of subsidies was removed). 
(c) The establishment of Machinery Renting Stations (MRS) was intended, 
pr imari ly, to serve the cooperatives. Sixteen of these MRS are scattered 
a l l over the country; each one serves a group of cooperatives and State farms 
available in a wadi. 
(d) AIT extension services and inst i tut ional training schemes are provided 
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free of charge to farmers and cooperatives management staf f . 
(e) The cost of a l l levell ing and d r i l l i ng act iv i t ies and canals' excav-
ation are met by the Government. 
However, the Government also has to f u l f i l i t s obligation to the 
nation by ensuring the supply of food at reasonable prices, so i t fixes 
the prices of each food item throughout the country without consideration 
of the variations in productivity or costs of these products in various 
areas. The Government, represented by MAAR, also lays down the production 
plan of food and crops with respect to the requirements of the population 
and local industries and regulates the importation of food (which s t i l l 
covers the bulk of the nation's requirements). 
The major emphasis in the cooperatives' policies have not changed 
or even been influenced by current changes as cooperatives are seen as so 
' important a form for social transformation and therefore have to be encouraged 
at any cost. However, various micro-policy changes have been taking place. 
At pol i t ica l level , the cooperatives in their early stages were 
po l i t i ca l l y oriented most of the time. The reason for this was the speed 
of the change that took place in the agrarian reform with respect to the 
pre-feudal system prevail ing. Peasants who benefitted from the land of 
Sultans and Sheikhs did not feel f u l l y entit led to the land so they had 
to be motivated po l i t i ca l l y to acquire confidence. After a few years of 
independence and part icular ly since 1972, the cooperatives had become 
po l i t i ca l l y well-established and so the emphasis was on the increase of 
production via new technology. High Yield Varieties (HYV) and mechanisation. 
An increase in production was quite noticeable up to 1975-76 but thereafter 
i t increased at a declining rate and by 1978 agricultural production of some 
basic crops was declining. 
In reaction to th i s , the agricultural authorities agreed to new 
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measures, the most important of which were to provide more rewards for 
achievements such as increased labour wages in the agricultural sector, 
release some of the 'st icky' price policies that had been going on for 
7 years and allow some freedom to cooperatives in marketing their products. 
The agricultural output i s , pr incipal ly, assessed by the performance 
of the "Production Plan" in which the cooperatives have the highest share. 
All agricultural policies are, ult imately, reflected in the Production Plan 
and i t s effectiveness. I t i s , therefore, important to examine the 
production plan mechanism befoi^ e evaluating agricultural output in 
cooperatives. 
The Production Plan is prepared annually (July/June) by the Production 
Plan Committee (P.P.C) and is reviewed quarterly. The Production Plan 
Committee is headed by the deputy Minister for Planning and Production in 
MAAR and has the following members : the Director of Planning & Statistics 
Department in MAAR as a Secretary, the heads of both planning and stat ist ics 
sections of the Planning Department, Directors General of Cooperatives, 
State farms and Animal Production Departments, agricultural Directors in 
regions, representative of Farmers Union, representative of the party, 
representative from the Ministry of Planning, General Director of PCMVF 
and some farmers' representatives from both State farms and cooperatives. 
The PPC draws out a proposed plan with respect to demand and available 
resources of area, water, equipment and labour. With a sketch of a proposed 
production plan, the PPC goes down to every region discussing the plan with 
a l l farms and the majority of farmers. Amendments are made on the f inal 
draft and each State farm or cooperative is bound by the plan which 
allocates areas for each crop in each farm. The PCMVF which markets a l l 
output through i ts receiving and reta i l centres, is also bound by the plan 
to market a l l farmers ' output in cooperatives. This gives security to the 
cooperative farmer in marketing his sales. Often there are losses in 
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marketing operations due to bad handling or inadequate storage and transport 
and these are settled by the Government in the form of subsidies. However, 
despite this re l ie f in marketing operation, the cooperative farmer seemed 
to be less contented with the whole centralised mechanism of production 
which involved "Sticky Prices" for his output, centralised marketing and 
pre-planned cropping pattern. 
The experience of over-centralisation has been proved unsucc-
essful and consequently some changes took place in 1979 when some farm-gate 
prices of some items have risen and a certain portion.of marketing process 
decentralised. Both State farms and cooperatives, today, are required to 
f u l f i l the production plan target and to grow beyond the plan's target 
any crops they l i ke . The PCMVF is entit led to market the plan's targets 
only. Non-basic items such as salads and cabbages are to be marketed by the 
cooperatives or State farms direct ly to consumers. These relaxion policies 
have been in i t ia ted to act as incentives to them. 
Evaluation of Performance 
In the face of the general problems, cooperatives have not been able 
to f u l f i l production targets at the planned rate. On average, the production 
plan would have been f u l f i l l e d at 50% and,, at best, 67% of the planned 
targets. The reasons for this are summarised as follows: 
(a) Productivity of both labour and crops in the cooperatives has not 
been progressing as was hoped for . On the one hand, the 'st icky' pricing 
policy and the lower wages in agriculture have been responsible for dis-
couraging farmers from attaining high productivity in labour and crops. But, 
on the other, cul t ivat ion has not been carried out by ski l led farmers 
at large scale. Most of the cooperatives' farmers are tradit ional and used 
to old cropping patterns. The new techniques of using f e r t i l i se r s , seeds, 
insecticides and machinery which are demonstrated by ski l led and technical 
-47-
agricultural s taf f are seldom followed by some tradit ional farmers. Of 
course sa l in i ty and dry climate influence crop productivity but prices 
and labour shortage worsen the situation. Whereas tomato productivity in 
Bulgaria is 28 tons per acre, i t is only 5-7 tons/acre in PDRY. Similarly, 
in other crops, large gaps have to be covered on productivity i f production 
is to be increased. 
(b) A lack of agricultural f ac i l i t i es stands as a bottleneck to agric-
ultural expansion. Extension services have been emphasised in a l l agricultural 
plans to be provided, primari ly, to the cooperatives throughout the country. 
An extension centre was established in 1971 to t ra in local farmers and 
peasants on their f ields and at the centre on various extension fac i l i t i es 
provided most of the time free of charge by the Government. In practice 
many peasants and farmers appreciate these fac i l i t i es but fa i l to keep up 
with instructions given. Another problem was that extension services were 
very weak up to 1975 owing to the lack of technical staff in this f i e l d . In 
fact the absence of an integrated extension system in the agricultural 
structure was the main defect of rural development strategy. I t was quite 
late when the authorities started to give significance to i t in MAAR. 
The credit f ac i l i t i e s have, to some extent, eased some farmers' 
problems. The Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) provides credit fac i l i t i es 
to farmers at 2% interest rate. Unfortunately, the records show that • 
hardly 10% of these loans are paid o f f . Apparently as the ADF is an organ 
f 12) 
of MAAR, farmers do not take i t s restrict ions and regulations seriously.^ ' 
While the Industrial and Agricultural Credit Department of the National 
Bank of Yemen (NBY) provides credit f ac i l i t i es to farmers or cooperatives 
at 5-6% interest rate and maintain a lo t of restrict ions in granting loans, 
their records show satisfactory repayments by cooperatives and farmers. 
This is due to the fact that the NBY has more experience in lending 
f ac i l i t i e s and the follow-up performance of loans at f i e ld level . 
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(c) Management of cooperatives has been another l imit ing factor in 
cooperatives' growth('^^To enhance pol i t ica l motivation in rural areas and 
among farmers and peasants, cooperatives' managements were, primarily, 
pol i t ica l ly-or iented. This was an inevitable stage in the agrarian and 
col lect iv isat ion changes. Management training for cooperatives only 
started in 1971 with the establishment of the Cooperative Insti tute 
(financed by the Government and the UNDP and executed by the ILO and 
some technicians from GDR). The Inst i tute has been providing short, 
medium and long-term courses, varying from 3 weeks to 2 years. Training 
on cooperatives' management, book-keeping and accounts are the main subjects 
in each programme. The cooperatives standards have improved to some extent 
in terms of rural management but they s t i l l need better management to 
cope with various development stages the country is passing through 1n 
various f ie lds . 
(d) Wages are another element depressing agriculture In both cooperatives 
and State farms. The majority of cooperatives are of type I where farmers 
either own or benefit from their land and during harvest or sowing time they 
hire labour. Unfortunately, as a typical LDC, agricultural labourers 
receive very low wages, while wages in other sectors and in rural areas are 
extremely high. Owing to the fact that PDRY suffers a labour shortage, i t ~ 
is very l i ke ly that labourers w i l l d r i f t to other non-agricultural sectors 
such as construction which pays not less than ten times the agricultural 
wages. This problem has been met by the Government several times and 
agricultural wages have risen twice since 1978 so far from an average wage 
of SYD 19-21 to SYD 43-50 per month, but they are s t i l l , far below other 
(8) 
competing sectors. 
(e) A prices policy came about to balance the positions of both the 
producer and the consumer. But as time went on, the consumer's economic 
condition has been improving with r is ing wages and various labour 
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opportunities on his way while the farmer's position with unchanged prices 
over a longer period did not improve. Thus the prices policy (with 
•imposed taxes) favoured the consumer rather than the producer. 
Final ly there is another category of factors responsible for the 
relative inefficiency of the cooperatives In rural development compared to 
that hoped for at an earl ier stage. F i rs t l y , agricultural objectives 
have been highly ambitious. Indeed In the early seventy's, the agricultural 
expansion was spectacular but agricultural objectives continued to be 
unrealist ic by expecting, for instance, a growth rate of 12% for the 
agricultural sector,^whereas good growth rates achieved i n Third World countries 
are'of the order of 5^. Secondly, the revolutionary leaps adopted by 
the authorit ies concerned did not allow a smooth and sustained development 
process for the cooperatives!^^Intervention by various pol i t ica l authorities 
in cooperatives' management weakened the democratic administration hoped 
for in cooperatives. As a result of a l l these complicated factors many 
agricultural labourers have l e f t the agricultural sector and no longer 
depend upon i t as the main source of their l ivel ihood. They have sought 
jobs in other nearby sectors and maintained their plots for part time work. 
Even the authorities have begun to lose confidence in the cooperatives 
capabil i t ies to supply adequate food for the nation and recently various 
alternatives in the cooperatives approach and organisation have been 
under discussion. 
2.4 STATE FARMS 
Origins 
The establishment and expansion of State farms in PDRY is closely 
t ied with the corrective move of 1969 which led to the execution of the 
Agrarian Reform Law in the country. The State farms are composed of the 
land in excess of the ceilings allowed for privately-held lands. Most of 
-50-
the confiscated arable was bQre-land ( i . e . virgin cultivable land) in major 
wadis. The Government levelled these areas and established most State 
farms on them. 
Structure 
By 1975, the Government had established about 41 Plant State farms 
and 6 Dairy State farms in the country, but these were, then, reduced 
to 33 Plant State farms by the amalgamation of the small ones into nearby 
cooperatives (a l i s t of the State farms in a l l Governorates is in the 
Appendix ) . The dairy State farms were scheduled to expand, but did not 
and remained as they were. The areas of State farms vary but, in general, 
they f a l l between 500-3,000 acres each. The total area of al l State farms 
In the country is approximately 30,000 acres - some 20% of the total 
cult ivated areas in PDRY. Unlike the cooperatives, the State farms depend, 
mainly on ground-water resources for permanent i r r igat ion which is required 
for vegetables and f r u i t . 
The State farms are regarded as the most dist inct ive form for 
agricultural transformation and for this reason they are given more attention 
and higher pr io r i ty than the cooperatives. For example, proper land-
level l ing and land-planning for State farms have been emphasised in each 
annual plan of MAAR and Party meetings. 
Policies 
The ruling Party often stresses the encouragement and promotion of 
the standard of State farms to ensure a regular supply of vegetables 
and f r u i t to the nation which could make the country sel f -suf f ic ient . This 
has been the main general objective of State farms, stressed by both the 
Party and the bitate. The other subordinating objective for the establishment 
of State farms was to in i t i a te a sophisticated social Inst i tut ion run by the 
State to help in the economic transformation of the rural areas. 
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The policies adopted to f u l f i l such objectives were various. F i rs t l y , 
the Government took f u l l responsibil ity for the physical in i t ia t ion of the 
State farms, level l ing their whole areas to a modern standard. Secondly, the 
main continuing policy for State farms has been the financing of a l l the 
required investment in the f i r s t 2 years by the Government. In practice, 
for reasons to be discussed below, the Government is continuing to fund 
a great deal of investments beyond the 2-year period with an average of a 
mi l l ion dinars annually, apart from other subsidies involved In agricultural 
inputs. Thirdly, the Government has been subsidising fe r t i l i se rs and 
chemical prices for State farms at a rate of 50%. In many cases State farms 
get their agricultural requirements free of charge (such as machinery, pumps 
etc.) in the form of a development project within the investment plan. 
Fourthly, and more s igni f icant , the Government d r i l l s a l l the wells and 
excavates the canals for the State farms, even beyond the two-year i n i t i a l 
period i f expansion is needed and more wells are required. Similarly 
with mechanisation, the State farms own a l i t t l e or some machinery 
( t ractors, ploughs, t ra i le rs and sprayers) which the Government provides 
in the investment programme. In most cases, current maintenance of wells, 
for example, is done free of charge by agricultural authorit ies. Thus State 
farms enjoy top p r io r i t y and better f ac i l i t i es than cooperatives with 
respect to Government investment. F i f th l y , State farms products are marketed 
by the PCMVF which takes the responsibil ity for marketing operations through-
out the country. Thus State farms do not have to think of storage and 
marketing problems. 
Final ly, the MAAR provides a l l extension, credit and training 
f ac i l i t i e s to State farms. Owing to tneir l imited areas compared to 
cooperatives, extension fac i l i t i es are more effective and f ru i t f u l - especially 
in. those State farms in proximity to main towns and research centres. As 
far as training is concerned, relat ively speaking, i t has more impact 
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on State farms than in cooperatives as the agricultural labourer who 
receives wages is more able to change practices than the peasant whose 
income is direct ly tied to his land's and family's production. 
Against a l l these above-mentioned advantages for State farms, the 
Government has laid down certain obligations for State farms. The most 
important one has been the prior ODligatlon of cult ivating vegetables and 
f r u i t and only then other cash crops ( i f any) as allocated by the Production 
Plan. The second one has been the f ix ing of farm-gate prices of a l l crops 
produced by State farms at levels such that the State farms are expected to 
get some pro f i t and the consumer pays reasonable prices for his requirements 
of vegetables and f r u i t . The th i rd obligation is that the State farms must 
sell a l l i t s products to the PCMVF at the controlled prices and not allowed 
to sell i t s production to a th i rd party. However, in 1979 when a portion 
of the marketing process was decentralised. State farms could sell non-basic 
items such as carrot, cabbages and salads to consumers on the free market 
and to sell the production beyond the Plan's targets also to consumers, 
as do cooperatives. 
Current changes 
After 10 years (1969-78) i t has been realised that State farms have 
not f u l f i l l e d the expected objectives for which they were established. 
Various evaluations have been carried out to pin-point the restr ict ing 
factors responsible for their fa i lu re , and as a result a new approach in 
policy has been adopted for State farms. ^''^ 
At po l i t ica l level , i t was realised that State farms, functioning 
as public enterprises, had been spoiled to a great extent by the heavy 
Investment and subsidies made by the Government to them and any further 
expansion would only add more fai lures to preceding ones. Consequently, 
a rest r ic t ive policy has been suggested to le t State farms stand on their 
own feet l ike any other commercial venture. 
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In view of the limited financial resources available for other sound 
national projects, the Government has restricted agricultural investment 
in State farms. Any further d r i l l i ngs , repairs or maintenance have to 
be met out of the farms' revenues. Subsidies on fe r t i l i se rs and insect-
icides are to be stopped. On the other hand, incentive policies have 
been worked out for State farms to improve their own economic conditions. 
Agricultural wages have changed twice since 1977 to allow some 
incentives for agricultural labourers. Today they have almost doubled 
compared to 1976 levels to keep labourers in the sector. 
Prices of basic items have also risen by about 100% to give more 
income to State farms and cooperatives and they are also allowed to market 
any surpluses at market prices. They have continued to use machinery 
at less subsidised rates from MRS for their farming operations. 
Above a l l , the Government at least has stopped thinking of State 
farms expansion in terms of numbers or in acreage. Rather, i t thought of 
eliminating some of the hopeless State farms in very remote areas and 
either handing them to private holders or amalgamating them into one large 
State farm as in Fayoosh area of Wadi-Tiiban where 3 State farms became 
one recently. 
Evaluation of Performance 
The performance of State farms overall had many ups and downs 
but, in general, they did not perform as was hoped. In mid-1978, a 
financial evaluation was made for State farms for 1977/78 and found that 
36% made some p ro f i t , 31% made permanent def ic i t and 33% just covered their 
expenditures, while an amount of roughly one mil l ion dinars was offered 
by the Government as a subsidy to State farms during that period. 
The Dairy State farms have been in an even worse situation as 
their circumstances are complicated inasmuch as most of their requirements 
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are imported at a heavy cost. Up to 1978 hardly any of them could even 
cover their running expenditures. With milk prices very low and meat 
prices control led, while fodder prices were spiral l ing upward internally and 
abroad, dairy farms continued to be a burden on the Government. 
There are many factors restr ict ing State farms' development such 
as low wages, sticky prices, natural problems, inefficiency of management, 
shortage of labour and low productivity. All these factors have already 
been discussed in the cooperatives section, but the following factors 
are thought to be more c r i t i ca l to State farms than to cooperatives. 
While the cooperatives management is an elected one, the State farms' 
management is an appointed one based on technical merits rather than the 
po l i t i ca l merits (or supposed to be so). In the early 1970's, one could 
hardly allocate a technical graduate to a State farm or a cooperative while 
there were many big projects in the agricultural sector looking for 
graduates. The State farms, therefore, were l e f t to be managed by trad-
i t ional farmers who could hardly absorb the management lessons of sophisticated 
administration. Even at a later stage, with discouraging conditions 
prevailing in State farms and cooperatives, no one would fo r fe i t a good 
opportunity in urban areas to work in a rural one. Thus poor management 
conditions in many State farms were reflected on production quantity and 
qual i ty. Today not more than 8 graduates are State farm managers, but the 
Government Is looking ahead to replace traditional managers with 
quali f ied ones. 
The other important factor is the agricultural labourers' wages. 
Unlike the cooperative peasant or farmer who owns or benefits from the land 
and can spare some time working at something else and s t i l l farm his land, 
he depends to ta l ly on his wage. He is tied to the State farm he works for , 
so long as his wage and other benefits in the State farm are better than 
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he can get in the labour market. I f the labour market provides him with 
better chances, he w i l l desert the State farm and go elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, many agricultural labourers have l e f t the State farms 
for better conditions and wages in other sectors. Despite the rise in 
agricultural wages recently, other competing sectors have been too strong 
to leave the agricultural sector in peace as wages in other sectors have 
also been r is ing rapidly, especially in construction where an ordinary 
worker gets 10-15 dinars a day compared to 2-3 in agriculture. Since 
1977 even Government projects throughout the country started to take 
agricultural labourers away from rural areas to work at other non-
agricultural ac t iv i t ies . In other words, the diversif ication of rural 
areas in various act iv i t ies has not favoured the agricultural sector and 
never w i l l owing to an overall shortage of labour which characterises 
the country. Any further expansion in other sectors in rural areas w i l l 
only be at the expense of the agricultural sector in terms of labour. 
Productivity in State farms has the same problem as in cooperatives. 
However, in general, although i t is low, i t is a l i t t l e better than the 
cooperatives in many crops but considering the more favourable factors 
they enjoy in terms of extension, demonstration plots and expertise, they 
are not doing as well as they should be. I t is worth mentioning, however, 
that fodder productivity is very high and recently i ts production exceeded 
the production plan ce i l ing, often at the expense of other basic crops. 
This is due to the fact that fodder production has no controlled market 
neither in price nor in production owing to the fact that a large sector 
of livestock are in private hands. 
' Finally the last factor to be pinpointed is that the relationship 
between State farms and other Government agencies outside agriculture is 
very poor. Such a relationship influences State farms act iv i t ies causing 
delays and a poor response to their needs. For instance, dairy farms 
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need proper roads to main towns so that milk reaches the factory (in Aden) 
in good condition. In practice. State farms must deal directly with road 
construction authorities for such jobs but owing to the poor management 
of State farms, the department of State farms in MAAR arranges a l l action. 
Dally contacts, however, are inevitable during the implementation stage 
between State farms and the road authorities but neither side can work 
with the other without the involvement of central authorit ies. Some State 
farms which are managed by good technical and capable managers need not 
involve central or higher authorities in their contacts with other 
Governmental agencies. 
In conclusion State farms have become important in Party l i terature 
and Government plans and have been considerably fostered in agricultural 
plans and investments. Their objectives have been partly f u l f i l l ed as a 
sophisticated social framework for the economic transformation of rural 
areas, but most economic objectives were too high to be f u l f i l l e d in such 
a short time and under a tradit ional farming system. The revolutionary 
leaps in respect of State farms' promotion were very unrealistic given 
the prevailing rural si tuat ion. The contradiction between a highly 
controlled system and personal incentives to farmers was obvious. Individual 
incentives cannot be stated in Plans' figures or planned for as the 
agricultural authorities thought. Over-investment in rural areas with a 
shortage of labour was not a rational policy since i t created rural divers-
i f i ca t ion but at the expense of agriculture. Rural imbalance has been the 
main problem of PDRY in i ts rural development programmes. 
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2.5 RESEARCH AND EXTENSION 
The research station at Al-Kod in Abyan Governorate was established 
in 1955 by the Bri t ish in order to improve the cotton crop grown in the 
Tub an and Abyan areas. The stat ion, then, consisted of only three sections 
namely : cotton, forestry and other cereals.Sincel970, the centre's 








(8) I r r igat ion and soil 
(9) Agricultural economics 
Furthermore, an extension centre attached to the station was established in 
1970. A sub-station was established in Seyoun (in Wadi-Hadhramout) with a 
similar structure to f u l f i l the research requirements of the surrounding 
agricultural areas. By 1980, the research station had established thirteen 
other nurseries ( i . e . small research stations) throughout the country 
mainly to carry out extension services nearby. 
The main objectives of the research station and i ts nurseries are 
to improve and upgrade existing crops, to find new high yielding varieties 
suitable for home consumption and export and to increase the productivity 
of a l l crops but with particular attention to agro-industrial crops such 
as tomatoes, cotton and tobacco. 
There are two types of programmes for the research station. The 
f i r s t and most important is a general one applicable to various crops such 
as maize, sorghum, f r u i t and non-basic vegetables. This type of programme 
takes di f ferent forms. On one hand, the experts with the local cadres 
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demonstrate modern agricultural practices to local farmers on their own 
f ields and keep v is i t ing them every fortnight or month. On the other hand, 
the research station has about 500 acres on which various crops are grown 
with modern techniques and practices for display to farmers and agric-
ultural labourers. 
The other type of programme is specific to certain crops and four 
are currently available : 





Each of these programmes has a signif icant status in agriculture. The f i r s t 
two are regarded as basic Yemeni food. The cotton crop is the basic cash 
and agro-industrial crop; and wheat i s , undoubtedly, the basic strategic 
crop but one for which only 20% of local consumption is produced 
domestically. Furthermore, these are the crops with particular problems in 
terms of damage, disease and low productivity. 
These programmes have, in general, contributed a lo t to agricultural 
development. The productivity of many crops, e.g. onion, okra, egg plant, 
banana, wheat, potatoes and tomatoes has been increasing markedly in many 
agricultural areas. Almost a l l State farms' and cooperatives' farmers are 
acquainted with the extension services and aware of their relevance so that 
i f there are fai lures in using modern practices, i t can be attributed to 
farmers' negligence rather than to the research technicians. 
Evaluation 
The valuable role of the research stat ion, i t s sub-station in Seyoun 
and i t s nurseries cannot be underestimated. The whole research structure 
represents the scient i f ic advisory body for the MAAR and the Minister on 
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(14) agricultural technology and development. I ts manpower today consists of 
about 50 ski l led technicians, 110 semi-skilled people and not less than 
500 labourers and other administrative staf f . I t has quite a good 
reputation, not only in the country but also in the whole Middle East 
region from the United Nations point of view. 
Ultimately most of the research and extension success can be a t t r i b -
uted to the UNDP and FAO programmes incorporated in Governmental act iv i t ies . 
The UNDP's contribution has been executed by FAO who recruit experts and 
arrange fellowships abroad. Through UNDP project, each section of the 
research station was i n i t i a l l y directed and supervised by an international 
expert,, but now many sections are headed and run by highly qualified locals. 
Some 60 academic fellowships have been granted to research staff from this 
project and about 80 short courses were undertaken both abroad and local ly. 
In spite of a l l these fac i l i t i es and the attention given to the 
research and extension services, there are s t i l l certain gaps to be f i l l e d . 
Basically, the problem is not the research structure or a shortage of 
means, i t is in the transfer of technology or the improved practices to 
the farmers. Getting the idea is one thing, but grasping i t is another. 
The Yemeni farmer, as a typical Third World farmer was very scared 
of any change on his land at the beginning of the new era of independence. 
The introduction of improved practices was to him not only an expensive 
idea, but also very r isky. After some years he has become convinced of 
their relevance but other factors discourage him from implementing new, 
improved practices. F i rs t l y , a typical farmer in a typical cooperative 
has a l imited mental and physical f ac i l i t i es and does not have cash in his 
pocket, so he wi l l only apply those inputs provided by the cooperative 
(either as a g i f t or loans). Secondly, he has to plant what the production 
plan or the cooperative asl^him to grow, and his produce w i l l be 
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automatically sold to the marketing corporation of f r u i t and vegetables at 
a fixed price which means he need not botherabout improving his produce. 
Thirdly, even i f he is keen to improve his productivity by spraying 
regularly or applying more f e r t i l i se rs , he has to go miles to the coop-
erative headquarters or the nearest research nursery, with no certainty 
of getting what he wants and, i f he does get i t , he may be asked to convey 
inputs to others which w i l l almost inevitably delay him. Fourthly, farmers 
outside the cooperatives must travel a long way to reach areas where he 
can f ind the required f e r t i l i s e r s , insecticides and other inputs as well as 
having to cope with various payment complexities. 
In conclusion, the research and extension services have been through 
a gradual expanding process horizontally and ver t ica l ly . Assisted by UNDP 
and FAO, the research and extension services contributed so much to 
vegetable and f r u i t production and to some specific important crops such 
as cotton, wheat, potatoes and tomatoes. I t took some time for these 
services to have positive repercussion in farmers' minds and to have confidence in 
their benefit. The farmers' position, however, in terms of mentality and 
resources, does not allow him to make optimum use of the available services. 
But with further integration in these services, MAAR authorities hope 
for better results from these services in the sector. 
2.6 AGRICULTURAL CORPORATIONS 
(1) Abyan and Tuban Development Boards 
Abyan and^JPuban Development Boards were both created at different 
times before independence. The former was developed in 1948 as the Abyan 
Committee and the la t ter in 1954 as the Reconstruction Committee. Both 
committees had similar objectives, namely the supervision of the cotton crop 
and the ginning of the cotton at the local ginnery in each area and control 
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of the i r r igat ion methods for the cotton crop. Each conmittee provided 
a l l inputs to farmers and supervised, monitored and controlled their 
farming methods for the cotton crop which was shipped to the United 
Kingdom after being ginned, or snared. 
Despite the agricultural changes that have been taking place since 
independence and the emergence of new agricultural inst i tut ions, both 
committees have achieved their basic objectives and even expanded their 
ac t iv i t ies by taking on MRS and l i teracy programmes. The major reduction 
in their ac t iv i t ies is that the marketing of long staple cotton is carried 
out by the Foreign Trade Company. The farmers, however, sell their 
produce to the respective committee which does the ginning before selling 
to the Foreign Trade Company. A further change is that they are now 
called the Abyan Development Board and the Tuban Development Board 
respectively. 
The role played by both boards is quite significant for local cotton 
crops, despite differences in their capacities in terms of ac t iv i t ies , 
manpower and their assets. The volume of cotton production and the size of 
area planted ultimately determines the power of the Board. In 1972 the 
labour force of Abyan Development Board was 926, while that of Tuban was 
only 393. 
Each of these development boards used to administer and supervise 
a large machinery renting station - Giar (MRS) for the Abyan delta and 
Saber (MRS) for the Tuban Delta beside their respective ginneries. Though 
a l l MRS are now being centrally administered by the Irr igation Department 
in the MAAR (Section 2.2) both boards s t i l l have high pr ior i t ies at these 
MRS. Vihenever a cotton plantation is threatened by a heavy f lood, the 
board can coordinate the efforts of i ts inst i tut ions to stop or minimise the 
damage. I f there is a drought the board can provide compensation or advance 
loans to farmers. I t might even deepen wells and negotiate re l ie f pro-
grammes for farmers with local or MAAR authorit ies. 
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Evaluation of Performance 
Both Abyan and Tuten Development Boards have been keen to improve 
but, unfortunately, not to a standard that could cope with the trans-
formation which the agricultural sector has been passing through. The 
management staf f of both boards are po l i t i ca l l y oriented but not technically 
qual i f ied. Hence in both deltas, various programmes have been scheduled 
and carried out but training programmes have been almost non-existent. 
Despite the volume of work achieved and enthusiasm of both Boards to 
function appropriately, most of the management and technical staf f are 
inef f ic ient and this low efficiency is one reason for the decline of 
cotton production and processing as shown in the following data-.-
COTTON PRODUCTION (TONS) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
12,833 15,391 12,111 13,158 10,327 9,987 8,000 
Source : Socio-economic Report for 1969-1976 - Ministry of Planning 
1977 1978 1979 
4,900 10,400 6,600 
Source : Annual report of Central Bank of Yemen 78/79 
Although other factors such as the i r regular i ty of the spates in the 
wadis are responsible for production fluctuations, much of the long-term 
decline is due to the low prices paid to farmers. Both Boards have made 
high prof i ts out of the difference in price between raw and l inted 
cotton so in 1981, raw cotton prices were increased, to motivate farmers to 
produce more for the local Textile Factory and for export. 
A debate about the future of the boards has been taking place 
since 1979 as the establishment of agricultural departments in the res-
pective Governorates have reduced their u t i l i t y . For instance, the 
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agricultural department in Abyan Governorate is a Statutory Body representing 
the Ministry in a l l i t s act iv i t ies and Abyan Development Board with i ts 
massive administrative structure, just for cotton, is regarded as a waste 
of resources (part icularly in view of the shortage of labour and technical 
staf f in the area). The other view is that such boards are v i ta l for the 
vertical integration of certain crops, while the agricultural department 
can undertake horizontal expansion. Whatever the outcome there must be 
an integrated agricultural structure at Governorate level with combined 
efforts under a unified administration and not permitting r ivalry so that 
the MAAR policy can be put into action. 
(2) The Public Corporation for Marketing Vegetables and Fruit (PCMVF) 
The PCMVF was established by Law No. 23 of 1976. Before that, this 
marketing organisation was known from 1973 to 1976 as the Horticulture 
Cooperative Union which was in turn, based upon the wholesaling organ-
isation existing in Aden during the Brit ish occupation. 
The PCMVF today has a massive administrative and operational structure 
consisting of about 2000 people, 25 receiving centres, 51 retai l ing centres, 
80 trucks and 2 (1,000 tons capacity) cold stores, 8 stores (500 kgs -
4,000 tons) and a computer unit for i t s accounts. The export, import, 
maintenance, agricultural inputs and accounts sections are the most important 
within the corporation. 
The main objectives of the PCMVF are : 
(a) The marketing of a l l agricultural output (including eggs) produced 
local ly and from abroad to a l l areas in the country. 
(b) Importing and exporting agricultural produce and eggs. 
Both of these objectives have been f u l f i l l e d but at a very expensive 
cost in terms of both subsidies and investment borne by the Government . 
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The contribution of PCMVF in agriculture has been striking despite 
various shortcomings. Its main role involves the PCMVF contracting with 
each cooperative and State farm for the quantity of the output to be 
purchased within the terms of the production plan. However, since i t is 
the only legal marketing organisation, i t is obliged to purchase a l l 
quantities produced - whether below or in excess of the production plan -
at a fixed farm gate price and then sell a l l items to consumers at a 
fixed re ta i l price. The difference between prices is supposed to cover 
the marketing expenses, plus a marginal p ro f i t . However, as mentioned 
previously, the marketing system was modified in 1980 whereby cooperatives 
and State farms were allowed to market only a portion of their produce 
through PCMVF and sell the rest direct to consumers at uncontrolled prices. 
The main positive impact of the PCMVF has been that i t has given 
the rural population access to vegetables and f r u i t . In PDRY, the majority 
of rural people who do not l ive in agricultural areas and used to depend 
on f ish or livestock (goats or camel mea ,^ can now have variety in their 
customary diet or food habits. The introduction of new crops in trad-
i t ional agricultural areas - such as potatoes in Wadi-Hadhramout - has 
had another important impact. The degree of mobility of agricultural 
products from the farms via wholesale centres to re ta i l centres despite 
some damage to perishable produce in the handling process has also been 
important. 
Evaluation 
The beneficial impact of PCMVF on agriculture in particular, and 
on society in general cannot be underestimated even though i t was not 
running e f f i c ien t ly as a commercial enterprise. Any marketing operation 
for agricultural produce to serve such a large country with a small 
scattered population requires not only huge investments and sound 
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infrastructure, but a high degree of eff iciency. Almost inevitably an 
emerging State enterprise in a Third World country lacks management 
capability and control. As a result , a considerable proportion of per-
ishable items are damaged before reaching the consumer. This is due to 
a shortage of storage fac i l i t i es on the one hand and mishandling of the 
produce on the other. Secondly, most of the transport fac i l i t i es were 
running at a loss when transporting the produce from farms or centres 
owing to being loaded to only half their capacity. Thirdly, because 
of the PCMVF's connections with other agencies, a l l their defects are 
reflected in i t s operations causing more damage and contingenies. Finally, 
the PCMVC does not confine i t s function to marketing operations alone 
as i t is also involved in the provision of inputs to cooperatives and 
State farms, thus dividing i t s activies and not really succeeding in 
either. Further details of problems in PCMVF are discussed in the approp-
r iate sections below. The PCMVF has eliminated middlemen and al l inter-
mediary agencies which used to exploit the farmer, but i t has s t i l l neither 
adequately satisf ied the producer nor the consumer. I t has suffered such 
financial losses that the Government has often had to cover them with 
heavy subsidies. However, one cannot put the blame for such losses 
entirely.on the PCMVF because they also represent the price to be paid for 
social equitable policies dictated by the Government. 
(3) The Public Corporation For Development of Poultry 
The Public Corporation for Development of Poultry (PCDP) was 
established by the Republican Ordinance No.45 of 1968 as a mixed 
Corporation and then was transformed into a public corporation in 1976. 
In 1970 i t s Law was incorporated into Corporations' Law No.13. 
The PCDP was established to f u l f i l the following objectives :-
(a) Encouraging and developing the poultry industry, part icularly 
in consumer areas. 
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(b) Introduction of High Yield breeds of eggs, chickens and broi lers. 
(c) Horizontal expansion via increasing production units. 
(d) Vertical expansion by promoting technical and administration fac i l i t i es , 
(e) Development of poultry production in rural areas by distr ibuting 
suf f ic ient numbers of improved breeds to poultry farmers. 
The main financial support for the PCDP is a development plan 
project which, with Cuban assistance, provides i t s infrastructure and i t s 
administration. 
The PCDP's act iv i t ies have been limited to the Aden, Abyan and 
Hadhramout Governorates. The PCDP has chicken farms and houses for 
improved breeds and the original 'PARENTS' which are brought from Havana. 
I t has a work force of just over 500 today and a poultry school for 
training annexed to i t . 
The PCDP was improving output at an increasing rate between 1968 
and 1976 when i ts production increased as follows:-
Year Eggs (Units) " Meat (kg) 
1968 127,713 576 
1976 18,816,646 218,902 
1977 15,015,221 193,429 
1978 12,748,146 102,000 
In 1977 and 1978 production started deteriorating and the PCDP 
suffered serious def ic i ts amounting to SYD 166,551 and SYD 237,880 in 
(8) 
1977 and 1978 respectively. 
Various reasons can be advanced for the decreasing returns to the 
PCDP. The major ones are : F i rs t l y , in the late 1960's and early 1970's, 
fodder prices were reasonable enough to be met by the corporation which 
then had a small volume of work to cope with. Secondly, with international 
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inf la t ion affecting foreign fodder prices, the PCDP depended mainly on local 
farms and the local fish-meat industry for i ts supply. Both parties, 
however, were reluctant to supply PDCP at the low sanctioned prices because 
they preferred to supply private and international markets at higher 
uncontrolled prices. Thirdly, the PCDP has Cuban expertise but insuff icient 
local technicians and consequently in 1977 a considerable stock of chicks 
died owing to the spread of foot and mouth disease which local technicians 
could not combat on a large scale. Final ly, and most important of a l l , is 
the fact that PDRY, with i t s humble resources, has adopted Cuban experience 
in this f i e l d namely, rearing and developing the 'or iginal Parents' which 
nowadays is adopted by only a very few advanced countries. As an isolated 
island Cuba has to operate such a strategy and can afford to do so, but 
this method has proved to be very expensive and unnecessary for PDRY. 
In the face of continuing losses, the MAAR decided, in 1980, to make the 
project less burdensome by introducing new breeds. The one-day chicks 
are bought and reared as broilers and eggs but in two different l ines. This 
policy commenced'operation in 1981 in coordination with help from Hungary 
and Bulgaria alongside the Cuban project which is s t i l l maintained but with 
less concentration upon i t . 
(4) The Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) 
The Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) was established by a Ministerial 
Order in April 1970 to f u l f i l the following objectives -
(a) Provision of agricultural inputs as short and medium-term loans at 
an interest rate of 1% for the cooperative sector and no more than 5% for 
other agricultural inst i tu t ions. 
(b) Import of agricultural inputs for agricultural projects and i ns t i t -
utions provided that they are paid for pr ior , immediately upon, or no more 
than one year after delivery. 
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(c) Establishment of stores for agricultural machinery, spare parts 
and other inputs. 
(d) Investment of bonds and establishment of economic relations with 
international organisations. 
(e) Training staf f in agricultural credit and finance. 
The working capital of the ADF was i n i t i a l l y made up of 40% of 
the returns from cotton of the Abyan and Tuban Boards. After two years, 
this percentage was reduced to 30% up unti l 1976. Since then, both 
boards have had to comply with Law No.13 of 1973 on Corporations' profits 
from which they had previously been exempted. 
The ADF has advanced various forms of loans in cash and kind over 
the period 1970-77. Most of these loans were in the form of f e r t i l i ze r , 
i r r igat ion equipment and tractors. The efficiency of agricultural credit 
by ADF has been very low and as a result total debts by 1977 amounted 
to SYD 1,376,873^^^It therefore had to stop a l l credit f ac i l i t i es to 
agricultural inst i tut ions and the debts were regarded as bad debts. This 
means that i t has fai led in i t s function as an agricultural credit 
ins t i tu t ion . 
I t is impossible not to be c r i t i ca l of the ADF and i ts impact on 
agricultural performance, but at the same time one cannot argue with the 
relevance of credit in agriculture in a Third World country. Basically 
ADF drew i t s working capital from only two out of over one hundred 
agricultural inst i tu t ions. This imbalance created a f inancial ly weak 
structure. Secondly, most of the credit f ac i l i t i es went to benefit other 
crops and other areas, but they, in turn, did not contribute to ADF and 
did not even repay a l l their debts. Thirdly, the credit mechanism in ADF 
has been very weak, both technically and managerially. The whole structure 
did not have a single qualif ied accountant, economist or even a mechanical 
engineer. Fourthly, the ADF was involved in other credit f ac i l i t i es 
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which had nothing to do with the agricultural sector .- such as lending money 
to private people, providing g i f ts and assistance to non-agricultural 
recipients and so on. Such practices naturally weakened the ADF as a 
crediting structure. The Government, however, as part of i ts economic 
transformation, w i l l be establishing the "Development Bank in 1983 which 
w i l l include agricultural crediting on a sound commercial basis. 
(5) The Public Corporation for Meat Marketing 
The Meat Marketing Corporation (MMC) was supervised by the MAAR 
unt i l 1979 when i t was annexed to the Ministry of Trade & Supply. The MMC 
purchases livestock from State farms, cooperatives, individuals and abroad 
(mainly Ethiopia and Australia) and sells them to consumers through i ts 
re ta i l out lets. I t also imports frozen meat and chickens in accordance 
with national demand throughout the country. 
The MMC had about f ive farms in 1979 where i t kept i ts stock which 
i t purchased from agricultural farms, individuals or abroad. The stock is 
supposed to remain for a very short period (2-7 days) before being moved 
to the MMC slaughter houses. The MMC has several reta i l centres throughout 
the country and has recently opened a few shops in urban centres to 
fac i l i t a te marketing functions to cit izens. Like the PCMVF, i t enjoys a 
marketing monopoly in urban areas but, in rural areas, private shepherds 
can sell their stock direct to consumers. 
The MMC divided i t s act iv i t ies into two parts : live-weight and 
frozen meat. Meat prices are constant throughout the country and are 
fixed by the Government for both slaughtered and frozen meat. The MMC, 
however, sells l ive animals to consumers and only here makes most of i ts 
prof i ts - part icularly from local breeds. The MMC gets the local breeds, 
and sometimes even foreign breeds, at a cheap rate i .e. about SYD 15 a 
goat and sells at a high rate, at about SYD 50 to 60. 
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The MMC i s , however, better equipped than the PCMVF owing to i ts 
l imited requirements in terms of labour force and range of products. I t 
also enjoys a better financial position particularly in recent years when 
i t became entirely independent. I t achieved most of i ts success since 
the decentralisation of i t s marketing operation. The MMC used to purchase, 
slaughter and sell the meat to consumers direct but today, i t slaughters 
i ts stock and sells the product to private butchers who, in turn, sell 
the meat to consumers. Private butchers are allowed to make a prof i t of 
25 Fi ls per lb . which, though seeming to be a marginal p ro f i t , amounts 
to a considerable return considering the fact that he has no overhead 
costs. The butcher is also provided with weighing equipment and the 
market f ac i l i t i e s such as storage and cleaning materials. In a c r i t i ca l 
evaluation of the marketing process of meat products, undertaken by MAAR 
authori t ies, i t has been found that the agricultural sector makes losses 
while the MMC makes a l l the p ro f i t s , as well as the private butchers 
who recently i l l ega l l y increased their prof i ts to 100 f i l s per lb . of meat!''^ 
2.7 AGRICULTURAL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Agricultural transformation in PDRY has required not only massive 
investments in physical infrastructure, but also a skil led and semi-
ski l led labour force. At independence the MAAR had no more than ten 
graduates and very few technicians to carry outexpensive projects. 
Training, therefore, was, and has been, an important issue to be tackled 
alongside other agricultural progranmes. In order to meet the immediate 
need and f i l l the numerous gaps in various f ields in agriculture, i t was 
thought necessary to carry out agricultural training at several horizontal 
and vertical levels.. Academic education was provided locally and abroad 
by the Ministry of Education, while other levels are tota l ly controlled by 
the Ministry - whether they are conducted locally at i t s inst i tut ions or 
abroad through bi lateral arrangements with other countries. 
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Considering only those local insti tut ions run by MAAR, there are 
the following f i ve , each of which is attached to the relevant department -
(a) The Irr igat ion Centre, attached to the DIME, runs a two-year course 
beyond the Secondary school level to train students in i r r igat ion techniques, 
soil science, surveying and hydro-agricultural engineering. I t started 
in 1973. and about 26 to 30 i r r igat ion technicians graduate annually. The 
centre is purely funded by the Government. Since 1979, the centre has 
had a quali f ied team in i ts s ta f f , as well as some experienced local 
technicians. 
(b) The Cooperative Inst i tu te , attached to the cooperatives department, 
was established in 1971 by the Government and assisted by UNDP/ILO 
project to t ra in cooperative managers and their staf f in accounts, cooper-
at ion, book-keeping, extension and cooperatives' farming at various levels. 
Short course are run for periods three weeks to three months, medium- term 
courses from 4 months to 9 months and long-term courses for 2 years. At 
least 1,200 cooperatives' members have benefitted from these courses. 
Today, the Inst i tute is well-equipped with accommodation, 4 
international experts (recruited via ILO), 8 German experts by GDR and 
some 8 local technical graduates qualif ied to run cooperative courses and 
research. The inst i tute has audio-visual aids and mobile units which v i s i t 
cooperatives and rural areas regularly. 
(c) The Giar Centre, attached to the research and extension department, 
has been an integral part of the Research Station at Al-Kod in Abyan 
Governorate. I t was basically established to provide training for State 
farms and private farmers in respect of extension services and farming 
techniques, but in practice i t provides courses to al l farmers. I t ran 
short courses during the period 1973-1978, then in 1979 i t started the 
f i r s t medium-term course for nine months for students finishing preparatory 
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education. Most of the courses are practical and in the f i e l d . Occasionally, 
i t runs rural development courses for women for six months in which health, 
sanitation, cooking and child welfare courses are taught by local and 
international s ta f f . The UNDP/FAO project on production improvement 
contributes considerably to the centre in terms of equipment, vehicles, 
fellowships and staff recruitment. I t is the most effective centre in 
terms of impact on farming in the country's programmes. I t is planned 
to be transformed in the near future into an agricultural polytechnic. 
(d) The Veterinary School, attached to the animal production department 
was established in 1976 to provide courses on a r t i f i c i a l insemination, 
animal production, animal health and alike subjects. The animal production 
department formulates courses, together with international experts who 
work in the department. The school expanded in 1979 to take more qualified 
students from preparatory stage to t ra in and employ them in dairy projects; 
but unfortunately, in recent years, dairy projects have been decreasing 
in importance and have been almost eliminated in the second amended 
Five Year Plan (1981-85). Consequently the school is affected and has 
closed down for some time but the department and MAAR are fighting hard to 
have i t reopened and operated on a smaller scale. 
(e) The National Poultry School, attached to PCDP, was established 
to t ra in poultry labourers of both sexes in various aspects of this 
industry. Again, as elsewhere, low level trainees are selected for minor 
but specialised courses which run for 3-6 months. A Cuban team with local 
translators makes up the s taf f . These courses have proved to be especially 
useful because they are more pract ica l than theoretical. 
In conclusion, these local inst i tu t ions, though humble in fac i l i t i es 
and resources, are very useful in the current stage of the agricultural 
sector. Similar courses are arranged abroad but i t has been found that 
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those trainees taking the local courses are often far better off than 
those being trained abroad. There are, however, many gaps to be f i l l ed 
in training programmes and both the MAAR and the Government are aware 
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At independence in 1967, the Government was faced by various and 
immense socio-economic problems, of which the most important one was the 
transformation of the existing service economy into a production-based 
one. With few resources and an impoverished State Treasury, social ist 
planning was seen as the only way of creating a cohesive society out of 
the seventeen dispersed states. I t implied a survey of available 
resources and then their distr ibut ion into projects according to national 
objectives and pr ior i t ies so as to avoid wasteful expenditure on unpred-
ictable act iv i t ies or areas and match goals to resources. 
3.1 THE TRIENNIAL PLAN 
The planning machinery in PDRY started in 1968 and the Titennial 
Plan (1971/72- 1973/4) was i t s f i r s t product. The plan was a simple and 
straightforward one in both i t s objectives and i t s resources which 
amounted to SYD 29 mil l ion of actual expenditure^ Hhe Trennial Plan, 
however, had a very weak technical and economic basis in terms of both 
manpower and capital . The scanty and unreliable data on al l social and 
economic issues made the situation even worse. The plan, therefore, can 
be regarded as no more than an investment programme for basic projects. 
Taking the agricultural sector, the Tr^nnial Plan's objectives 
were not production oriented. They were not even aimed at specific crops 
or confined to specific agricultural f ields such as research or livestock 
production, rather they were of a general nature, touching a l l f ie lds 
but concentrating, to a certain extent, on i r r iga t ion. All the objectives 
in the sector stressed the creation of basic infrastructure for agricul-
tural development based on a horizontal strategy. 
Table No. 3 .1 displays the agricultural investment during the 
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TABLE 3.1 AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS IN THE TRENNIAL PLAN 
1971/72-1973/4 
Field Planned Actual % actual to 
planned 
Ir r igat ion 3,812 3,684 96.6 
State farms 412 399 96.9 
Animal prod. 454 452 99.7 
Research & 
Training 
1,008 465 46 
Studies 1,135 785 75 
TOTAL 6,721 5,785 86 
Source : Planning & Stats. - Ministry of Agriculture 
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Tn'ennial Plan by f ie ld ac t iv i t ies . I t shows that i r r igat ion act iv i t ies 
had the l ion 's share of agricultural investments with about 57% of the 
planned and 64% of the actual expenditure. Animal production and state 
farm act iv i t ies also involved i r r igat ion projects, namely d r i l l i ng 
boreholes (wells) and land reclamation. In general, however, the high 
percentage of actual expenditure compared to the planned, is attributed 
to effecting the ' take-o f f of agricultural development in i ts i n i t i a l 
stage. The low percentage of research and training components was due 
to lack of technical manpower in the sector. 
The Triennial Plan was unfortunate not to have the required fac i l i t i es 
or resources in the agricultural sector - neither in terms of capital and 
machinery, nor in terms of manpower and so depended heavily on bilateral 
assistance. Most of the equipment that had to come from friendly countries 
was delayed or came with insuff ic ient spare parts,thus affecting on-going 
projects. Problems of storage, transportation of heavy equipment to 
project s i tes, maintenance, shortage of important equipment such as r igs, 
bulldozers, excavators, motor-graders and tractors were basic problems on the 
material or capital side. On the manpower side, a shortage of technical 
personnel in a l l agricultural f ields was a general setback. There were only 
four i r r igat ion technical s ta f f , of whom only two had any real experience. 
Most of the projects' staf f had l i t t l e technical know-how but fortunately 
as most of the projects were involved in construction work, the majority 
(2) 
of constant labour force became more experienced with construction. 
EVALUATION 
I t is very hard to assess the achievements of the triennial plan 
in the agricultural sector today in relation to the very d i f f i c u l t 
circumstances then exist ing. Considering the non-availability of data, 
the agricultural sector did not do too badly. I t accomplished the 
following: 
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( i ) Construction of eight diverting weirs in Tuban area. 
( i i ) Dr i l l ing of 200 deep wells for State farms and cooperatives. 
( i i i ) Land reclamation on several State farms (including the dairy farms) 
( iv) Construction of elementary poultry farms in the f i r s t (ADEN) 
Governorate 
(v) Other minor act iv i t ies such as the building of stores on State 
farms, the creation of an i r r igat ion department and the 
establishment of three small machinery workshops. 
As well as this humble material contribution, the Tnennlal Plan 
gave various lessons to the tradit ional agricultural sector. In terms 
of d isc ip l ine, the financial and administration laws and regulations 
started to have real effect and the agricultural administration at various 
levels started to see the significance of planning. Above a l l , the intra-
sectoral relationship began to be developed through the planning machinery. 
In conclusion, i t could be said that the Ttiennial Plan had pinpointed 
major obstacles to agricultural and national development for the f i r s t 
Five Year Plan to tackle.^^^ 
3.^ THE FIRST-FIVE YEAR PLAN 1974-78 (FFYP) 
The preparation for the First Five Year Plan started in the early 
1970's during the implementation of the Tnennial Plan. At that time most 
of the available economic data were roughly estimated with approximate 
allowance f o r 
error , part icularly in the agricultural sector. Effective preparation 
for the annual plans, however, kept going on while the Plan was under 
implementation. This resulted in wide deviations of actual allocation 
from those planned. Positive deviations indicate vigorous act iv i t ies 
of the planning mechanism and ambitious goals of planners. 
The planning machinery i t se l f was also being transformed as a law 
was passed in 1974 by which planning units had to be in i t iated at 
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Gbvernorate level . The avai lab i l i ty of Information was Improved when a 
computer unit was installed in 1973 in the Central Statist ical Bureau 
(CSB) to run the Population Census and other data collection prograimes. 
Furthermore, during the FFYP, the Ministry of Planning placed some of 
i t s technical staf f in planning units of various sectoral ministries 
to help in planning act iv i t ies outside the Central Planning Ministry, 
and to ensure proper coordination with them. Production planning also 
started during the FFYP period; effectively i t began in 1974/75 when the 
f i r s t agricultural production plan was laid down though i t had only limited 
links with the annual investment plan. As time went on strong ties 
developed between the production and the investment plan as any obstacles 
or bottlenecks faced by production were given top pr ior i ty for elimination 
by the Investment plan. 
Within the broad framework of transforming the economy to one based 
on production, the FFYP stated certain specific quantified objectives. 
For example, there were to be 50-55 thousand acres to be reclaimed during 
the plan period and increases of cereal crops by 47%, of cotton by 114%, 
of vegetables by 111%, of fodder by 89%, of milk cows by 3%. of goats 
by 2%. of beef by 25%, of mutton by 32% and of milk by 69%.^ ^^ 
Regarding resources and f a c i l i t i e s , they were far better than for 
the Trennial Plan. In terms of man-power, employment opportunities 
increased immensely for both men and women, particularly in rural areas 
to which a high portion of investment was directed. In terms of capi tal . 
Table .3.2 displays the tremendous increase - by about 253% - in the 
amended plan's investment. Local resources constituted 62.5% of these 
investments while foreign contribution amounted to 37.5% early in the 
sector . The table also shows the significance of i r r igat ion in agric-
ultural investment, as this took 80% of the planned expenditure and 62% 
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planned and the amended allocations for animal production, plant production 
and marketing were due to other non-agricultural pressures within the 
national economy such as the milk plant, tomato-paste factory and consumer 
demand for more vegetables and f ru i t s respectively. The shi f t in research 
and training f ie ld was necessary for the horizontal expansion of agric-
ultural development and for any future vertical expansion. 
Table 3.3 displays the value of building and construction during 
both the trennial and the FFY Plans with respect to economic act iv i t ies in 
each Governorate. I t Indicates that both plans placed a heavy emphasis 
on the transport and communication sector and on agriculture and fisheries 
sector in order to l ink the country together with as many as possible 
of productive areas as a prerequisite for rural development. Indeed, the 
transport and communication projects were mainly jus t i f ied by their agric-
ultural use ( i . e . to ensure proper roads for the distr ibution of agric-
ultural output). Thus the communication sector was an essential and 
integral part for the agricultural development strategy. The agricultural 
and fisheries sector increased i t s construction by about 400% during both 
plan periods. 
As regards i t s ef fects. Table 3 .4 presents evidence of the low 
growth rates achieved by FFYP. Cereals and cotton are the main crops 
dependent on spate i r r igat ion in Wadi Tuban and Wadi Abyan, but during 
the FFYP period both wadis were affected by long-range Irr igat ion projects. 
The planners, both in MAAR and the Ministry of Planning, were very optim-
i s t i c that the work in both wadis would be completed but for technical 
drawbacks, major portions of land were not released for cult ivation as 
planned. Another reason for the low growth rates achieved was that the 
figures of the base year production were over-estimated. Furthermore, 
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Tabl e 3. 4 THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF Q U A N T I T A T I V E OBJECTIVES 






( P L A N N E D ) 
PROD= 





( A C T U A L ) 
Cereals 130 47,4 26,61 26,51 ZERO 
Cotton 25 113,7 10,8 5,6 -51,85 
Fodder 460 88,5 86,66 87,69 +1,2 
Potatoes 1.4 55,5 2,13 4,74 +122,5 
Tobacco 1,7 25,9 1,2 1,06 +11,7 
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Source: Evaluation of the 1st Five Year Plan Report - Ministry of Planning 
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tradit ional sector with an unpredictable i r r igat ion system. A reasonable 
growth rate for an agricultural sector in the Third World would be 
5-7% and so the FFYP growth rate for certain crops of above 100% was 
just unreal ist ic. 
In monetary terms, the total value of the agricultural output 
(plant and livestock) reached SYD 10.4 mil l ion in 1978 though i t was planned 
(5) 
to be SYD 36.5 mi l l ion. This overall result reflected the loss of 
land being held for i r r igat ion projects. The average rate growth of the 
agricultural value over 1974-78 was about 3%. 
EVALUATION 
To evaluate the FFYP in agriculture, one has to understand the 
nature of planning, distinguishing between investment planning and 
production planning on one hand; and knowing the relationship between 
policy-making structures and planning structures on the other. In effect 
there were no strong links between production and investment plans at 
that time despite serious efforts to l ink them. This was due to the 
fact that a high portion of Investments went on overhead costs of 
i r r igat ion schemes and even those investments directed to State farms 
and other f ields were s t i l l to establish and strengthen the inst i tut ional 
bases and infrasiructure (e.g.20 State farms were established as well as 3 
dairy farms and other establishments in Tuban, Abyan and Hadhramaut 
Governorates). Not more than 25% of Investments contributed directly 
to production and, compared to the base year production of 1972/73, a 
high portion of Tuban and Abyan land (22,000 acres and 45,000 acres 
respectively) was held back from farmers for i r r igat ion schemes. Thus 
the investment plan was paying attention to long-range schemes which 
hoped to give returns in the long-run and actually reducing production 
in the short-term. 
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The agricultural production achieved during the FFYP period was 
attributed mainly to the act iv i t ies of cooperatives which had l i t t l e 
assistance - or hindrance - from the investment plan. Some sixteen 
agricultural cooperatives were established during the FFYP period and 
by 1978 there were 44 agricultural cooperatives in the country. Apart 
from d r i l l i n g a few wells and subsidies on agricultural inputs, the 
cooperatives did not get the attention required from the Government. 
In contrast. State farms (about 41 in 1978) were getting a l l their 
production requirements from the investment plan while their contribution 
to the agricultural production was hardly 20% of the total value. However, 
one would argue that i r r igat ion schemes were designed to serve, primarily 
the cooperatives; indeed they w i l l , but when they are completed, and the 
cooperatives w i l l then be better o f f . 
There are, however, also "structural" reasons which are direct ly or 
indirect ly responsible for the short- fa l l of the plan's objectives. The 
most str ik ing one was the weak technical l inks between the policy-makers, 
the planning and the implementing structures of the agricultural strategy. 
In other words, the people who formulate the policies were not the same as 
those who planned agricultural development and the l ink of both structures 
to those who implement plans was even weaker. The basic inst i tut ions for 
planning and implementation were set-up but effective contact did not exist 
appropriately due to differences in attitudes and capabilities at top 
levels of each structure. In the FFYP period, the polit icians decided 
the agricultural policies without planners being involved, then planners 
received the policies and formulated the objectives with insuff ic ient 
involvement of executors and consequently implementation meant various 
amendments and subsequent short fa l ls . 
The other dist inct ive feature of FFYP was a technical one. Adequate 
planning implies at least one policy instrument for each objective 
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to be reached (e.g. to reduce unemployment, income tax may be reduced) 
and i f this is not achieved another policy instrument has to be added. 
The FFYP has far too many ambitious goals, but far too l i t t l e policy 
instruments. Sometimes even policy instruments used such as "cent-
ralised marketing" to secure farmers' incomes and "sticky" pricing 
policies did not work out favourably. As a result too much burden 
was put on producers and agricultural labourers and l i t t l e satisfaction 
was provided to the consumers. In general planners and polit icians 
fai led to see the negative effects of certain policy instruments such as 
low prices and projects congestions which meant to l i f t up the agric-
ul tural and rural standard of l i v ing . 
On the more positive side of the plan, the FFYP created the tech-
nical agricultural inst i tut ions by which the tradit ional sector could be 
transformed and divers i f ied. The establishment of 16 machinery renting 
stations with a large stock of various agricultural machinery was a 
valuable investment made by the plan. In cooperatives and State farms 
most agricultural operations are mechanised today by the virtue of the 
machinery bought by the plan. Major agricultural studies to explore, 
agricultural potent ial i t ies in various parts of the country were 
started by the plan. Furthermore, agricultural marketing corporations 
such as the vegetable and f r u i t marketing corporation (PCMUF), the 
meat marketing coporation (MMC) and the poultry corporation (PCDP) 
were established legally during the plan's period and provided with 
very expensive equipment, machinery, cold-storage and transport f ac i l i t i es 
I r r igat ion works such as d r i l l i ng of more than 400 wells and the excav-
ation of canals contributed a lo t to an increase in output which, though 
i t was not up to the level required, indicated the potential for further 
improvement. Above a l l also the FFYP led to a substantial number of 
technicians and qualif ied staf f to run agricultural projects and their 
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administrati on at an acceptable standard. 
In terms of popular welfare, the FFYP enabled nutrit ional im-
provement in two ways. The increase of agricultural output and introd-
uction of new crops such as potatoes was one way and the increase of 
personal disposable income by creating many employment opportunities 
was the other. 
The general operation of the FFYP did have an adverse effect on 
agriculture by creating many projects in other sectors which took labour 
away from agriculture. The plan in general measured achievements 
quantit ively rather than qual i tat ively which was rather unfortunate 
in the case of agriculture since this encouraged inefficiency in many 
aspects. 
3.3 THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN (SFYP) 
The Second Five-Year Plan (SFYP) 1979-1983 started in 1979 
with actual expenditure of approximately SYD 52 mil l ion for a l l sectors. 
During 1979 and 1980, the plan had to be amended in order to be parallel 
to other fr iendly countries' plans.and, therefore, the preparation of 
the "Amended" Second Five-Year Plan 1981-85 started during 1979 
and 1980. 
The SFYP, started effect ively in January 1981 and marked a new 
era in planning improvement and development whereby investment plans 
became more closely linked with production plans. The total investment 
of the plan in the whole economy is SYD 508,203,900 of which the local 
resources amount to SYD 153,999,400 and foreign, resources SYD 355,204,500. 
The objectives of the SFYP in a l l sectors have been more specific 
with respect to production plans. In the agricultural sector the plan 
aims to attain the following -
(7) 
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(a) Achievement of agricultural output-increase from SYD 30 millions in 
1980 which is the base year for the SFYP to SYD 47.2 millions 1n 
1985 ( i . e . a 52.3% increase during this period or an 8.8% annual 
average grnwth rate) . 
(b) Increase of agricultural (plant) output by 64.2% and of animal 
production 40.9% in 1985 (to the base-year 1980 level) as shown in 
Table IV.5. 
(c) To enhance the importance of the public sector in agricultural 
inst i tut ions as shown in Table 3,5. The Government attaches great 
importance to the public sector ( i . e . State farms and public 
corporations) with the cooperatives' sector coming next, and 
f i na l l y the private sector. 
(Detailed tables on crops and areas that are planned to be cultivated are 
in the appendices). 
To achieve these objectives, the Government has provided a total 
of SYD 61.9 mill ions for agriculture. This amount has already been 
increased to 81 mil l ion dinars during the current two years. The agric-
ultural investment, however, as or iginal ly planned, represents 12% of 
the total investment of the economy. Table 3 .6 shows the breakdown of 
the agricultural investment into a l l the agricultural projects in each 
f i e l d . Table 3.7 displays the i r r igat ion act iv i t ies constituting about 
72% while other agricultural projects constitute only 28%. I t is worth 
indicating that 63% of total agricultural investments comes from foreign 
sources and only 37% from local sources. I rr igat ion wi l l depend a great 
deal on foreign sources (81%) while other agricultural act iv i t ies w i l l 
largely be financed by local resources. ^^ .^  
Despite the significance of the agricultural sector in the economy 
as a whole, i t s share in total investment has been fa l l ing from 23% in 
the FFYP to only 12% in the SFYP. In terms of local sources, which 
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Table 3.5 The Value of Agr icu l tura l Output 
During the Second (amended) Five Years 
PLAN (1981 - 1985) 
Mil l ions of Dinars 
OUTPUT - VALUE Rate of Increase Relative Importance 
1980 1985 % 1985/1980 1980 1985 
Prod^ (Plant) 21,2 34,8 64,2 68,4 73,7 
Prod2 (Animal) 9,8 12,4 40,9 31,6 26,3 
TOTAL Agric. 
Output 31,0 47,2 52,2 100 100 
Public Sector 5,1 13,6 165,7 16,4 28,8 
Coop's Sector 9,9 16,5 66,7 31,9 35,0 
TOTAL 31 ,0 47,2 52,3 100 100 
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Table 3. 7 INVESTMENT ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURE SECTOR 
FOR S F Y P (1981 - 1985) 
FIELD TOTAL LOCAL FOREIGN PERCENTAGE 
INVESTMENT RESOURCES RESOURCES (RATIO) 
(1) (2) (3) 2:1 3:1 
I r r i g a t i o n 44,886 13,500.5 31 ,385.5 30 70 
Agricul ture 17,049 9,718 7,331 57 43 
Production: 
of which: 
Livestock 4,600 4,600 -
Plant 12,449 5,118 . 7,331 
TOTAL 61 ,935 23,218.5 38,716.5 37 65 
% of i r r i g a t i o n 
81% to Total Agr ic. 72% 58% 
7o of Agr icu l ture 
19% Production to 28% 42% 
Total Agr ic. 
Source : The SFYP 1981 - 1985 Minist ry of Planning, 
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are more re l i ab le than foreign sources, i t s share is 15% - better than 
i t s share in foreign sources which amounts to only 11%. This is due 
to the fac t that most b i l a te ra l assistance and agreements favour service 
sectors fo r p o l i t i c a l reasons. 
Regarding the resources and f a c i l i t i e s of the SFYP, one can say 
that t h i s plan is in a much better s i tua t ion than previous plans in terms 
of capi ta l and manpower. Due to the horizontal expansion during the 
past ten years, most establishments are re la t i ve l y well-equipped with 
technical s t a f f and machinery. What th is plan has to do is to ensure 
that these s ta f f and equipment are working e f f i c i e n t l y . An emphasis 
on ve r t i ca l expansion in a l l f i e l ds has been stressed in a l l Party and 
Government l i t e r a t u r e and pa r t i cu la r l y so in the case of agr icu l tu re . 
The Plan's programmes incorporate improvements in inputs, the use of 
machinery, fu r ther and higher t r a i n i n g , to improve the y ie ld of crops 
both per man and per acre. Problems such as wastage of resource and 
disguised unemployment have been iden t i f i ed and given the avai lable res-
ource and'.irith some ingenui ty, th is plan can t r y to overcome some of them. 
F i n a l l y , i t i s necessary to say something about the agr icu l tura l 
Investment in re la t ion to the on-going agr icu l tu ra l po l i c ies . I t is 
qui te natural fo r ag r i cu l tu ra l pol ic ies to change from time to time as 
long as the broad l ines of pol icy fo r a speci f ic ideology are maintained. 
So fa r in PDRY, agr icu l tu ra l po l ic ies have been s t r i c t l y wi th in soc ia l i s t 
philosophy. Up to 1977 no changes took place In basic agr icu l tura l 
po l ic ies wi th production and marketing t o t a l l y control led by the State. 
Many problems were observed due to such cent ra l isa t ion both in terms 
of lower y i e l d of production and in lower e f f ic iency in marketing 
operat ions. Consequently, the Government t r i ed to assist the public 
sector by al lowing some decentra l isat ion in marketing operations as 
already described in Chapter two, section 3 on the cooperatives. In 
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terms of production, farmers and State farms are also allowed to cu l t i va te 
any p ro f i tab le crops beyond the production plan's capacity. 
Against th is background of the overal l agr icu l tura l po l i c ies , the 
investment plan is something of a spoiled ch i ld in the agr icu l tura l sector. 
I t has enjoyed a very lax investment control whereby.all requirements of 
investment programmes are f u l f i l l e d wi th in the l i m i t s of avai lable 
resources whi le the production sphere of agr icu l ture has suffered from 
s t r i c t implementation of agr icu l tu ra l pol ic ies - such as the st icky 
pr ic ing po l icy or the l im i ted c red i t f a c i l i t i e s . 
The other discrepancy between agr icu l tu ra l investment and production 
po l ic ies is that the former take long-term views while the l a t t e r take 
immediate and short-term views. In investment plans e f fo r t s are made in 
a l l ag r i cu l t u ra l areas to f i nd agr icu l tu ra l po ten t i a l i t i es in the long 
run. Production pol ic ies on the other hand have tended to ensure f a i r 
prices to both the producer and the consumer. The investment po l i c ies , 
therefore, re f lected very l i t t l e on the production pol ic ies because most 
of i t s a c t i v i t i e s re la te to i r r i g a t i o n projects which w i l l support agr ic -
u l tu ra l po l ic ies only over a long-range period. I f investment po l ic ies 
were concentrated and v e r t i c a l l y integrated with production po l i c ies , 
higher production wi th higher y ie ld could have been achieved in speci f ic 
areas. Also, i f production po l ic ies came into l i n e with the long-range 
investment po l ic ies (e .g . i f prices were allowed to move wi th in speci f ic 
ranges) that might have given farmers greater incentive to produce 
cer ta in p ro f i t ab le crops. 
Eventual ly, we can argue for and against each pol icy adopted, whether 
in investment or production, but given a soc ia l i s t doctrine and l imi ted 
resources, the conformity of various pol ic ies and a c t i v i t i e s is essential 
fo r development. The experience of both the Trennial and FFYP have already 
i d e n t i f i e d spec i f ic technical bottlenecks so the SFYP can t r y to avoid 
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with minimum inconsistencies that are bound to be brought up among sector ial 
po l ic ies (e .g . to al low some release in price pol ic ies with minimum 
d ispa r i t y in income). However, the agr icu l tu ra l sector Is l e f t to pursue 
a horizontal strategy with few v e r t i c a l l y Integrated a c t i v i t i e s and 
programmes (e .g . no fur ther expansion on state or dairy farms and con-
centrat ion on y ie ld improvement). The l imi ted resources w i l l not allow 
the v e r t i c a l l y integrated programmes to be e f fec t i ve with major horizontal 
programmes going alongside, pa r t i cu la r l y in i r r i g a t i o n . One w i l l be 
improved a t the expense of the other and here the horizontal programmes 
are more i n f l uen t i a l in monetary terms and, therefore, unfortunately, 
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AGRICULTURAL POLICIES ON PRICES, TAXATION 
AND SUBSIDIES 
The prices of a l l goods in the country are control led by the 
Government, usually at constant levels throughout the country, and 
agr icu l tu ra l prices are no exception. Producer and consumer prices 
of almost a l l agr icu l tu ra l commodities are proposed by MAAR and f ixed 
by the Government. Producer prices are set to cover an estimated average 
of var iable costs, plus a margin fo r the farmer. Fixed costs - such 
as land, we l l s , canals and even water - are not current ly taken into 
account since they have already been met, so f a r , by the Government. 
Consumer prices are set according to the current personal disposable 
Income of the ordinary c i t i z e n . In many cases consumer prices do not 
defray the producer p r i ce , plus the marketing expenses so the di f ference 
is met by the Government in the form of subsidies. 
The Government's main aims in cont ro l l ing and supporting ag r i cu l -
tu ra l prices are : f i r s t l y , to supply basic food requirements at reason-
able p r i ces , secondly, to el iminate the middlemen who had been taking 
advantage of the farmer, as well as the consumer, and t h i r d l y , to 
el iminate regional di f ferences in the income of agr icu l tu ra l labourers 
and farmers. In general, despite Government subsidies and the heavy 
Government investments in the sector, producers are not enthusiastic about 
the pr ic ing po l ic ies which seem to them to favour the consumer. 
As we have discussed in Sections 2.2&2.52,most input , farm-gate 
and consumer prices were "s t i cky" un t i l about 1979 and then rose f a i r l y 
sharply. The pa t te rn , however, varies by commodity as we shall now 
see In examining some of the indiv idual causes and ef fects of pol icy 
change in pr ices, subsidies and taxat ion. 
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INPUT PRICES 
(a) Seeds : 
T rad i t i ona l l y , farmers depended on the i r own production for seeds. 
A f te r 1972 the Al-Kod Research Centre was the main agr icu l tu ra l agency to 
import, tes t and c e r t i f y improved seeds. The research s ta t i on , however, 
imported seeds from abroad, pr imar i ly fo r i t s demonstration programmes 
and very l i t t l e of i t s stock went to State farms or cooperatives. 
In 1974, the f i r s t production plan was launched to specify for each 
crop, when, where and how much should be grown. In order to f u l f i l the 
production p lan, the then Hor t icu l ture Cooperative Union (HCU) (now PCMVF) 
was instructed to import the required seeds. Technical speci f icat ions of 
seeds were drav/n up by the research s ta t ion s t a f f and the HCU imported 
the seeds annually. 
In 1976 a new seed programme was launched by the Cooperative 
Programme of the FAO, namely the seed mu l t i p l i ca t ion programme. This 
programme aimed to provide local improved seeds to farmers to reduce the 
fore ign exchange spent on seed imports. The programme has been e f fec t ive 
(2) 
mainly f o r basic crops : wheat, sorghum, potatoes and maize. 
At present, the PCMVF i s s t i l l responsible for the bulk of imports 
and the d i s t r i bu t i on of improved seeds for cooperatives and State farms 
at cost p r i ce , while the mu l t i p l i ca t i on programme provides free seeds to 
cooperatives and State farms which have programme p lo ts . The research 
s ta t ion cu l t i va tes high y i e l d var ie t ies and d is t r ibute them free of charge 
to ac t i ve ly involved farmers in both State farms and cooperatives. 
I t is very hard to evaluate the effectiveness of seed programmes 
on to ta l ag r i cu l tu ra l production because seed qua l i ty represents only one 
minor var iable in the whole production mechanism. But i t can be said 
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that where there has been e f fec t i ve Government supply of seeds to farmers 
the Impact on production has been noticeable. For instance, in the 
potato and tomato programmes, with the MAAR rea l l y keen to promote these 
two products, farmers w i l l i n g l y received the seeds. These were provided 
free of charge at f i r s t , in 1975/76 and 1976/77, and then at a nominal 
p r ice . Tomato production more than doubled as the fol lowing data 
. (3) ind ica te : - . 
(Tons) 
73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 
1321 2536 .5686 6859 
43 592 1232 
Tomatoes (Household 
consumption) 
" ( fo r canning) 
Potato production is also s i gn i f i can t l y expanded by seed 
programmes which s t i l l provide considerable subsidies to farmers. The 
fo l lowing figures display the remarkable upward sh i f t s in production:-^^^ 
(Tons) . 
73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 
Potato production 2 120 4731 3874 
The drop in production in 1976/77 may be a t t r ibuted to less land 
being al located to potatoes in the production plan because a large reserve 
remained from the preceding year. 
In the case of wheat, pa r t i cu la r l y in Wadi Hadhramout, the local 
consumer prefers the local var ie ty and not the High Yield Variety 
recommended by experts. The farmer is therefore less Interested in the 
HYV which the Government encourages. The main factor for th is is in 
and buoyant^ 
fac t the local wheat pr ice is very elastic^and recently being pushed up 
in the local market. 
With other vegetables and f r u i t s , the Impact of seeds is less 
noticeable because the marketing po l ic ies and mechanisms do not take 
qua l i t y in to account. This gives no incentive to the farmer to prefer HYV's. 
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(b) F e r t i l i s e r s : 
F e r t i l i s e r imports are, p r imar i l y , the respons ib i l i t y of the Agric-
u l tu ra l Development Fund (ADF) in the MAAR, although a few large projects 
co-financed by the World Bank are allowed to import f e r t i l i s e r s for the i r 
own use. F e r t i l i s e r prices were set the by Government at subsidies up 
to 40% to cooperatives and 50% to State farms from 1975 to 1979. Thus the 
pr ice of a 50 kg. bag of urea was SYD 4.0 to cooperatives and SYD 3.0 to 
State farms, whi le a bag of t r i p l e superphosphate cost SYD 5.0 to both. 
Apart from the in te rna t iona l l y funded pro jec ts , the to ta l f e r t i l i s e r 
usage fo r the period 1975-1980 was as fol lows : 
Year Tonnes 




1979 1 .518 
1980 (estimated) 4,400 
I t i s clear that usage of f e r t i l i s e r was encouraged by the low 
prices preva i l ing up to 1978. In 1979, however, f e r t i l i s e r prices rose to 
SYD 7.0, which covers the cost pr ice plus transport and storage costs. 
The sharp decl ine in usage in 1979 may be a t t r ibu ted to th is increase. 
The overal l increase fo r the estimated inputs of f e r t i l i s e r s includes a l l 
the i n te rna t i ona l l y funded pro jects ' requirements. Cereals and cot ton, 
however, account fo r the bulk of f e r t i l i s e r usage with lesser amounts 
(4) 
going to tomatoes, potatoes, bananas and tobacco. 
The impact of f e r t i l i s e r s on production is again not easy to assess 
because of the f luc tua t ion of other var iable factors such as spate. 
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machinery and other inputs. The second f ive-year plan estimates the 







These f igures cover the requirements of a l l projects as well as that for 
current production plans during th is period. 
I t i s rather more d i f f i c u l t to disassociate f e r t i l i s e r ' s e f fec t or 
i t s impact from other factors which determine agr icu l tura l production on 
spate i r r i g a t i o n areas, such as the condit ion and course of the spate i t s e l f . 
However, assuming a normal spate course, adequate f e r t i l i s e r sh i f t s 
up ag r i cu l tu ra l production which tends to s h i f t down when less f e r t i l i s e r 
is appl ied. At present prices i t is very un l ike ly that the farmer w i l l 
apply adequate f e r t i l i s e r and therefore in the SFYP projects which are 
using and can af ford to apply f e r t i l i s e r s w i l l have higher product iv i ty 
than the ordinary farmer. 
(c) Insect ic ides 
The research s ta t ion and i t s nurseries have prime respons ib i l i t y 
f o r extension work in the country. Semi-ski l led extensionists are 
t ra ined l oca l l y and recrui ted by the research stat ion to spray various 
ag r i cu l tu ra l areas seasonally, free of charge. Cooperatives and State 
farms also have the i r own local extension groups who are trained by the 
researchers and extensionists in e i ther the research centre or the 
cooperative i n s t i t u t e . 
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Most insect ic ides are imported by both the research centre and 
the PCMVF, which supplies those plant protect ion chemicals required by 
the production plan. The insect ic ides are sold to State farms and 
cooperatives on a c red i t basis at the import cost. 
The impact of insect ic ides on agr icu l tu ra l production can be 
noticed pa r t i cu la r l y with the e l iminat ion of various crop diseases, 
and wi th pest con t ro l . Regular spraying is well maintained, especial ly 
in large wadis. Unlike f e r t i l i s e r , insect ic ides do not cost much compared 
to t h e i r e f f ec t on production. The farmer foresees that without use of 
insec t i c ides , his crop w i l l suf fer serious losses; therefore i t is not 
cost ly to avoid such a catasrophe. 
(d) Machinery and Fuel : 
Fuel prices had been heavily subsidised by the Government un t i l 
March 1980 when they rose by almost 100% owing to the removal of a l l 
subsidies on them. Machinery and spare parts are imported by the 
Agr icu l tu ra l Development Fund (ADF) or the Foreign Trade Company and are 
general ly d is t r ibu ted to State farms, cooperatives and projects at import 
cost and f ree of duty. 
Although cooperatives general ly own some machinery,they increasingly 
re ly on t rac to r services provided by the MRS. Unt i l 1980, the charges 
fo r MRS t ractor -serv ices were far below the i r costs at roughly SYD 0.65 
per hour fo r a farm t rac to r with dr iver and equipment and SYD 1.50 per 
hour fo r a crawler t r ac to r . During the course of 1980 the rates were 
increased to SYD 1.75 and SYD 4.0 per hour respect ively. Even so, 
according to o f f i c i a l estimates, a subsidy of SYD 0.50 per hour was 
involved and in 1981, the farm t rac to r charge was fur ther raised to 
SYD 2.25 per hour.^^liowever, considering the low e f f i c iency of the MRS, 
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the real cost could be reduced again i f e f f i c iency is considerably 
Improved. 
OUTPUT PRICES 
Output pr ices , both farm-gate and consumers, are basical ly det-
ermined by the agr icu l tu ra l au tho r i t i es , namely by the Po l i t i ca l 
Committee fo r the Min is t ry of Agr icul ture headed by the President in 
the past (up to 1977) and by the Consulting body of the Minist ry at 
present. This body Involves the d i rectors of a l l the main departments 
and corporations and a l l the regional d i rectors of the Ministry and 
discusses a l l the major agr icu l tu ra l issues monthly. 
Pr ic ing po l ic ies are, general ly , guided by the estimated average 
var iable costs of a crop but other factors are also considered. For 
Instance, the role of the product in the Yemeni d ie t is rather more 
important than the average costs. With crops such as tomatoes or 
potatoes which const i tu te a considerable part of the dai ly food of a 
typ ica l fami ly , the pr ice Is set at a reasonable level for those with 
the minimum income. (Both crops mentioned have costs higher than the 
price in terms of production and marketing operations and require 
Government subsid ies) . In some cases farm-gate prices alone exceed 
consumer prices and in many cases consumer prices do not f u l l y cover 
marketing and storage expenses. Table 4.1 indicates that tomatoes 
(winter) crop in 1981 and 82 and red onion and okra in 1978 were 
heavily subsidised by the Government as consumer prices f e l l short of 
farm-gate pr ices. Table4..2also Indicates generally that most crops have 
very low marketing margins. These cannot cover marketing expenses 
which have been r i s i ng owing to a spi ra l in fuel pr ices. The r i s ing 
prices of other inputs such as f e r t i l i s e r s , machinery, equipment and 
insec t i c ides , were creating great pressure on the st icky pr ic ing pol ic ies 
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Table 4.2 : Fixed Prices of Selected Fruits and Vegetables, 





















































































































































































































Prices which were f i r s t fixed in 1973 were not changed unt i l 
February, 1977. 
Department of Planning and Stat ist ics, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Agrarian reform. 
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adopted by the Government. Consequently the Government found i t se l f in an 
awkward financial situation by providing a l l necessary subsidies to 
productive sectors. In 1979 certain economic measures were taken by the 
State. The most important were the rise of wages and the release of the 
pricing policies in the agriculture and fishing sectors. Farm-gate and 
consumer prices of many items have risen though the Tatter's prices 
have risen in a higher proportion as indicated in Table 4 .1 . 
Eventually price changes for vegetables and f ru i ts came about as 
a result of various forces : F i rs t , as mentioned above, the rise of fuel 
prices and of other inputs had an increasing impact on the limited resources 
of the Government. Secondly, despite the heavy subsidies provided by 
the Government to farmers and PCMVF, depression of production in the 
second half of the 1970's on the producers and on the efficiency of the 
marketing operations. Thirdly, the Government had admitted that without 
self-motivation of the producers, huge subsidies of this type are not 
j us t i f i ed . Consequently, the general policy for the State in 1979 was to 
reduce subsidies to a minimum and provide freedom in marketing and 
cul t ivat ion pattern to farmers as discussed above in the sections on 
cooperatives and marketing. 
Other categories namely cereals, cash-crops and fodder have 
di f ferent consideration in price structures. For instance, cereal 
prices are generally guided by import prices. Most cereal crops 
f a l l short of self-suff iciency and therefore, protection policies 
are inappropriate. In wheat, the country produces, at best, 20% 
of i t s consumption. Local mil lets and sesame are in great demand; 
and sesame in part icular, witnessed higher prices in recent y e a r s . O n l y 
basic cereals such as wheat and sorghum are s t r i c t l y controlled in price 
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while others have some price fluctuations with respect to supply and demand 
factors. 
Cash crops have two prices : an agr icul tural , farm-gate price and 
an industrial or trade price. Cotton, for instance, has a farm-gate 
price for the producer (the farmer) (175 f i l s a lb) and the Board, after 
ginning, sel ls i t at a di f ferent price to the National Company for foreign 
trade which in i ts turn exports i t at a dif ferent price. The case of 
tobacco is similar. Farm-gate prices of cash crops are guided, mainly, 
by production cost, while their industrial or export prices are guided 
by international prices taking quality into consideration. In recent 
years - from 1979 onwards the farm-gate prices of a l l cash-crop prices 
have been pushed up sharply. For example cotton : from 75 f i l s per lb 
to n o f i l s per lb for short and medium staple and to 175 f i l s 
per lb for long-staple; Tobacco, f i rs t , f rom SYD 1 .250 per kg. to 
SYD 2 .00 , then to SYD 3.00 per kg. today, Bananas from 20 f i l s per kg. 
to 55 f i l s per kg. ^ ^ ^ 
Fodder crops such as A l fa l fa , fodder-sorghum, -enjoy a free market 
price. The State has six completed dairy farms and two under construction. 
High-grade breeds of dairy catt le (Freisians and crossed Herefords) 
are kept and reared. In total there are about 80,000 cat t le , of which 
about 5,000 are State owned. There are two mil l ion goats and sheep, of 
which not more than two or three thousand are on the State farms. 
Thus the majority of livestock is in the private sector. State dairy 
farms, however, are sel f -suf f ic ient in fodder, apart from some minerals 
that are imported for their livestock. The private sector obtains 
i t s fodder from cooperatives and State farms. Due to a high demand for 
fodder, cooperatives have in recent years expanded fodder crops at the 
expense of vegetables, f ru i t s and cereals. This situation worried the 
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agricultural authorities very much when plan-production targets were 
not achieved. Restriction on fodder planting has therefore now become 
of prime concern to the agricultural authorit ies. The Government, 
therefore, is now engaged in grouping shepherds and providing basic 
f ac i l i t i e s for their herds such as wells and pastures. 
Livestock prices are uniform throughout the country as discussed 
above in the section on corporations - Meat Marketing Corporation. The 
private sector price is for live-weight goats or cows and is subject 
to the Supply-Demand market. 
For economic s tab i l i t y , the Government through i ts marketing 
agencies (PCMVF & MMC) imports several items such as onions, potatoes, 
f r u i t s , dried ch i l l i e s , gar l ic , chickens, eggs and frozen meat in order 
to cover shortages of local production. Imported items are controlled 
and have the same prices as l oca l l y produced items. 
Looking at the whole structure of agricultural prices, i t is 
hard to establish a single-basis for these prices. The assemblage of 
socio-economic factors is taken into account each time when prices are 
changed. Some consultants have tr ied to analyse price changes with 
respect to purely economic factors but such an approach does not f i t . t he 
socially-manoevred economy. For example, i f the opportunity cost of 
land for any strategic crop such as wheat or sorghum were considered, 
the whole country would instead produce tobacco, which is the highest-
return product! Pricing policies are, therefore, to be viewed and 
analysed with respect to the socio-economic and pol i t ical objectives of 
the national economy as a whole. 
No doubt the heavy costs borne by the Government in subsidising 
agricultural output were the major feature behind price rises in 
recent years. But some cr i t i cs would attr ibute the gradual decline in 
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the output of certain basic crops in the mid 1970's to low prices. 
Cotton and dates notably f e l l short in 1976 of their records of the 
early 1970's and continued to decline up to 1979. Sesame, onions and 
nuts had almost stagnant or declining yields per acre. Most cr i t ics 
in MAAR would think that stable prices had been for a long time and 
therefore no longer provide any incentive to farmers, while other 
sectors such as construction and communications provide better pay, 
return and conditions to their workers. Stagnant prices for agric-
ultural output would have destroyed the farming sector and the Govern-
ment budget i f prices had not risen in favour of producers. But whatever 
is said about the decline of the mid 1970's in output, i t is very hard 
to single out one factor as responsible for this phenomenon. There are 
other crucial but uncontrollable factors in the production process. The 
i r regular i ty of spate i r r igat ion could be held more responsible than 
sticky prices, or inefficiency in management could be another factor and 
so on and so for th. The element of prices is a factor, but not the 
only one. 
Taxation 
Almost a l l imports for agricultural inst i tut ions (State farms, 
cooperatives, corporations and institutes)are duty-free in accordance 
with the statute regarding development plans. The exemption from duty on 
raw materials, equipment and machinery is not specific to agriculture 
but applies to a l l public and cooperative sectors of a l l productive 
industries.^'^^Imported machinery bought by the private sector and outside 
the development plan programmes is subject to duty at relat ively low 
rates, for example 1% on agricultural pumps and 15% on tractors 
(4) 
(compared to 100% on other vehicles). 
On the production side, a State tax is levied on the value of 
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agricultural production. Within the public and cooperative sector the 
tax applies to a farm's total output of grains, sesame, cotton and 
tobacco and to the marketed portion of i t s production of vegetables 
and f r u i t s . 
The rates of tax applicable from 1975 to 1981 were as follows i ' 
Grains 10?^  Cotton 15% 
Sesame 10% Tobacco 15% 
Potatoes 10% Bananas 10% 
Dates 10% Fodder NIL 
Tomatoes 10% Livestock NIL 
The tax on cotton was reduced to 10% in May 1981; taxes on other products 
remained as above. 
The private sector is not subject to State taxes since i t receives 
hardly any Government assistance and i ts marketed portion is very 
nominal. Only the production of Qat, which is a mild drug, is severely 
restricted (as is i t s use) and taxed. Further expansion of ^at is 
prohibited and every encouragement is given to replacing i t by coffee. 
Table 4.3 displays revenue from tax on agricultural production and 
indicates the significance of Qat production-tax to the Ministry of 
Finance. 
Cooperatives are responsible for collecting the State tax from 
their members, usually by deduction when the member is paid for produce 
marketed through the cooperative. 
Cooperatives levy a membership fee on their members to cover 
administration and other overhead costs. The rate of levy is normally 
(8) 
5% but cooperatives are permitted to set a higher rate up to 10%. 
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percentage charges for pump replacement, insurance and social purposes. 
/ o 1 
These levies are also collected by sales proceeds' deduction.^ ' 
Furthermore, farmers dependent on spate i r r igat ion are charged 
the nominal sum of SYD 1.0 per acre per season in Abya Delta and Wadi 
Tuban areas. This represents a considerable subsidy to farmers benefiting 
from developed i r r igat ion schemes. 
Taxes are also levied on certain imported agricultural products to 
bring the prices up to the local leve l ; conversely, they may be subsidised, 
i f necessary, for the same purpose. Example of the current rates of 
duty on commodities that are important in domestic production are:-
Grains 5% Tomatoes 10% 
Sesame seeds 5% Dates 10% 
Sesame o i l 5% Raw cotton 15% . 
Potatoes 10% Cotton l i n t 15% 
Other imported items necessary for domestic consumption, gar l ic , dry ch i l l i es , 
eggs and various f ru i t s were substantially subsidised from 1970 unti l 
1981. In 1982 most of these items have higher consumer prices as personal 
income is now increasing; thus relieving the Government gradually of 
large subsidies. Due to the excess in banana production, the State has 
a protective tax for i t reaching 30%. 
Final ly , there is the taxation levied on the profi ts of agric-
ul tural inst i tut ions and corporations. All corporations and f inancial/ 
productive inst i tut ions are subject to Law No.11 of 1973 which states 
that 75% of a l l net prof i ts goes to the State. Until 1980 this was in 
the ra t io : 50% to the Development Fund ( i . e . Ministry of Planning) : 
25% to the current budget ( i .e . Ministry of Finance) and 25% to be 
ploughed back in further investment. This rat io was changed in 1980 and 
90% is to go to the Ministry of Finance which, together with the Ministry 
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of Planning, allocates i t to national programmes. 
In conclusion, agricultural prices are controlled throughout the 
country by price policies which were for a long period 1969 - 1979 very 
sticky and did not change. Prices set by agricultural authorities 
approved by the State were guided to a certain extent by the average 
variable costs of production. Fixed costs are not considered and are 
usually borne by the Government. Socio-economic factors, however, play 
a major role in determining the prices of basic productions such as 
the personal disposable income and the position of the product in 
family d iet . 
Input prices have been heavily subsidised in order to help the 
producer to cope with the low farm-gate prices of his output. Irres-
pective of qual i ty , the farmer's output maintains a guaranteed market 
with no burden on him in marketing act iv i t ies . Furthermore, the farmer 
receives re l i e f or compensation during drought or flood seasons 
respectively. 
Cr i t ics of the sticky prices policy attr ibute the decline in 
agricultural production of 1976 and 1977 to stagnant price policies, des-
pite the heavy subsidies borne by the Government. With the intention 
of reducing subsidies to a minimum level , the Government changed the 
price structure in favour of the producer to motivate him for more prod-
uction in 1979. Farm-gate and consumer prices rose as income and wages 
were r i s ing . The Government reduced local subsidies but continued to 
subsidise imported products needed for consumption. The marketing system, 
somehow, relaxed so that a farmer can market privately any products 
beyond the Plan's target. Such Incentives made by the Government are 
throught to increase the production to meet r ising demand for food and 
improve productivity per acre. 
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Taxation, for some time, was thought to be rather harsh on 
farmers, but considering a l l the essential infrastructure borne by 
the State, i t is just at the r ight level . Where there is a need to 
promote a specific crop, taxes are reduced as in the case of cotton. 
Similarly i f production of a specific crop is in excess of national 
consumption, a protective tax is set up as in the case of bananas. 
Unfortunately, most of the basic items fa l l short of local 
consumption and therefore nominal taxes are applied to bring the 
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Rural development is usua'Sly treated as one of the vi tal issues 
in social ist l i terature and has been particularly emphasised in the 
Marxist-Leninist theory. Indeed, i t is often argued that without rural 
development, socialism is meaningless. 
As a newly established State with the majority of i ts population 
in rural areas, PDRY has repeatedly underlined rural development issues 
in Party and State l i terature. The issues have been addressed and 
emphasised in a l l the economic plans of the State since independence. 
The importance attached to rural development in PDRY reflects three main 
factors, namely: F i rs t , the whole country was divided pol i t ica l ly into 
seventeen States and economic and social gaps existed between the then 
scattered Sultanates and Sheikhdoms. Secondly, most of economic potential 
for the development of the country exists in the rural areas - agriculture, 
f isheries and o i l . Thirdly, most of the leaders of the Party and the 
State have rural roots which gives them a special enthusiasm for the 
effective implementation of rural policies. 
With respect to rural strategy the country adopted a balanced 
growth strategy in i t s social and economic development plans ( i . e . giving 
equal attention in investment programmes in both social services and in 
productive sectors). Unlike most other developing countries (Venezuela, 
for example) which in the 1960's invested most heavily in the industrial 
sector, PDRY gave pr ior i ty to agro-rural sector to- build up i ts national 
development from. Accordingly, the communication sector was the f i r s t 
to be given attention in the f i r s t economic plan.^^ )\bout 40% of the 
total tr iennial plan (1971/72-1973/74) resources allocated to the building 
(2) 
of roads to l ink a l l the main towns with the capital (Aden)i Mhis was 
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an essential step - not only for rural development - but also for def-
ensive purposes. 
The 'balanced growth' strategy contributed enormously to rural 
development through the spread of social f a c i l i t i e s . At independence 
only Aden City enjoyed some social services (3 secondary schools for 
boys and 1 for g i r l s ; about 9 primary schools; 6 preparatory schools, 
2 hospitals and about 5 health.centres). Even those social services 
were not suff ic ient for the growing population of Aden, which was at 
least 350,000. Other main towns such as Mukalla, Seyoun, Zingibar and 
Lahej hardly enjoyed any decent social f a c i l i t i e s . Up to 1965 none 
of these main towns had any secondary school or a technical college. 
However, since independence - and especially since 1973, the number of 
schools, colleges, hospitals and health centres has increased in number 
as displayed in Tables 5.1,2 and much of this increase has been outside 
Aden indicating the horizontal expansion of national development.^ "^^ 
Table 5.1 shows that educational expenditure has risen from about 
. SYD 1.5 mi l l ion in 1970 to about 8.2 mil l ion in 1977. This represents 
the Government's deep concern on basic educational programmes despite 
i t s meagre resources. The big rise in number of students in a l l stages 
is an important achievement of the country's plans. However, the 
rat io of educational expenditure to total State expenditure has been 
. . (4) r is ing. 
Table 5.2 displays medical establishments in the country during 
the period 1969-1977. Unlike schools, hospitals and medical centres 
involve more time and capital (beds and medical equipment). The increase, 
therefore,is not as spectacular as schools. Medical units, however, 
easy to establish with 2 to 3 qualified nurses and a v is i t ing doctor per 
day for each have been of great use in rural areas. All medical 
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Table 5.1 
Schools in the Education Sector 


























1968/69 n.a. - 109,227 1,560 
1969/70 1,517 10.2 781 17 114,956 2,058 
1970/71 1,976 11.3 940 17 156,130 3,023 
1971/72 2,293. 11.4 972 18 163,231 3,627 
1972/73 2,397 11.5 1,033 22 .178,928 5,206 
1973/74 3,547 15.5 1,131 22 206,984 6,933 
1974/75 4,134 15.0 1,114 22 226,940 7,915 
1975 4,012 15.7 1 ,153 24 237,965 9,767 
1 
1 
1976 5,877 j 15.0 
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1,379 32 263,682 13,501 
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establishments provide free medication. 
The main rural policies of the Government were to provide basic 
needs of l i f e to rural populations namely, shelter, water, food, clothing, 
education, health and employment. I n i t i a l l y the major emphasis was on 
the main towns and nearby villages where the short term economic pot-
ential was promising. However, before attempting to deal with basic 
economic needs, certain constitutional changes were needed as a legal 
basis for the new economic policies (such as the family law, i l l i te racy 
law, women's r ight and, above a l l , land reform). The Government, thus, 
spent the f i r s t four to f ive years manipulating social and economic 
legis lat ion. 
There have been many dif ferent instruments for implementing 
rural pol icies. For example, the Agrarian Reform Law No. 27 of 1970 
had the MAAR, the State farms, the cooperatives and other inst i tut ions; 
while the 'Housing' Law No. 32 of 1972 had the newly created Ministry 
of Housing; and the Yemeni Women Federation was one of the instruments 
for the Family Law No. I of 1974. At the local level , several more 
inst i tut ions were established to act as instruments for social and 
economic policies such as cormnunity development centres,.social centres, 
party inst i tut ions and Government departments of sectoral and social 
services ministr ies. Thus a l l policies had several instruments at 
both central and local levels to ensure effective supervision and 
manipulation, but s t i l l coordinating problems do take place as wi l l be 
discussed below. 
Rural development progranmes are a combination of economic 
ac t iv i t ies - agriculture, f isheries, communication and transport, water 
and e lect r i f icat ion and of social services - education, health and 
cultural ac t i v i t ies . The effects and impact of the Government invest-
ments and policies in rural areas are examined sector by sector below. 
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I t has a l ready been i nd i ca ted t h a t the Government has adopted a 
h o r i z o n t a l p a t t e r n f o r i t s na t iona l development. Tables 5 .3 , 5,4 and 5.5 
d i s p l a y investment expendi ture i n the Trenn ia l P lan , FFYP and SFYP 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . The Trenn ia l P lan , s t resses the communication and con-
s t r u c t i o n sec tor to l ay down the requ i red in f rast ruc lure (noacfe)for na t iona l 
development. The FFYP g ives s t ress to the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector as a 
lead ing p roduc t i ve sector and to t rans form r u r a l l i f e together w i t h 
soc ia l se rv i ces programmes. The SFYP cont inues w i t h the ho r i zon ta l 
p a t t e r n o f the na t iona l development w i t h some s t ress on housing, e l ec -
t r i c i t y and a g r i c u l t u r e . 
A g r i c u l t u r a l sec tor has been the most impor tant sec to r , not on ly 
f o r i t s popu la t i on but f o r i t s socio-economic p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . About 
80% o f the popu la t ion l i v e ou ts ide Aden c i t y - i n r u r a l areas and about . 
60% o f them depend on a g r i c u l t u r e f o r t h e i r 1 i v e l ihood.( ^ Vhe Government 
f e e l s the g rea t need o f more investment i n t h i s sector to prov ide the 
requ i red food produc t ion and the raw ma te r i a l s f o r c i t i z e n s and growing 
i n d u s t r i e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . The i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s , however, are very expensive 
but being i n e v i t a b l e f o r r u r a l development, they absorb a high po r t i on 
o f investment plans and labour . 
The f i s h e r i e s sector i s a lso a r u r a l one but l i m i t e d to the 
coas ta l a r e a . Before 1969, f i s h i n g was the occupat ion o f about 13,000 
p r i v a t e f i shermen, most ly grouped i n p r i m i t i v e v i l l a g e s scat te red along 
the coast and c o n t r o l l e d by ch ie f s .and f i s h t r a d e r s . Since then the 
Government has d r a s t i c a l l y changed t h i s s t r u c t u r e . At present , most 
f ishermen are grouped i n t o coopera t ives whose catch i s mainly f o r domestic 
consumption. The m i n i s t r y a lso has a l a rge f l e e t whose catch i s main ly 
f o r e x p o r t . A t i t s peak i n 1977, f i s h product ion was f a r behind i t s 
f u l l p o t e n t i a l . I t i s est imated t h a t the minimum sus ta inab le y i e l d 
should range between 425,000 and 650,000 tons - th ree to fou r t imes the 
1977 l e v e l . Such vas t p o t e n t i a l i n t h i s sector had encouraged the 
-122-
Table 5.3 Investment Expendi ture o f 
The Trenn ia l Plan (1 971/72 - 1 97_3/74[ 
SECTOR . ALLOCATED ACTUALS 
A g r i c u l t u r e 6.81 5.88 
F isher ies 0.78 0.84 
Inudstr.y 9.20 5.33 
T ranspo r t , Communications 
and Cons t ruc t ion 
12.90 10.15 
Socia l Services 2.72 2.52 
TOTAL 32.41 24.72 
Source : The Trenn ia l Plan (1971/72-1973/74) 
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Table 5.4 Investment Expenditure 
FFYP 1974 - 1978 
YD m i l l ions 
Sector Planned A l l oca ted Actuals 
A g r i c u l t u r e 20,797 52,556 43,382 
F isher ies 9,447 37,475 26,810 
Indus t r y n ,574 46,974 33,966 
Transpor t & Communication 3,103 36,752 25,726 
Cons t ruc t ions 16,285 40,136 31 ,023 
Socia l Services 14,153 62,254 33,905 
TOTAL 75,359 276,247 194,812 
P E R C E N T A G E % 
A g r i c u l t u r e 28 19 23 
F isher ies 12 14 • 14 
I ndus t r y 15 17 18 
Transpor t & Communication 4 13 13 
Const ruc t ions 22 15 16 
Socia l Services 19 23 17 
100 100 100 
Source : Eva lua t i on o f the FFYP - M i n i s t r y o f P lann ing . 
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Table 5.5 Total Investment For 
The Second Amended Five-Year 
Plan 1981-1985 
YD m i l l i o n s 
S e c t o r / M i n i s t r y YD 000,000 % 
M i n i s t r y o f I ndus t ry 19,6 3.9 
Pub l ic Corpora t ion f o r E l e c t r i c i t y 68,6 13.5 
Nat ional Water Corporat ion 20,7 4 
Minera ld and Oi l Corporat ion 31,4 6.2 
M i n i s t r y f o r Fish Wealth 33,2 6.5 
M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e 61 ,9 •12.2 
M i n i s t r y o f Const ruc t ion 48,9 9.6 
M i n i s t r y o f Transport 44,3 8.7 
M i n i s t r y o f Education 22,5 4.4 
M i n i s t r y o f Publ ic Heal th 14,4 2.8 
M i n i s t r y of Cu l tu re and Tourism 16,0 3.1 
S ta te Committee f o r In fo rmat ion 16,5 3.2 
M i n i s t r y o f Labour and C i v i l Service 1,5 0.3 
M i n i s t r y o f Trade and Supply 5,3 1.0 
M i n i s t r y o f Housing 86,3 17.0 
M i n i s t r y o f Local A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 15,0 3.0 
High Sport Council 1,1 0,2 
Centra l S t a t i s t i c a l Bureau 0.8 0.16 
Centra l Bank o f Yemen 0.2 0.4 
TOTAL 508,2 i^o_g 
Source: The Second Amended FYP 1981-85, M i n i s t r y of P lanning, 
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Government to i nves t more i n t h i s sec to r , not on ly to generate c a p i t a l 
bu t a l so to improve r u r a l and urban n u t r i t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s ^ ) 
The t r a n s p o r t and communication sector i s a key support OT r u r a l 
development. Before 1969, except i n the p r i v i l e g e d d i s t r i c t o f Aden, 
the c o u n t r y ' s reg ions were connected o n l y by unpaved t r a c k s . There 
were a i r l i n e s using unpaved a i r f i e l d s and minor coastal s h i p p i n g , 
s e r v i c e s , us ing t r a d i t i o n a l boa ts , l i n k i n g Aden and Muka l la . Now Aden 
i s l i n k e d w i t h Mukal la (620 kms.) and Taiz i n Yemen Arab Republic 
(80 kms. i n PDRY) by paved roads and the t o t a l l eng th o f paved roads 
i s about 1,500 kms. In a d d i t i o n there are unpaved roads o f about 5,500 
kms. compared w i t h 4,368 kms. i n 1969. During the per iod 1971-77 some 
YD 46 m i l l i o n (28% o f t o t a l p lan investment) were devoted f o r the deve l -
opment o f t h i s sec to r . The second pa r t o f the sevent ies saw some a t t -
en t i on to o the r k inds o f communicat ions, namely : telephones i n o ther 
main towns o f the Governorates; increase i n t r anspo r t equipment such as 
buses, t a x i s and aerop lanes; cables and t e l e x communication among Gov-
e rnora tes and abroad. In g e n e r a l , the Government i s s t i l l pursuing the 
expansion p o l i c y o f l i n k i n g a l l r u r a l areas w i t h the urban popula t ion 
by roads and o ther means. 
S t a r t i n g w i t h educat ion on the soc ia l serv ices sec to r , the Gov-
ernment a t tached high p r i o r i t y to i t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r u ra l areas where 
the re had been v i r t u a l l y no development in the pre-independence e ra . 
Dur ing the per iod 1968/69-77/78, the number o f students en ro l l ed in a l l 
l e v e l s o f formal educat ion rose from 110,787 to about 277,183 as 
i nd i ca ted i n Table 5.1 (Tota l Number o f s tuden ts , pr imary , in te rmed ia te 
and secondary) . In a d d i t i o n to formal schools there are now about 446 a d u l t 
l i t e r a c y cen t res ( w i t h 44,000 p a r t i c i p a n t s ) and a l i m i t e d number o f 
voca t i ona l t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t e s . However desp i te these achievements, the 
i l l i t e r a c y r a t e i s s t i l l as h igh as 80%. I t dropped a t the pr imary 
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school l e v e l to 50% of the age group and a t secondary school l eve l to 
(6) 
66%. Moreover, there i s a g rea t need to improve the q u a l i t y o f educ-
a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s . Not l e a s t , due to lack o f resources, almost a l l 
educat ion i s co-educat iona l - a step t h a t met resentment a t the beginning 
f o r c u l t u r a l purposes - but has begun to be accepted. 
The hea l t h se rv ices were, on the whole, poor before independence 
but s ince then they have been expanded q u i t e r a p i d l y . The PDRY 1970 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s ta ted t h a t medical care " i s the r i g h t of each c i t i z e n , 
and the Government guarantees t h i s r i g h t through expansion o f f r e e 
hea l th s e r v i c e s . " As pa r t o f t h i s guarantee, p r i v a t e c l i n i c s were a b o l -
ished i n 1973, w h i l e the number o f phys ic ians has increased from 71 i n 
1970 to 222 a t present (o f which 114 are l o c a l s ) . The number o f hosp i t a l s 
beds rose from about 1,278 i n 1970 to around 3,000 i n 1980. At present 
there are 29 h o s p i t a l s , 17 medical c e n t r e s , 263 s tab le and mobi le medical 
u n i t s and 91 c l i n i c s throughout the coun t r y . Mobi le u n i t s now tour r u r a l 
areas to i n j e c t people aga ins t dangerous diseases such as T.B and ma la r i a . 
Table ^.2. d i sp l ays the medical estab l ishments which have been increas ing 
owing to Government concern over the hea l th aspect in r u r a l l i f e . The 
general decrease i n the number o f c l i n i c s i n e a r l y 7 0 ' s , however, i s due 
t o the f a c t t h a t many p r i v a t e c l i n i c s run by p r i v a t e doctors were closed 
and some o f the doc to rs emigrated to surrounding areas i n the Gul f 
S t a t e s . To sus ta in these serv ices the Government has invested heav i l y -
w i t h ass is tance from the UNICEF and WHO - i n the hea l th manpower i n s t i t u t e 
t o supply graduates and q u a l i f i e d manpower. The medical expendi tures i n 
the p lan i n 1981 reached SYD 3.7 m i l l i o n c o n s t i t u t i n g 3% o f the t o t a l 
p l a n ' s expendi ture o f the same yea r . 
The supply o f d r i n k i n g water to a l l people i s a major na t iona l 
p o l i c y . The pub l i c water copora t i on was s p e c i f i c a l l y es tab l i shed to 
f u l f i l t h i s need, working i n c o o r d i n a t i o n w i th the d r i l l i n g sec t ion o f 
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the DIME a t the MAAR. (Very r e c e n t l y (1981) the d r i l l i n g sec t ion has 
been t ransformed i n t o a d r i l l i n g Corporat ion at tached to MAAR). Dr ink ing 
water i s most ly ground water suppl ied by a we l l or a s p r i n g . In the 
e a r l y years o f the Pub l ic Water Corpo ra t i on , i t s annual budget f o r 
d r i n k i n g water programmes (apar t from cu r ren t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e expenses) 
was weighted towards the tremendous problem o f supply ing Aden but s t i l l 
about 25% on average was d i r e c t e d towards s p e c i f i c a l l y r u r a l p r o j e c t s . 
The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e d i sp lays expendi tures on s p e c i f i c water p ro jec t s 




Total j 69-70 70-71 71-72 72-73 
Rural water 45,709 86,635 53,518 75,371 181,853 178,000 
1 
621,086 i 
Nor th-Deser t 22,000 17,000 3,119 9,002 26,397 - 77,518 ; 
ADEN 522,578 561,644 639,532 787,497 766,142 768,368 4,045,761 
MUKALLA 12,000 33,000 38,725 31,471 53,503 92,818 261,517 
^Purposes ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ 1 22,549 107,687 322,357 
TOTAL 641 ,421 698,279 749,820 941 ,402 1,150,444 1,146,873 5,328,239 
These programmes were not the on l y ones as o ther d r i n k i n g water programmes 
were inco rpora ted in the i n t eg ra ted r u r a l development .programmes (which 
w i l l be discussed i n t h i s chapter be low) . Nat ional d r i n k i n g water pro-
grammes i n the l a t e 1970's and e a r l y 1980's have been acce lera ted -
e s p e c i a l l y i n r u r a l areas - but w i t h ever inc reas ing u n i t c o s t s . For 
example, the Aden Water Supply P ro jec t s t a r t ed in 1981 to withdraw water 
f rom Abyan about 60 kms. away - a t a t o t a l cost o f about SYD 700,000. 
The t o t a l SFYP investment o f the Publ ic Water Corporat ion i s now 
SYD 3 m i l l i o n s o f which t h i s SYD 700,000 i s f o r Aden and the remaining 
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75% i s f o r r u r a l a reas. This i s i n a d d i t i o n to programmes f o r d r i n k i n g 
water incorpora ted i n o ther p r o j e c t s . 
Rural e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n d id not e x i s t i n the.pre- independence 
per iod except in very few main towns, such as MukaTla, Lahej or Modia, 
which had l i m i t e d capac i t y f o r e l e c t r i c p roduc t i on . Even Aden c i t y 
on l y had two power s t a t i o n s , each w i t h a capac i t y o f 25 megawats (MW). 
Undoubtedly urban and r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n i s very much needed 
f o r p roduc t ion methods and processing i n modern days. Modern techniques 
i n both a g r i c u l t u r e and i n d u s t r y cannot be app l i ed w i thou t e l e c t r i c 
power - p a r t i c u l a r l y i f these are a t l a rge sca le . 
In PDRY, however, a g r i c u l t u r a l areas a t the o u t s k i r t s o f towns . 
used to be run on d iese l pumps and genera to rs . In order to increase 
p roduc t ion and to in t roduce modern farming methods,, most o f the 
coopera t i ves and State farms have now replaced t h e i r d iese l pumps by 
e l e c t r i c a l pumps a f t e r being connected to the loca l urban supply nearby. 
Up to e a r l y 1982 - before complet ing the Wadi-Hadhramout e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n 
p r o j e c t - a subs tan t i a l sector o f a g r i c u l t u r e was not e l e c t r i f i e d . 
Rural e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n on l y s t a r t e d to have proper programming i n 1971, 
the f i r s t year of the Trenn ia l P lan. Before t h i s , there were a few 
r u r a l schemes run by the l o c a l res iden ts but a l l involved non-planned 
expansion which r e s u l t e d i n t echn ica l f a u l t s . With cen t ra l planning 
o f economic a c t i v i t i e s , e l e c t r i c i t y p ro j ec t s go in p a r a l l e l w i t h o ther 
major p r o j e c t s in urban and r u r a l a reas . Rural e l e c t r i c s t a t i ons have 
t h e i r own techn ica l s t a f f i n t h e i r respec t i ve s t a t i ons ready to r e p a i r 
any f a u l t . Aden C i t y , however, s t i l l dominates the major po r t i on o f 
generated capac i t y (about 60%) and owing to l i m i t e d f i n a n c i a l resources, 
r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n i s main ly conf ined to product ive areas and densely 
popu la ted areas such as Muka l la , Seyoun, Ash ih r , Z ing ibar and L a h ^ j . 
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F i n a l l y a t the formal soc ia l serv ices f r o n t the housing sector 
rece ived l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n i n the e a r l y stage o f development. There was 
no pub l i c housing sector before 1972 and, s ince t hen , the sector has 
faced many problems as the Government could do very l i t t l e f i n a n c i a l l y -
on l y i n v e s t i n g SYD 1 m i l l i o n i n 1976. In 1979 and 1980, the housing 
investment increased to SYD 1.5 and 3 m i l l i o n s , r e s p e c t i v e l y and even 
those amounts are meant to cope w i t h urban popu la t ion growth ra the r 
than r u r a l g rowth . I t i s the task o f the SFYP, however, to c o n t r i b u t e to 
r u r a l housing w i t h i t s housing a l l o c a t i o n s o f SYD 86 m i l l i o n f o r both 
urban and r u r a l housing p r o j e c t s . The p r i v a t e sector in housing - f inanced 
by Yemeni immigrants abroad c o n t r i b u t e , to a c e r t a i n ex ten t , to r u r a l 
housing problems. However up to now the housing problem i s on a much 
l a r g e r sca le i n urban areas than r u r a l areas owing to the f a c t t h a t 
extended f a m i l i e s s t i l l tend to l i v e together i n r u r a l areas wh i le i n 
urban areas nuclear f a m i l i e s are predominant. 
Amongst the main elements i n r u r a l development are the r u r a l formal 
and in fo rmal o rgan i sa t i ons such as the Yemeni Women Federat ion (YWF), 
Farmers' Union, Youth Unions, Cooperat ives, Pub l ic Counci ls and, above a l l . 
Community Development Centres (CDC). 
The YWF was es tab l i shed i n 1974 w i t h the i n t e g r a t i o n o f two women's 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s founded dur ing the l i b e r a t i o n movement. I t s p o l i c i e s and 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s are designed to achieve g rea te r p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f 
women a t a l l l e v e l s o f economic and p o l i t i c a l l i f e , the e rad i ca t i on of 
i l l i t e r a c y and the implementat ion o f the p r i n c i p l e s o f compulsory 
educat ion f o r women w i t h regard to matr imonia l r i g h t s . I t has advocated 
the es tab l i shment o f a minimum age f o r mar r iage; the r i g h t o f g i r l s to 
have the f i n a l dec i s ion i n t h e i r mar r iage ; the a b o l i t i o n o f polygamy, 
the es tab l i shment o f a f i x e d amount f o r the dowry and the l i m i t a t i o n and 
r e d u c t i o n o f the inc idence o f d i vo rce c la ims l a r g e l y supported by the 
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Family Law o f 1974.^^-' 
The Farmers' Union was organised i n October 1976 in accordance 
w i t h the r e s o l u t i o n o f the Centra l Committee o f the Un i f i ed P o l i t i c a l 
Organ isa t ion - Nat ional F ron t . I t s main f u n c t i o n i s to r a i s e the s t an -
dard o f l i v i n g o f r u r a l people, represent them a t the Central and P o l i t i c a l 
Committees; guide r u r a l pub l i c op in ion ' , change the out look o f farmers 
and p a r t i c i p a t e in the p lanning and implementat ion o f development schemes. 
The Yemeni Youth Democratic Federat ion p lay a great r o l e i n r u r a l 
areas by o rgan i s i ng and m o b i l i s i n g youth f o r s o c i a l , economic and 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . They c o n t r i b u t e to s e l f - h e l p p ro j ec t s and i n i t i a t e 
campaigns f o r implementat ion o f development schemes by vo lun ta ry work. 
They a lso p a r t i c i p a t e i n the i l l i t e r a c y e r a d i c a t i o n campaign i n r u r a l areas. 
The Community Development Centres (CDC) are the most impor tant 
i n s t i t u t i o n s because they are main ly designed f o r r u r a l areas where nomads 
predominate. About seven CDC's have been s t a r t ed i n 1975-77 i n the nor thern 
dese r t o f the Shabwa, Hadhramout and Al-Mahara Governorates. Each cent re 
has indoor and outdoor a c t i v i t i e s , k i nde rga r ten , c h i l d and mother we l fa re 
s e c t i o n , h a n d i c r a f t workshop f o r men, sewing and embroidery c lasses f o r 
women, animal t rea tment u n i t , l i t e r a c y c lasses and a l i b r a r y . The cent re 
organ ises t r a i n i n g courses and extens ion work i n a l l aspects o f i n t e r e s t 
t o r u r a l people. S e l f - h e l p a c t i v i t i e s are the backbone o f the cen t r e . 
Another impor tan t issue i n r u r a l development i s t h a t o f employment 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s which the huge amounts o f development plans in the form o f 
l a r g e - s c a l e and long-range p r o j e c t s are provided i n r u r a l areas. PDRY's 
work ing age popu la t i on i n 1980 was est imated a t 950,000 ( i . e . 50% o f 
Tota l Popu la t ion ) o f which 860,000 were capable o f employment. Of these 
o n l y about 490,000 a re employed and about 370,000 are e f f e c t i v e l y 
unemployed. However, 350,000 o f the unemployed are not seeking jobs 
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( e . g . urban women out o f the labour f o r ce and those depending on r e m i t -
tances sent to them from abroad) . Consequently the number of those 
who are r e a l l y unemployed i s about 12,000 workers,compares favourab ly w i t h 
47,000 i n 1969. A l l these are u n s k i l l e d labourers coming o r i g i n a l l y 
(6) 
from the r u r a l areas. A t p resent , most o f the unemployed are being 
absorbed and the coun t ry a c t u a l l y imported about 15,000 workers from 
Ind ia and Bangladesh i n 1981 to f u l f i l cons t r uc t i ona l p r o j e c t s . 
In terms o f urban and r u r a l investments , i t can be sa id t h a t not 
less than 80% o f t o t a l investments have been d i r e c t e d towards r u r a l 
a reas . I t i s , however, very hard to draw a s t r i c t l i n e between the two; 
but f rom Tables 5 .3 , 5 . 4 , and 5.5 which represent the plans a l l o c a t i o n s 
and expend i tu res o f the Trenn ia l P lan , the FFYP and SFYP r e s p e c t i v e l y , 
the h igh p o r t i o n o f r u r a l investments represented by a l l sec to rs ,excep t 
i n d u s t r y , c a n be observed. Even the i ndus t r y sector inc ludes c e r t a i n 
r u r a l p r o j e c t s such as r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n , d r i n k i n g water and o i l 
and minera l e x p l o r a t i o n p r o j e c t s . Table 5.6 d i sp lays investment 
expend i tu re o f FFYP on soc ia l se rv ices sec to r . About 60% o f these i n v e s t -
ments on soc ia l se rv ices were des t ined f o r r u r a l a reas . 
I t has been quest ioned whether these r u r a l a c t i v i t i e s have any 
l i nkages w i t h each o ther or j u s t r e f l e c t a se r ies o f separate dec i s i ons . 
I t cannot be denied there have been i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n the programming o f 
some o f these r u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . For i ns tance , a market ing cent re would 
be opened and on l y some t ime l a t e r would the quest ion o f storage be taken 
up, or there might be the es tab l ishment o f a State farm w i thou t t h i n k i n g 
o f an access road l i n k i n g the farm w i t h the main road. Such uncoordinated 
a c t i o n has taken place even dur ing the per iod o f p lann ing . For these reasons 
the idea o f i n t e g r a t e d r u r a l programmes was i n i t i a t e d by p lanning machinery 
and encouraged by i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rgan isa t i ons such as the Uni ted Nat ions , 
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Tab1e 5.6 Investments On Social Services 
Sector During the FFYP 






Educat ion 6,060,0 10,297,0 169,9 i 
• 
Heal th 3,410,0 3,292,0 96,5 ; 
I n fo rma t i on 861 ,0 3,194,6 371,0 
Cu l tu re & Tourism 65,0 1 ,764,0 2713,8 
Labour & C i v i l Serv ice - 941,0 - 1 
Local A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 437,0 4,323,6 990 1 
Hou s i ng 3,320,0 4,739,4 142,7 • 
Trade & Supply - 1 ,423,6 i 
j 
Planning - 364,2 
S e c r e t r i a t o f Presidium - 1,064,2 1 
Socotra I s . - 317,0 -
Thamoud D i s t r i c t - 346,8 
A l - A ' b r D i s t r i c t - 185,4 -







Source : The Eva lua t ion o f the FFYP 1974-78. M i n i s t r y of P lanning, 
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World Bank, FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, UNIDO and UNESCO as these o rgan isa t ions 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y advocated i n teg ra ted r u r a l development i n the wor ld i n 
t h e i r programmes. 
I t has been admi t ted t h a t i n t eg ra ted approach minimises wastefu l 
resources and l e a d , more or l e s s , to opt imal use of a v a i l a b l e resources 
combined i n a much shor te r t ime than would have been al lowed by separate 
a c t i o n s - one a t a t ime . 
In t h i s chapter th ree o f the major p ro j ec t s w i l l be reviewed, 
namely : 
(1) The Bedouin Development P ro jec t 
(2) The Wadi Hadhramout Development P ro j ec t & 
(3) The Wadi Tuban Development P ro jec t 
to determine the impact o f the i n teg ra ted approach on the ru ra l development. 
The Bedouin Development P ro jec t i s a se t t lement p ro j ec t f o r those 
200,000 nomadic bedouins (10% o f the p o p u l a t i o n ) , intended to b r ing them to 
the mainstream o f the Yemeni l i f e . The p r o j e c t from i t s i n i t i a l phase i n 
1973 has covered the nor thern pa r t o f the 4 t h , 5th and 6th Governorates. 
The main o b j e c t i v e s o f the p r o j e c t were to provide appropr ia te se t t lement 
f o r 120,000 nomadic bedouins w i t h t h e i r animal f l o c k s i n those areas and 
to r a i s e t h e i r standard o f l i v i n g . This imp l ied p rov i s i on o f water po in ts 
f o r them and t h e i r l i v e s t o c k ; p r o v i s i o n o f hea l th u n i t s , l i t e r a c y 
programmes, schools f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n , h a n d i c r a f t s t r a i n i n g and i n i t -
i a t i o n o f socio-economic i n s t i t u t i o n s to br idge the gap between the nomadic 
and sedentary 1 i f e . 
The p r o j e c t cons is ted of the f o l l o w i n g components:-
(1) I d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f r e l a t i v e l y permanent places f o r nomadic bedouins 
and those places v i s i t e d seasonal ly i n the p r o j e c t a rea . 
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(2) D r i l l i n g o f 42 deep we l l s and 10 k a r r i f s f o r the bedouins and t h e i r 
l i v e s t o c k . 
(3) Establ ishment o f s i x community develoment centres to i n t e g r a t e 
nomads i n t o the Yemeni l i f e st ream. 
(4) Prepara t ion o f a socio-economic study on the nomadic bedouins i n 
the p r o j e c t area a iming a t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i r problems and t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e s towards se t t l ement and to f i n d out ways and means f o r t h e i r 
i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o the s o c i e t y . 
(5 ) P repara t ion o f a s tudy o f the bedouins' l i v e s t o c k and pasture 
a reas , the reasons f o r t h e i r d e t e r i o r a t i o n and methods f o r i t s 
development. 
(6 ) Cons t ruc t i on o f 3 - 5 v e t e r i n a r y u n i t s f o r the bedouins l i v e s t o c k and 
p r o v i s i o n o f f r ee extens ion on t h e i r l i v e s t o c k development. 
The p r o j e c t s t a r t e d i n March 1973 and i s s t i l l going on i t s t h i r d 
phase. I t has achieved a l o t of i t s ongoing o b j e c t i v e s and the bedouins 
b e n e f i t e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y - p a r t i c u l a r l y from the w e l l s and the water 
po in t s prov ided by the Government. Today not less than 60% o f the bedouins ' 
c h i l d r e n are now i n what are c a l l e d the nomadic bedouins schools . Roughly 
33,000 pr imary s tudents have been admit ted to these schools in 1978. The 
hea l t h u n i t s have changed the bedouins' a t t i t u d e s towards modern medical 
t rea tment and are r ep lac i ng o ld - fash ioned p r a c t i c e s . 
Grazing remains the main occupat ion o f the bedouin. In 1973 
i t was 90% but by 1981 t h i s percentage had decreased to 73%. Other 
occupa t ions , such as c o n s t r u c t i o n a l l abou re r s , t r u c k - d r i v e r s , pump-
o p e r a t o r s , t eachers . Government o f f i c i a l s , v e t e r i n a r y and hea l th a s s i s t a n t s , 
have become more common g r a d u a l l y and now invo lve about 16 % o f the 
bedouin popu la t i on i n the p r o j e c t a rea . A g r i c u l t u r e i s p rac t i sed by 
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bedouin to a very l i m i t e d ex ten t a t places such as Nisab, Al-Soam and 
Gouf Al-Awamer. Goats, sheep and camels s t i l l c o n s t i t u t e the main weal th 
o f bedouin w i t h i n the p r o j e c t a rea . 
Maybe the most impor tant and long- te rm f e a t u r e o f the. p r o j e c t i s 
the p r o v i s i o n o f the bedouins ' c h i l d r e n schoo l . Indeed t h i s aspect was 
viewed by the Government as so important t h a t i t has been i s o l a t e d as 
a separate p r o j e c t i n the p lan w i t h the ass is tance o f IDA and WFP. In 
the e a r l y stages o f i t s development, the p r o j e c t was implemented w i t h 
g rea t d i f f i c u l t y s ince bedouin were r e l u c t a n t to d e l i v e r t h e i r c h i l d r e n 
t o schools which were ma in ly s i t u a t e d ou ts ide the nomads' a reas. Gradual ly 
the idea s t a r t e d to be meaningful to them and s ince 1979 the e x i s t i n g 
schools can on l y accept a l l c h i l d r e n by an annual expansion. Ch i ld ren 
are admi t ted a t the age o f 5 f o r the s i x -yea r sy l labus of pr imary schools 
and then 4-5 years o f voca t iona l t r a i n i n g on var ious p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s : 
t e a c h i n g , t y p i n g , n u r s i n g , med ica l , e l e c t r i c a l and var ious h a n d i c r a f t s . 
The very b r i l l i a n t ones can go to f u r t h e r formal school ing i f they w ish , 
and q u i t e a few have done so. Ch i ld ren are g iven a small amount o f cash 
monthly to g i ve to t h e i r parents i n r e t u r n f o r being in school and g i v i n g 
up t h e i r t ime ins tead o f he lp ing i n f a m i l y a c t i v i t i e s . Despite the 
l i m i t e d resources o f the Government, the p r o j e c t - from the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s ' po in t o f view - has been q u i t e successful and has changed 
the bedouins ' l i f e to a great e x t e n t . 
The second impor tant i n t eg ra ted r u r a l development p r o j e c t i s the 
Wadi-Hadhramout A g r i c u l t u r a l P r o j e c t . Wadi-Hadhramout i s regarded as 
one o f the most impor tant wadis f o r h i s t o r i c a l , a g r i c u l t u r a l and 
demographic reasons. I t has a popu la t ion o f 200,000 (of which 66% are 
females owing to the f a c t t h a t the m a j o r i t y o f i t s men are immigrants ) . 
The a g r i c u l t u r a l p o t e n t i a l i t i e s are cons iderab le but more incen t i ves 
are needed i n t h i s f i e l d . The Government, t h e r e f o r e , decided to have 
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an i n t e g r a t e d p r o j e c t whereby o the r i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s such as d r i n k i n g 
water and feeder roads can be i n j e c t e d i n the p r o j e c t . From the s t a r t 
the p r o j e c t was thought o f to be c o n s i s t i n g o f several a c t i v i t i e s 
namely : a g r i c u l t u r e , ex tens i on , feeder roads, d r i n k i n g water , e l e c t r i c i t y , 
hea l t h u n i t s and schoo ls . During the p r o j e c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i t became 
c l e a r t h a t the e l e c t r i c i t y component would be very expensive i f i t had 
to cover the p r o j e c t area and so i t became a separate p r o j e c t (valued 
a t t h a t t ime US $14 m i l l i o n s ) . The schools and hea l th u n i t s were to be 
inco rpora ted w i t h i n ongoing p ro j ec t s under the UNICEF and WHO organ-
i s a t i o n s r e s p e c t i v e l y s ince they needed very l i t t l e f inances y e t cons id -
e rab le s u p e r v i s i o n . Consequently, the p r o j e c t cons is ted of the 
f o l l o w i n g components i n i t s f i r s t phase:-^^^ 
(a ) A hydro -geo log ica l s tudy f o r the ground water i n the Wadi. 
(b) A v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n scheme f o r an area o f about 20,000 acres 
depending p r i m a r i l y on we l l i r r i g a t i o n . 
( c ) P rov i s ion o f machinery of var ious types to the Machinery Renting 
S t a t i o n i n Seyoun to support i t s serv ices to State farms and cooperat ives 
i n the a rea . 
(d) P rov i s i on o f a g r i c u l t u r a l inpu ts such as f e r t i l i z e r s , seeds, 
i n s e c t i c i d e s and spray ing machines to fa rmers . 
(e) Prepara t ion o f a socio-economic study on the wadi to f i n d out 
the most economic crops and methods to encourage them. 
( f ) Cons t ruc t i on o f 120 mi lometres o f feeder roads connect ing eleven 
v i l l a g e s w i t h the main road i n the wad i . 
(g ) Cons t ruc t i on o f two water r e s e r v o i r s i n the two main towns o f 
Shibam and Qan to prov ide d r i n k i n g water to c i t i z e n s . 
(h) Expansion o f ex tens ion serv ices by t r a i n i n g 40-60 wel l -equ ipped 
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extensionists in the State farms and cooperatives to combat seasonal 
and permanent diseases prevailing in the wadi (especially on date crops), 
The project had some successes as well as fai lures; i t faced 
many problems owing to the strong forces the region has had. The con-
tinuing higher wages, the shortage of labour and the influx of re-
mittances from abroad did not favour the integrated rural approach 
sponsored by the Government as hoped for . 
According to the latest progress report (No.7) received from the 
project management in 1981, the production area was only increased 
by 5% in 1977 and 10% in 1980, and even this increase (in the area) was 
due to an expansion in Al fal fa production rather than in basic items 
such as wheat or dates. In general the cropping intensity of a l l crops 
was only about 53%. 
Dates production - the major agricultural product of the wadi -
suffered serious decline in recent years for many economic and organ-
isational reasons. Reliable figures of date production in the wadi are 
not available but according to earlier reports from the project manage-
ment, the production was estimated at 20,000 tons in 1974/75. The 
present estimate made by Sogreah is only about 3,500 tons in 1981. This 
indicates a sharp decline of the most important product of the wadi 
whatever the scale of the unrel iabi l i ty of data might be.^^^) 
Feeder roads, which is a considerable component in the project, 
also had a serious time and d i f f i cu l t y in i ts implementation. In 1981, 
only about 75 km. of feeder roads could be accomplished out of the 




The withdrawals from IDA credit 615 259,952 
Local Contribution 207,573 
Value of food provided by WFP-Project 2265 65,410 
TOTAL COST 532,935 
I t is worth indicating that even IDA component for feeder roads has 
been increased to almost double the original allocation. 
Other components in the project, however, have not encountered 
serious obstacles since they are either contracted with foreign companies 
(studies and equipment) or do not involve high labour input. The three 
main factors : the higher wages, shortage of labour and low farm-gate 
prices of products, part icularly of dates, have been responsible for 
the stagnation ( i f not decline) of the agricultural output in the wadi. 
Other factors such as higher fuel prices, cultural r ig id i ty and organ-
isational structures - with less impact - hampered rural development in 
the area at a faster rate. 
In view of the fact that many male population are immigrant, a great 
influx of remittances reach relatives regularly to pay for their l iv ing 
and some of them build new houses. Together with ongoing economic 
projects in the region, labourers are attracted to move from low paid wages 
to higher ones within the same area. The existing shortage of labour 
aggravated the problem of the agricultural sector as already indicated 
above. The result is an unoff ic ial rise of wages continuously. As an 
example, a labourer on a feeder road was receiving, in 1976, around 
SYD 1.25 a day; in 1980 he must be paid at least SYD 3.00 plus some food 
i f the job is to be done in time. The project management, therefore, had 
to double the allocation by local contribution from the Government and 
decrease the volume of the work. Fuel prices which increased in 1980 
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by 100% further aggravated the problems of the project but this was a 
common problem in a l l regions. Farm-gate output prices have much greater 
impact on agriculture in Wadi-Hadhramout than in other areas. Due to 
the inf lux of remittances and the provision of much more work opportunities 
than other regions, the farmer in the wadi does not have suff icient 
incentives with the controlled farm-gate prices in farming. As a result 
around 13% of agricultural labourers and farmers leave the sector annually 
to other jobs in the same area (mainly in construction)!^^kccording to 
Sogreah report, i f such a move persists, there wi l l be only 25% of the 
farming labour force l e f t by 2000 (end of C20th). However, in the face 
of these problems, the Government has already improved farmers' wages 
twice in 1978 and 1980 - and formulated a formula for extra incentives 
with respect to piece-work and production increase. Output prices also 
increased as discussed in Chapter 4. Marketing process also decentralised 
to a certain degree to favour producers as explained above in Section 2.5c. 
In general, however, despite a l l these economic drawbacks, the 
project contributed a lot to agricultural practices, many of which have . 
become mechanised. The introduction of modern machinery has raised the 
farmers' opinion of the value of modern techniques in farming, while 
the provision of large, areas of levelled land gave new possibi l i t ies for 
cooperation in farming with more incentive to work on a family basis. 
Feeder roads have been, indeed, socially and economically, very meaningful 
and useful. Mobility between the vil lage and the main towns has increased 
and brought about many economic and social benefits. One of two water 
reservoirs is completed with a capacity of 100,000 gallons (in Al-Hotta 
near Shibam town) and pipe f i t t i n g is under way. Together with health 
units and e lec t r i c i t y , this seems to have remarkably improved sanitation 
and rural l i f e . 
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The third, integrated rural development project is the Wadi-Tuban 
agricultural development project. I t has a very similar structure to 
f 12) 
that of Wadi Hadhramout with the following components:-^ ' 
(a) I r r igat ion works covering 5,000 acres of perennial irrigated 
land with about 135 km, of asbestos underground canals. 
(b) Agricultural services which include the provision of f e r t i l i se rs , 
insecticides, machinery, equipment and 100 acres of windbreaks. 
(c) Improvement of Lahej Ginnery by replacing old ginning machines 
with new ones more suitable for medium-staple cotton produced in the 
project area. 
(d) Construction of two water reservoirs and extension of water 
pipes to 6 villages in the area. 
(e) Construction of 20 km of feeder roads to connect nine villages 
with the,main road in the project area 
( f ) A hydrological study of the water resources of the wadi. 
The project started implementation at the end of 1979 and is 
s t i l l in process. Again social services in the wadi have been developed 
alongside the project and other infrastructural projects - such as weirs, 
canals and main road construction - are taking place. 
As far as organisation is concerned, rural development programmes 
are, primari ly, implemented under regional supervision with some control 
from the central authorit ies. 
The region in PDRY enjoys some autonomy power since both the State 
and the Party are homogeneously represented. The Governor, who is also 
a top party member, is the head of the local public council which discusses 
the problems of the region local ly and then at Government level with the 
authorities concerned. Al l members of the local public council of a 
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region are elected and are mainly from al l sectors and social services 
agencies. The basic idea of a project or a programme comes from the 
local level and often formulated at the central authority by the 
Ministry of Department concerned. Once i t is approved, i t is implem-
ented regionally with some help from the central authority. Social 
services, however, has been the responsibil ity of the region exclusively 
once the required investment is allocated by the central concerned 
authority. For example the building of a school in a region implies 
provision of investment by the Ministry of Education (in coordination 
with the Ministry of Planning) and then the amount is transferred to 
the region where education authorities within the Governor's establish-
ment headed by the executive off ice of the local public council are 
situated. 
Sectoral projects, however, are rather d i f f i c u l t to monitor and 
implement under regional supervision alone due to the technical knowledge 
required which is not available at the regional level permanently. 
Typically, a sectoral project is headed by a technician from the central 
authority or ministry based temporarily on the project site and the whole 
project is implemented with direct contact with the central authority. 
There is also close contact with the regional authorities for day-to-day 
work, such as provision of more labour, or to settle local disputes 
arising with other regional agencies or some other local contingencies. 
The integrated rural programmes, however, have special organ-
isational arrangements owing to the huge investments involved and the 
requirement by the co-financiers that there is some commitment from the 
region. The Wadi Hadhramout Project, for example, is implemented in one 
of the remoter parts of the Governorate, a long way from the regional 
central authority. The manager - in this case - is an IDA expert and the 
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co-manager is usually a local technical man appointed by the ministry. 
The project is implemented by a technical team-from both foreign and 
local experts and the contract and schedule documents are signed by the 
Government, co-financiers and executing agencies. In our example, the 
project is supervised, primari ly, by the MAAR, but at the regional level , 
a committee has been formed headed by the Governor with a membership 
of the Project Manager, Co-Manager, the Manager of the d i s t r i c t / s , a l l 
heads of involved departments in the area such as the Department of 
Public Works (for roads). Water Corporation (for water reservoirs). 
Department of Agriculture and so on - , Secretary of the Party of the 
d i s t r i c t and the accountant of the project. The objective of the 
Committee is to smooth the machinery of the project's implementation 
and to solve basic problems of the region. Basic decisions are taken 
by central authori t ies, in this case, the MAAR takes up decisions with 
co-financiers and the Ministry of Planning; e.g. types of machinery. 
Companies to be contracted with for studies or equipment and project 
progranming. Regional authori t ies, however, may decide local issues, 
e.g. which feeder roads to start wi th, where to get stones or gravel 
from, which areas in cooperatives to be provided with inputs and 
other such issues. 
The integrated rural development programmes in PDRY are scattered 
among di f ferent agencies. To coordinate so many authorities takes time 
and a lot of e f for t despite the homogeneity of Party and State authorities 
at both regional and central authorit ies. There is no single and con-
solidated administrative structure for integrated rural programmes at 
present and i t is not l i ke ly to change in the hear future. However, no 
one denies i t s importance and yet no one intends to take the i n i t i a t i ve . 
Despite t h i s , the aforementioned programmes have achieved a lo t of their 
objectives which were neither simple nor straightforward. On the contrary 
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these programmes were highly intr icate and more complex than might seem, 
but their success came from the attention given by the Government to 
them at top pr io r i ty in development programmes. Above a l l , both the 
Party and the State authorities at the regional level are strongly in 
favour of such an integrated approach in rural development. 
In conclusion, the Government has been adopting a balanced growth 
strategy for i t s national development in a l l sectors and social services. 
This strategy, however, has favoured rural development though at an 
expensive cost. Policies and programmes for rural areas have been 
substantially encouraged and f u l f i l l e d by adequate and useful instruments 
set by both the Party and the State authorities in a homogeneous manner. 
A high portion of a l l plans' investment - so far - has been allocated . 
for rural programmes and projects to raise, primarily, the standard of 
l iv ing in rural areas and ultimately of society as a whole. Rural 
act iv ies, however, though properly implemented, haid only partial successes 
for lack of useful linkages with each other at optimal standard. 
The integrated rural approach was thought of to be the appropriate 
approach for rural development whereby wasteful resources should be 
minimised and technical people optimally used in large-scale programmes. 
Rural act iv i t ies within such approach were also thought of to be properly 
linked together and integrated in a useful manner. However, despite 
the combined efforts of national and international agencies and the 
homogeneity of the Party and the State at both central and regional 
levels, problems at macro- and micro-levels were in view. Continuing 
higher wages, shortage of labour, in f la t ion , low-productivity and low 
prices of output have been the major problems of rural areas. The 
Government s t i l l maintains top pr ior i ty to these programmes and, 
therefore, does i t s best to smooth their machinery and provide their 
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requirements in giving them sanctioned policies such as increasing rural 
wages, investments and output prices. Even foreign cheap labour has, 
recently, been imported from abroad to f i l l the gap in the labour force. 
Eventually, rural development is a costly task and the more r ig id 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
PDRY became independent in 1967 with revolutionary leaders who 
adopted Socialist philosophies as a basis for transforming the service-
based economy into a production-based one. The country's natural resources 
are few and unt i l 1981 the country had no prospects for mineral or o i l 
production.-so agriculture has been the lynch pin of i ts internal economic 
transformation. 
The agricultural sector is signif icant for two main reasons 
namely : 80% of population were dependent on agriculture for their l i ve -
lihood in 1968 and, secondly, agriculture produced about 33% of the GDP 
in the same year. These proportions have been declining with the growth 
of other sectors such as construction and transport and communication 
so that today about 45% of the working labour force are engaged in agric-
ulture and about 20% of the GDP comes from agriculture. 
In formulating development plans, the Government's objectives in 
the agriculture sector have been the following : 
(a) To raise the standard of l iv ing of rural people by transforming 
tradit ional agriculture into a modern form. 
(b) To increase rural income by increasing agricultural production. 
(c) To improve nutr i t ion nationally by stimulating demand and providing 
a regular food supply to consumers. 
(d) To eliminate regional income inequalities by adopting an income 
redistr ibution policy. 
The methods chosen to achieve these overall objectives took 
various forms : (a) Legal form, (b) Restructuring the agricultural sector, 
(c) Long term investment pol icies, (d) Short-term prices and taxation 
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controls and (e) Creation of appropriate social laws and policies for 
rural areas. 
The i n i t i a l step was in the legal one when the Agrarian Reform 
Law was f i r s t issued (subsequently amended in 1970) whereby a l l feudal land 
was confiscated and redistributed. This law laid the basis for public, 
cooperative and private ownership of cultivable land in this form of 
State farms, agricultural cooperatives and private plots respectively. 
The MAAR was entrusted to supervise agricultural act iv i t ies 
primarily through the newly established inst i tut ions of State farms, 
cooperatives and marketing corporations. I rr igat ion projects dominate 
i t s ac t iv i t ies so far . This is due to the fact that they represent 
the basic infrastructure for modern agriculture. The DIME constitute 
the largest single group of Ministry employees and gets not less than 
60% of total investment of the agricultural plan annually. Irr igation 
schemes have been condensed in the major three wadis : Abyan, Tuban and 
Hadhramaut but other relevant wadis such as Beihan, Ahwar, Maifa'a and 
Nisab. receive attention as wel l . Since 72% of cultivated land depends 
on spate i r r iga t ion , 70% of i r r igat ion expenditures go to dams, diverting 
weirs and the excavation of main and distr ibutary canals. Floods, however, 
remain hard to control (as was forcibly demonstrated in April 1982 
when they devastated large areas of cultivated land and also destroyed 
dams, roads and settlements). Well- irr igation may be more appealing to 
farmers but is very expensive to implement on a large scale. 
There are seventeen MRS under the supervision and administration 
of the DIME. Eleven MRS, scattered throughout the country, are wel l -
established and the rest are close to completion. The MRS have 
incurred heavy losses due to low eff iciency and their uneconomical 
hir ing prices so the Government did subsidise them heavily up to 1980 
but since then their prices have risen almost threefold as the level of 
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subsidy is reduced. The lack of adequate training is the main factor 
responsible for inefficiency in the handling of machinery and other 
equipment. 
Agricultural cooperatives cover about 70% of total cultivable land 
and depend mainly on spate i r r igat ion - part icularly for their cotton, 
cereal, fodder, nuts and sesame crops. Vegetable and f r u i t crops more 
often depend on well i r r iga t ion . Cooperatives sell their produce to the PCMVF 
at farm-gate price set by the relevant authorities which bear the marketing 
or storage costs. Total production increased sharply in the early 1970's 
but started to decline in the mid-1970's (part icularly in 1975/76 and 1976/77). 
There were several technical reasons for this but the price system is 
regarded as the main one. Hence in 1979 farm-gate prices rose and some 
freedom in marketing was given to cooperatives. However, there remains 
considerable scope for improvements in yields but untrained manpower and 
the paucity of the f ac i l i t i e s that the cooperatives have to contend with 
do not enable them to achieve their objectives at present. Nor is this 
l i ke l y to change rapidly as the limited resources of the State can hardly 
cope with the requirements of the State farms and i r r igat ion schemes. 
The number of State farms reached 41 in 1978 and has since been reduced 
to 32 by the amalgamation of some with others or with cooperatives. State 
farms provide about 20% of total agricultural output - the rest being 
mainly provided by the cooperatives. They are established as State 
enterprises so their entire requirements are met by the State in the 
i n i t i a l 2-3 years and they then finance themselves from their production. 
Unfortunately the majority of State farms throughout the past ten years 
have proved to be inef f ic ient and unsuccessful. Various reasons account 
for t h i s , of which the important ones are : low wages of agricultural 
labourers, low output prices, inef f ic ient management and, above a l l , 
shortage of labour. State farms mainly grow vegetables and f ru i t s and 
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their output is sold to PCMVF at farm-gate prices. Recent output prices 
and marketing policies for cooperatives also apply to State farms. The 
State farms, however, have better yields per hectare, per person in 
crops than cooperatives owing to the level of f ac i l i t i es provided by the 
Government in terms of wel l - i r r igat ion, land reclamation and available 
machinery. 
Research and extension services have been the major means of agric-
ultural intensif icat ion but they were only operating on a relat ively 
small scale unt i l 1977. However, the second phase.of the UNDP/FAO 
programme (1977-82) saw the expansion of research and extension fac i l i t i es 
in quantitative and qualitative terms - no less than 40 fellowships have 
been granted to qualif ied staff for further research (this thesis is the 
result of one of them) - and various practical courses at farm-level 
have been run regularly. The research and extension services now con-
tr ibute a lo t to the improvement of yields of many crops but especially 
those of tomatoes, potatoes, cotton and wheat. Furthermore, the Giar 
extension centre, together with other technical agriculture inst i tut ions, 
has trained personnel in management, bookkeeping and extension work in 
both plant and livestock production. 
Turning to the other important agricultural inst i tut ions, the 
corporations and boards. The PCMVF is regarded as the largest - i t markets 
a l l vegetables and f ru i t s produced by both State farms and cooperatives 
at consumer prices which, generally, do not cover i t s marketing and storage 
expenditures. I t thus receives heavy subsidies from the Government and 
most of i t s available f ac i l i t i e s were provided by the State. I t also 
imports seeds and insecticides required by State farms and cooperatives 
to f u l f i l the production plan. Faced with increasing local demand for 
vegetables and f r u i t s , the PCMVF has to import supplies and exports any 
surplus of local production. Abyan and Tuban Development Boards were 
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established to promote cotton production in both areas. A ginnery is 
under the control of each Board. Development of i r r igat ion projects in 
both areas has contributed to the improvement of standards in the technical 
and administrative capabilities;and the financial performance of both 
Boards has been satisfactory. The Poultry Corporation is responsible 
for poultry production and training. Its act iv i t ies are very much 
assisted by Cuban technical advisors within a bi lateral agreement. Poultry 
prices are set by the MAAR authorities and were not. giving an economic 
return unt i l recently. Egg prices have now been revised upwards several 
times to ref lect increasing demand and r ising input prices. The ADF is an 
important source of credit for farmers, providing credits at a nominal 
interest rate of about 2% to cooperatives and no more than 5% to agric-
ultural inst i tu t ions. The ADF is also responsible for fe r t i l i se r imports 
and of some equipment (such as pumps and tractors) needed by cooperatives. 
The MMC was part of the MAAR unti l 1979 when i t became attached to the 
Ministry of Trade of Supply. I t is responsible for meat marketing of 
local production and of imports. Due to the low level of local production 
for sale, the MMC imports frozen and live-weight meat from Australia, France 
Holland and Ethiopia. 
Investment pol icies, at central level , have been very rational in 
essence. The agriculture sector maintained the l ion 's share throughout 
the past f i f teen years. Within the agricultural sector, the Government 
has adopted a balanced growth strategy with horizontal expansion in each 
f i e ld but recently the Government has started to concentrate on the 
vert ical integration of the sector. This, however, required more resources 
qual i tat ively rather than quantitatively. 
The pricing policies were very sticky for just over eight years 
which resulted in the decline of the agricultural sector in terms of both 
labour and productivity. However, price changes have now been implemented 
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as a result of the perceived need to deal with farmers' incentives, 
increasing agricultural wages and the reduction of subsidies. The tax 
system in agriculture only applies to State farms and cooperatives and not 
to private farmers since the la t ter do not get substantial Government help. 
The taxes collected from the sector fa l l s short of the heavy subsidies 
provided by the Government. 
A new approach adopted by the State to tackle the problem of rural 
development was the integrated rural development programme which started 
in 1973 with the Bedouin Settlement project and continued in the agric-
ultural sector throughout the 1970's and early 1980's. Wadi Hadhramaut develop-
ment project and Wadi Tuban development project are being implemented in 
their respective areas with an integration of rural act iv i t ies and the 
farming sector. 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, resource and manpower l imitations make i t d i f f i c u l t 
for PDRY to achieve i t s economic, social and defensive aims smoothly and 
rapidly. 
Capital shortage has been the most important l imitat ion in the 
economy. PDRY has not drawn upon i t s mineral or o i l wealth unti l 1982 
when i t s potential was discovered in the Hadhramout and Al-Mahara Govern-
orates. The country's resources were very limited compared to i ts ambitious 
national objectives. The physical structure of the country requires huge 
investments to provide services and transport products and to build a 
sound agricultural and rural infrastructure. Further, natural l imitations 
in the sector, such as water shortages and soil sal in i ty needed much more 
capital (in terms of money and equipment) than was original ly thought. 
The social philosophy of the country, however, implied a central control 
over production which, in turn, required heavy capital resources to create 
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appropriate agricultural inst i tut ions such as marketing agencies, MRS, 
State farms and agricultural corporations. 
Labour shortage, as wel l , has been a persistent general problem 
since independence. The population (then one mil l ion and a half) could 
not meet both the demands of defence and of expanding service and prod-
uction sectors. Development plans have always been vulnerable to labour 
shortages in a l l sectors of the economy. In some growing sectors such as 
construction, the problem is sometimes temporarily solved but usually 
at the expense of agriculture which has poor working conditions and pay. 
These general l imitations have had greater impact on specific 
. issues in agriculture. For instance. Management, throughout the sector 
was not of adequate standard during the period. Most agricultural 
inst i tut ions such as State farms and cooperatives have been of sophist-
icated nature and mill ions of dinars were involved in them but they have 
had insuff ic ient management capabil i t ies. Up to 1978 only six State farms 
were managed by agricultural graduates and although they were fu l l y 
informed on agricultural practices, they were not trained in management. 
Often agricultural projects involving two mil l ion dinars and above, are 
managed by a secondary-school leaver who had only f ive years' experience. 
In extreme situations, projects involving 5-10 mil l ion dinars can be 
managed by young enthusiastic graduates. The MRS, technical insti tut ions 
and other agricultural inst i tut ions also suffer from the low efficiency 
of management. 
Another problematic aspect is productivity in the agricultural 
sector of both crop and labour. Crop productivity improved sharply in the 
early stages of development but started to increase at a declining rate 
unt i l i t became stagnant towards the end of the 1970's. The low marginal 
efficiency of labour, land and capital combined, held back any further 
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improvement i n y i e l d i n the l a t e 1970 's . 
The most impor tant f a c t o r t h a t has helped the State to achieve a 
g rea t deal o f i t s o b j e c t i v e s was i t s good o rgan i sa t i on es tab l ished by the 
B r i t i s h occupat ion and preserved today. The coherence o f p o l i t i c a l , 
p lanning and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s o f the count ry minimised the adverse 
e f f e c t s o f the l i m i t a t i o n s noted above. The shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
a s p e c i f i c c o n s t r u c t i o n i n a reg ion by the Governor, the d i r e c t o r o f t h e 
a g r i c u l t u r a l department o f the r e g i o n , the Planning d i r e c t o r i n the reg ion 
and the p r o j e c t (or Sta te farm or coopera t ive or MRS) manager on the spot saves 
t ime and e f f o r t - even sometimes saving any cen t ra l a u t h o r i t i e s involvement. 
The d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n o f d a i l y and r o u t i n e f unc t i ons represents a f u r t h e r 
s tep i n the i n t e g r a t i o n o f p l ann ing , p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f u n c t i o n s . 
This p o s i t i v e f a c t o r upgraded r u r a l coopera t ion and e l im ina ted t r i b a l 
f r i c t i o n s i n t he a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . 
The Government adopted a ho r i zon ta l pa t t e rn s t r a tegy f o r na t iona l 
development s ince independence. The Trenn ia l p lan concent ra ted , p r i m a r i l y , 
on communications to l i n k a l l pa r ts o f the count ry but then a l l sectors 
rece ived equal ; a t t e n t i o n i n investment . Social serv ices got almost the 
same share as a g r i c u l t u r e which was supposed to be the leading sec to r . I t 
was an i n e v i t a b l e p o l i c y the r u r a l development o b j e c t i v e . This general 
s t r a t egy r e f l e c t e d i t s e l f on the a g r i c u l t u r a l sec tor whereby a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p o l i c i e s were fo rmula ted to f i t na t i ona l o b j e c t i v e s . The a g r i c u l t u r a l 
sec tor performance could be assessed by the performance o f the product ion 
plan i n which a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s are r e f l e c t e d . 
A t the s t a r t o f the exper ience, tbe product ion p l an ' s performance 
was f a r f rom s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r many techn ica l reasons ( e . g . u n r e l i a b l e 
d a t a , bad demand-p ro jec t ions ) . However, a f t e r several yea rs , the f u l f i l -
ment o f the p roduc t ion plan reached an average o f 60-65%. I t i s worth 
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no t ing t h a t 90% of Government's investments go to I r r i g a t i o n Schemes, 
State farms and research and ex tens ion . While the cooperat ives which 
supply 70% or more o f a g r i c u l t u r a l ou tput hard ly rece ive any d i r e c t investments 
i n t h e i r p roduc t ion processes. No doubt i r r i g a t i o n scheme are undertaken 
p r i m a r i l y to serve coopera t i ves but on l y a f t e r t h e i r complet ion w i l l the 
coopera t i ves have any subs tan t i a l b e n e f i t . This gap between the product ion 
and the investment plans has been reviewed by MAAR a u t h o r i t i e s i n 1980 
when a t t e n t i o n i s g iven to economic assessment o f any a g r i c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y 
i n terms o f p roduc t ion and r e t u r n . 
Both investment and produc t ion plans have succeeded i n c rea t i ng 
a g r i c u l t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s i n c u l t i v a b l e areas but have f a i l e d to mot ivate , 
farmers to increase p roduc t ion and, on many occas ions , even f a i l e d to 
keep a g r i c u l t u r a l labourers i n the sector or i n t h e i r a reas. Investment 
plans c rea ted compe t i t i ve p r o j e c t s i n o the r sec tors and, together w i t h 
the e f f e c t s o f the p r i c i n g p o l i c i e s , many a g r i c u l t u r a l labourers moved 
ou t o f a g r i c u l t u r e to o ther sec to r s . In recent y e a r s , the pressures 
on a g r i c u l t u r a l p roduc t ion created by these p o l i c i e s became more w ide ly 
a p p r e c i a t e d ; hence there has been some r e l a x a t i o n o f l a t e . Producer 's 
p r i c e s , f o r i ns tance , were pushed up and market ing processes became 
d e c e n t r a l i s e d w i t h i n a c e r t a i n l i m i t ; State farms shrunk i n number e i t he r 
by amalgamation or e l i m i n a t i o n of small ones. Such changes, though,had 
a sho r t t ime to be assessed, but have had a p o s i t i v e impact so f a r and 
s t i l l more to come. 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The evidence presented i n t h i s t h e s i s suggests t h a t w i t h i n the 
e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , the best s t r a tegy f o r the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector 
i n PDRY i s a v e r t i c a l one w i t h a minimum of State con t ro l f o r a t ime . This 
can be achieved w i t hou t l o s i n g s i g h t o f the goals o f na t iona l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y 
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i n f o o d , improving r u r a l incomes and improving l e v e l s of n u t r i t i o n i n 
the f o l l o w i n g manner:-
The State should adopt a p o l i c y o f concen t ra t ion on those areas 
w i t h most a g r i c u l t u r a l p o t e n t i a l represented by the three main wadis : 
Abyah, Tuban and Hadhramout. A l l e f f o r t s and a v a i l a b l e resources should 
be d i r e c t e d to these areas w i t h i n the framework o f c a r e f u l l y prepared 
i n t e g r a t e d r u r a l programmes. In a l l o ther areas a g r i c u l t u r e should be 
s t i m u l a t e d by a removal o f c o n t r o l s (but a lso removal o f s u b s i d i e s ) . 
The Product ion Plan should take i n t o account product ion o f the major 
wadis . Only a f t e r the complet ion o f the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f the main 
th ree wadis (about 10-20 years ) can the State s t a r t on development 
programmes f o r other, a reas . 
More s p e c i f i c a l l y , each aspect o f a g r i c u l t u r e should be i n teg ra ted 
w i t h the o the rs i n the main wadis , as f o l l o w s : -
(a) I r r i g a t i o n 
I t i s recommended t h a t i r r i g a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s i n Abyan, Tuban and 
Hadhramout be more h e a v i l y supported than be fo re . I r r i g a t i o n schemes i n 
o ther wadis take not l ess than 40% o f i r r i g a t i o n investment . I f these 
investments were d i r e c t e d to the main wadis , they would have more impact 
than on a sca t te red se t o f p r o j e c t s . 
I n Tuban a rea , the Yemeni-Russian programmes need f u r t h e r conso l -
i d a t i o n i n terms o f good manpower and b e t t e r superv is ion and management. 
This programme a lso needs some a d d i t i o n a l schemes i n the upper area o f 
the wadi around Musaimeer. 
I n Abyan a rea , recen t f l oods destroyed e x i s t i n g i r r i g a t i o n schemes 
as they were unable t o w i ths tand a s t rong f l o o d . A l l the years o f 
investment were swept away w i t h i n a few hours - dur ing t h i s great f l o o d . 
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The area now needs an ex tens ive hyd ro log ica l and topographic study on 
which a sound i n f r a s t r u c t u r e p r o j e c t can be implemented. 
In Hadhramout, the problem i s even grea te r because o f a much 
l a r g e r area being i n v o l v e d . I t w i l l be very d i f f i c u l t to create a f u l l 
a g r i c i l i l t u r a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n the near f u t u r e , but the State should 
i n i t i a l l y concent ra te i t s e f f o r t s on s p e c i f i c s t r a t e g i c pos i t i ons i n 
major t r i b u t a r i e s f o r de fens ive purposes and c o n t r o l l i n g the spate. The 
wadi bad ly needs w e l l - i r r i g a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n coopera t i ves . 
W e l l - d r i l l i n g , however, must be i n p a r a l l e l w i t h e l e c t r i c - p o w e r expansion 
i n the wad i . 
(b ) State Farms 
I t i s recommended t h a t the Government must f i r s t reduce the 
number and then c o n t r o l those State farms in the main wadis on l y . With 
5-6 State farms i n each wad i , the Government w i l l be able to improve the 
management standard i n the few e f f e c t i v e ones. The State farms must be 
viewed as a spec ia l form o f p roduc t i on -en te rp r i se and unless they are made 
t o be s u c c e s s f u l , they g ive a bad image to pub l i c e n t e r p r i s e . 
(c ) Cooperat ives 
Cooperat ives are a lso recommended to be conf ined to these major 
wadis where i r r i g a t i o n and o the r a g r i c u l t u r a l p rac t i ces are being improved. 
I t i s a l so recommended to keep type I coopera t ives predominant f o r some 
t ime and to encourage, but never impose type I I . In o ther subs i d i a r y 
wad is , coopera t ion can be encouraged i n the more densely-populated areas 
( e . g . i n Wadi-Beihan areas and Nisab. ) but i f i t f a i l s , i t need not be 
p e r s i s t e d w i t h . These o the r areas must be under cont inuous review by 
MAAR a u t h o r i t i e s to assess t h e i r performance under f ree-market c o n d i t i o n s . 
I t must be s ta ted t h a t the re w i l l be d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n t r o l l i n g data 
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i n u n c o n t r o l l a b l e sectors but e f f o r t s should be g iven to t h i s aspect . 
(d) Research and Extension 
The research and ex tens ion department i n MAAR must be supported 
to a g rea t e x t e n t , both c e n t r a l l y and r e g i o n a l l y . I t r e c e n t l y managed 
to c rea te a good team i n Wadi-Hadhramout and a l ready has two sound 
cent res : one f o r research and one f o r ex tens ion i n the Abyan area . I t 
needs to c r e a t e a q u a l i f i e d team or s u b - s t a t i o n i n the Tuban a rea . 
I t s n u r s e r i e s , so f a r , are j u s t o f average standard i n other areas and 
so there i s scope f o r f u r t h e r development i n f u t u r e . 
(a) A g r i c u l t u r a l Corpora t ions 
Due t o the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the co t ton crop i n Abyan and Tuban 
a reas , both Abyan and Tuban Development Boards should remain and could 
be more e f f e c t i v e w i t h c o n t r a c t i o n o f t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e 
and expend i t u re . The management o f both Boards i s poor and the standard 
should be upgraded to a l l ow c lose r l i n k s w i t h coopera t ive fa rmers . 
The PCMVF badly needs g rea te r i n t e g r a t i o n ; w i th i t s e x i s t i n g 
f a c i l i t i e i s and resources i t can on l y cope w i t h market ing ou tpu t o f the 
th ree main wadis and t h a t needs b e t t e r management. This l i m i t a t i o n i n 
i t s f u n c t i o n would save a l o t o f resources i n unnecessary t r a n s p o r t . 
Maybe i n h igh land areas and dur ing suiraner, the PCMVF needs to be invo lved 
i n market ing c e r t a i n summer crops such as : tomatoes, potatoes and peaches 
f o r main towns and Aden C i t y , b u t , i n gene ra l , the market ing opera t ion 
must be d e c e n t r a l i s e d s ince i t i s too small t o cope w i th such a la rge 
a rea . Imported i t ems , however, can be suppl ied to main towns under 
PCMVF's c o n t r o l but to o ther areas through p r i v a t e shop keepers who can 
arrange d e l i v e r y i n the saneway as they do f o r o ther basic i tems ( r i c e , 
t e a . . . e t c . ) . 
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( f ) Investment P o l i c i e s 
The State i s recommended to g ive ^Y\or\^^ \ro Hv«. 
main wadis i n i r r i g a t i o n schemes and p lan t and l i v e s t o c k p roduc t ion . 
I t w i l l s t i l l need to prov ide some a l l o c a t i o n s to o ther areas f o r land 
l e v e l l i n g , w e l l - d r i l l i n g and c lean ing f o r f a rmers , p rov id ing seasonal ly 
some f e r t i l i s e r s and i n s e c t i c i d e s to small f a rmers , but t h i s should 
not rep resen t more than 20% of a l l investments . Foreign ass is tance , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y f rom i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rgan isa t ions such as IFAD, could be 
o f g rea t b e n e f i t i n producing loans f o r small farmers a c t i v i t i e s : 
World Bank and o the r subs tan t i a l funds can be invo lved i n more concen -
t r a t e d r u r a l p r o j e c t s i n major wadis . 
(g) Other A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c i e s 
I t i s f u r t h e r recommended t h a t p r i ce c o n t r o l on a g r i c u l t u r a l 
ou tpu t be con f ined to the main wadi a reas , wh i l e i n o ther wadis , 
the S ta te must put a c e i l i n g on consumer p r i ces (which i s l i k e l y to 
be h igher than consumer p r i ces c o n t r o l l e d by the State i n the three 
main wadis) and then leave consumer p r i ces to f l u c t u a t e up to t h i s 
c e i l i n g w i t h respect to supply and demand law. 
The l e v e l s o f t a x a t i o n and subs id ies w i l l depend on the per-
formance o f the c o n t r o l l e d and the f r e e sectors i n a g r i c u l t u r e . 
However, t a x e s , as they a r e , could on ly apply to the output o f the 
th ree main wad is , wh i l e i n o ther areas t a x a t i o n i s not recommended 
s ince the farmer w i l l face some r i s k s i n market ing h is output and i s 
depr ived o f many Government inpu ts enjoyed by the o ther fa rmers . In 
g e n e r a l , subs id ies w i l l be reduced under t h i s p o l i c y but w i l l s t i l l 
be needed i n MRS i n major wad is , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f f ue l p r i ces are not 
reduced and on imported items such as c h i l l i e s , potatoes and g a r l i c . 
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(h) Rural I n teg ra ted P ro jec ts 
Assuming the expansion o f soc ia l serv ices i n r u ra l areas w i l l 
cont inue a t the same r a t e wi tnessed i n the 1970 's ; the recommended 
a g r i c u l t u r a l s t r a t egy w i l l p rov ide an idea l atmosphere f o r suppor t ing 
i n t e g r a t e d p r o j e c t s - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n major areas. Even i n the o ther 
areas i t w i l l be expected t h a t fa rmers ' incomes w i l l increase due to 
s e l f - m o t i v a t i o n . 
O i l weal th i n the f u t u r e w i l l undoubtedly have a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t 
i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l sec to r i f i t i s used r a t i o n a l l y , p r i m a r i l y to 
sus ta i n a g r i c u l t u r e and on ly secondarily t oo the r sec to rs . A g r i c u l t u r a l 
performance w i l l depend, t h e r e f o r e , on the scale o f investment al lowed 
by o i l revenue and the balance o f na t iona l o b j e c t i v e s and the moderate 
a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s f o r cooperat ives and small farmers a t l a r g e . 
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roHTl COtJMTOT DATA 
337,800 sq. km 
POPULATION nsism 
1.7 o t l U o n (s.14-1977) 5 .1 P « ' I -
Ri t e of Growth: 2 . 61 ( f r o o X973 t o 1977) 
Crude B i r t h Rate (per 1,000) 
Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) 
A C C E . S S T O P I P E D W A T K H (1977) 
Occupied d u o U l n g i without 




Population per physician 
Fopulatloo per h o i p l t a l bad 
X of Population - t o t a l 





NUTRITION (19 77) 
Calorie Intalio aa X of roqutroBonts 
Per capita p r o t e i n intake (gr«m»/day) 
90 
58 
P^ DUCATIOS (1976) 
Adult l i t e r a c y r a t e (X) 
Primary aehool a n r o l l a a n t (X) 
32 
89 
CNP PER CAPITA IN 19771 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 
1976__ 
GN? at Market Prices 
Crosa Domestic Investment 
Gross National Savings 
Exports of Goods, NTS 
Imports of Goods, NFS 






CROSS DOMESTIC PRODtKIT IN 197t 
(market p r i c e s ) 
100 CDF at f a c t o r cost 
31 of which 
11 A g r i c u l t u r e & f i a h i n g 
20 I n d u s t r y 3/ 
60 Trade, Transport, Finance 
Other Service* 
USS n l l l i o n 
326 MO 
71 . •22 
27 8 
117 36 













1974/75 y 1975 1976 
Prelim. Est. 
1977 
i n M l l l i o n i Yemeni Dinara 
6/ 
T o t a l r e c e i p t s — 
Current expenditures 
Revenue d e f i c i t 
Development expcndlture:6 
Ovo.voll d e f i c i t 
Borrowing from Banking Systoi 
Other Assets and Accounts J j 
External financing 
24 17 32 40 
28 25 39 45 
-4 -8 -7 -5 
21 19 39 57 
-25 -27 -46 -62 
12 10 17 18 
2 1 1 
13 15 28 43 
•••iOSri'. CREDIT AND PRICES 
Money and quasi-monoy 
Bank c r e d i t to government . 
ilank c r e d i t to non-Cov't. sector-' 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 






















Tne per c a p i t a CNP estimate c a l c u l a t e d by the aane conversion technique aa the World Bank At l a a , 
A l l other converalona to d o l l a r a l a the t a b l e ere et the average cxchenge p r e v a i l i n g during the 
period covered. 
Rcujh estimate. • ^ 
Includes petroleum r e f i n i n g . 
The o v e r a l l n e g l i g i b l e growth of the i n d u s t r i a l sector i s due to the decline i n Aden Kafinery . 
production from 6.2 m i l l i o n tons i n 1969 to. 2,8 B i l l i o n tone i n 1973 and 1.6 m i l l i o n tons l o 
1976—the non-petrol«um i n d u s t r i a l aector grew at an aatloatad rata of about IS percent por 
annua between 1973-76. 
The f l a c a l year waa A p r i l l-Karch 31 u n t i l March 3 1 , 1975 when i t becaae April 1-D«C, 31, 1975 . 
and t h e r e a f t e r 1* on a calendar year baala. 
Includes c u r r e n t and davalopnont revanuea and • e l f-financing of publte aatarptlae*. 
Net operations o f apeelal funda ( F r l c e StabUliation tuai, o t c ) . 
Indudae p u b l i c sector agenelee. ; 
- 1 6 1 -
STATE FARMS 
ADEN GOVERNORATE 
1 , Peoples' farm 
LAHEJ GOVERNORATE 
1 . Al Imad 
2. A lHusse in i 
3. 26 September 
4 . Muqahid (Al-Thowrah) 
5. 6 th Congress 
6. Assalam 
7. 22 June 
8. 14th October 
9. The P i l o t Farm 
10. Abr-Yacoob 
1 1 . Jawala 
COOPERATIVES 
ABYAN GOVERNORATE 
1 . Lenin 
2 . .27 August 
3. 7 October 
4 . 4 th Congress 
5. Al Mustaqbal 
6. At Tar i yah 
7. Al Qawz 
8. Al Assal 
1 . 13 August 
2. 26 September 
3. 11 October 
4 . 5 November 
5. Al Washa 
6. Upper Wadi. 
7. Tuban 
8. Al Mi lah 
9. Tur Al Baha 
10. Halmin 
n . Al Hadd 
12. Hateeb 
13. Dhi Nakhib 
1 . Gian . 
2. Zingubar 
3. Al Makhzan 







1 1 . Rusd 
12. Al Khubar 
13. Al Hussn 
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SHABWAH 
1 . Tumnah 
2. Usa i lan 
3. Lasaleeb 
4 . Al Wuhud 
5. Naqab Al Hagr 
1 . 3 May 
2. 9 Ju l y 
3. 10 Ju ly 
4 . 11 Ju ly 
5. 4 September 
6. 5 September 
7. Red Flag 
8. Revolut ion march 
9. Irmah 
HADHRAMOUT 
1 . Mayfa' Hagr 
2. Bour 
3. Guaima 
4 . Baala l 
5. Ar Rudood 
6 . Al Qatn 



















Animal Husbandry Farms 
1 . B i r Ahmed 
2. Ga'awala 
3. A l -F i yush 







Area & Product ion of Crops on State Farms : 1975-85 
: '000 feddans 
i : Tonnes/feddan 
i c t i o n : '000 tonnes 
ACTUAL PLANNED 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1982 1984 1985 
leat 
-ea 0.6 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.2 
e ld 0.81 0.78 0.73 0.55 0.70 0.69 0.64 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.90 
'oduc t ion 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.6 1 .9 
:her Cereals &Lequmes 
'ea - - - - 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 .0 
e ld - - - - 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 
•oduct ion - - - - - - 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
nq Stap le Cotton 
-ea 1.3 2.6 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
e ld 0.48 0.28 0.46 0.63 0.53 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.54 0.56 0.59 
•oduction 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
dium Staple Cotton 
•ea - - - - 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 
e l d - - - - 0.43 0.40 0.49 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.63 
oduc t ion - • - - - 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 
bacco 
ea 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 O.o 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 
e ld 0.50 0.40 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.08 1.09 1 .10 0.27 
oduc t ion 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 




1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
( E s t . ) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Tomatoes 
Area 2.4 3.2 3.3 1.9 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 
Y ie ld 3.58 2.93 2.41 3.39 3.98 5.36 5.78 5.98 6.25 6.54 6.92 
Production 7.4 9.3 5.5 6.6 5.4 7.2 5.3 6.1 6.9 7.8 8.9 
Other Vegetables 
Area 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.9 
Y ie ld 3.04 2.13 1.69 1.75 1.78 3.12 3.50 3.80 4.10 4.50 4.90 
Production 2.1 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.5 2.8 4.1 5.4 7.2 9.2 
Dates 
Area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Y ie ld - - 0.25 1,25 1.50 1.75 1.20 1.36 1.55 1.77 2.05 
Production - - 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Bananas 
Area 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 
Yie ld 5.90 6.26 8.06 6.36 6.85 6.94 7.23 7.61 8.02 8.45 8.90 
Production 
i 
8.5 8.8 8.0 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.7 9.9 11.2 12.7 14.2 
Source : Department of Planning and S t a t i s t i c s . MAAR 
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Area & Production of Crops in Cooperatives : 1975-85 
ea: '000 feddans 
e l d : Tonnes/feddan 














































































































10.0 9.5 9.5 10.2 10.2 9.9 9.9 9.9 
0.49 0.63 0.63 0,64 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.90 
4.9 6.0 6.0 6.5 7.1 7.5 8.1 8.9 
0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 
0.26 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.44 0.50 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 
11.3 10.0 10.2 14.6 16.1 17.4 19.0 20.5 
0.62 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.59 
7.0 4.3 4.3 5.9 8.4 9.4 10.6 12.1 
6.0 4.8 4.8 5.3 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.7 
0.50 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.63 
3.0 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.4 3.8 4.2 
0.6 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 
0.76 1.15 1.00 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.10 1.11 
0.4 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 2.0 
2,2 2.3 1 .9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 
4.22 4.72 5.16 5.59 5.89 6.27 6.68 




2.5 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.5 3.6 3.9 4.2 
3.07 3.56 3.12 3.50 3.80 4.10 4.50 4.90 
7.8 10.0 8.7 10.5 13.1 15.0 17.6 20.7 
6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 
0.75 0.75 0.95 1.20 1.36 1.55 1.77 2.05 
5.2 5.2 6.6 8.3 9.4 10.8 12.3 14.2 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
8.97 10.97 11.07 8.29 8.53 8.83 9.13 9.45 
2.6 3.3 3.3 2.5 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.8 
irce Department of Planning and S t a t i s t i c s MAAR. 
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Total Area & Production of Crops : 1975-85 
Area: '000-feddans 
Y i e l d : Tonnes/feddan 
Production: '000 tonnes 
Wheat 
Area 
Y ie ld 
Production 
lOther Cereals & 
Legume? 
Area 












Y ie ld 
Production 
ACTUAL PLANNED 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
8.9 16.1 14.4 13.7 13.2 13.2 15.0 15.3 15.2 15.4 15.6 
0.99 0.62 0.60 0.49 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.90 






































































3.5 6.9 4.4 
3.26 2.28 3.12 





























































5.0 4.0 5.6 3.9 
2.49 3.63 2.90 2.78 
12.4 14.4 16.2 10.8 
4.0 3.6 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.0 
4.48 5.22 5.63 6.09 6,26 6.63 7.09 
17,7 18.8 17.5 19.6 22.0 24.9 28.7 
4.2 4.1 4.3 5,1 5.5 6.0 6.6 
3.22 3.12 3.50 3.80 4.10 4.50 4.90 





















































1.9 2.0 2.1 
8.19 8.59 9.00 
15.6 17.2 18.9 
Sou rce : Department of Planning and S t a t i s t i c s MAAR. 
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